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 I. Introduction 
 
 
 A. Inclusion of the topic in the Commission’s programme of work 
 
 
1. At its sixty-fifth session, in 2013, the International Law Commission decided 
to place the topic “Crimes against humanity” on its long-term programme of work.1 
After debate within the Sixth Committee in 2013,2 the General Assembly took note 
of this development.3 At its sixty-sixth session, in 2014, the Commission decided to 
move this topic onto its current programme of work and to appoint a Special 
Rapporteur. After debate within the Sixth Committee in 2014, the General Assembly 
took note of this step as well.4 
 
 
 B. Purpose and structure of the present report 
 
 
2. The purpose of the present report is to address the potential benefits of 
developing draft articles that might serve as the basis of an international convention 
on crimes against humanity. Further, the report provides general background with 
respect to the emergence of the concept of crimes against humanity as an aspect of 
international law, its application by international courts and tribunals and its 
incorporation in the national laws of some States. Ultimately, the report proposes 
two draft articles: one on prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity 
and the other on the definition of such crimes.  
3. Section II of this report assesses the potential benefits resulting from a 
convention on crimes against humanity, which, if adhered to by States, include 
promoting the adoption of national laws that contain a widely accepted definition of 
such crimes and that allow for a broad ambit of jurisdiction when an offender is 
present in territory under the jurisdiction of the State party. Such a convention could 
also contain provisions obligating States parties to prevent crimes against humanity, 
to cooperate on mutual legal assistance for the investigation and prosecution of such 
crimes in national courts and to extradite or prosecute alleged offenders. This 
section notes the reactions of States in 2013-2014 to the Commission’s selection of 
this topic, which were largely favourable, but which in some instances raised 
questions about the relationship of such a convention to other treaty regimes.  
4. Consequently, section II also considers the relationship of such a convention to 
other treaty regimes, notably the Rome Statute establishing the International 
Criminal Court.5 The International Criminal Court stands at the centre of efforts to 
__________________ 
 1  See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-Fifth Session, U.N. 
GAOR, 68th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/68/10, at 116, para. 170 and Annex B (2013). 
 2  See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-Third and Sixty-Fifth 
Sessions: Topical Summary of the Discussion Held in the Sixth Committee of the General 
Assembly During Its Sixty-Eighth Session, Prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/666, 
at 17-18, para. 72 (2014) (hereinafter “Topical Summary”); see also infra Part II(B). 
 3  See G.A. Res. 68/112, para. 8 (Dec. 18, 2013). 
 4  See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-Sixth Session, 
U.N. GAOR, 69th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/69/10, at 247, para. 266 (2014) (hereinafter 
“2014 Report”); G.A. Res. 69/118, para. 7 (Dec. 10, 2014). For discussion of the debate in the 
Sixth Committee, see infra Part II(B). 
 5  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (hereinafter 
“Rome Statute”). 
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address genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and is one of the 
signature achievements in the field of international law. With 122 States parties as at 
January 2015, the Rome Statute provides a critical means for investigating and 
prosecuting these crimes at the international level. A convention on crimes against 
humanity could help promote the investigation and prosecution of such crimes at the 
national level, thereby enhancing the complementarity system upon which the 
International Criminal Court is built, as well as promoting inter-State cooperation 
not addressed by the Rome Statute. 
5. Section III of this report provides general background with respect to the 
emergence of crimes against humanity as a concept of international law, including 
its progression from a crime associated with international armed conflict to a crime 
that can occur whenever there is a widespread or systematic attack directed against 
a civilian population by means of certain heinous acts. Further, section III notes the 
existence and application of crimes against humanity by contemporary international 
criminal tribunals, including the International Criminal Court. As noted above, the  
Court is built upon the principle of complementarity, whereby in the first instance 
the relevant crimes should be prosecuted in national courts, if national authorities 
are able and willing to investigate and prosecute the crime. With that in mind, 
section III also considers whether States have adopted national laws on crimes 
against humanity; whether those laws coincide with the definition of these crimes 
contained in article 7 of the Rome Statute; and whether those laws provide the State 
with the means to exercise jurisdiction over crimes occurring in its territor y, crimes 
committed by its nationals, crimes that harm its nationals and/or crimes committed 
abroad by non-nationals against non-nationals in situations where the offender is 
present in the State’s territory. 
6. Section IV notes that a wide range of existing multilateral conventions can 
serve as potential models for a convention on crimes against humanity, including 
those that promote prevention, criminalization and inter-State cooperation with 
respect to transnational crimes. Such conventions address offences such as 
genocide, war crimes, State-sponsored torture, enforced disappearance, 
transnational corruption and organized crime, crimes against internationally 
protected persons and terrorism-related offences. Likewise, multilateral conventions 
on extradition, mutual legal assistance and statutes of limitation can provide 
important guidance with respect to those issues.  
7. Section V assesses the general obligation that exists in various treaty regimes 
for States to prevent and punish crimes. Since the obligation to punish is to be 
addressed in greater detail in subsequent draft articles, this part focuses on the 
obligation to prevent as it exists in numerous multilateral treaties, and considers the 
contours of such an obligation as discussed in the comments of treaty bodies, United 
Nations resolutions, case law and the writings of publicists. In light of such 
information, section V proposes an initial draft article that broadly addresses 
“prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity”. 
8. Section VI turns to the definition of “crimes against humanity” for the purpose 
of the present draft articles. Article 7 of the Rome Statute marks the culmination of 
almost a century of development of the concept of crimes against humanity and 
expresses the core elements of the crime. In particular, the crime involves a 
“widespread or systematic attack”; an attack “directed against any civilian 
population”, which means a course of conduct “pursuant to or in furtherance of a 
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State or organizational policy to commit such attack”; a perpetrator who has 
“knowledge of the attack”; and an attack that occurs by means of the multiple 
commission of certain specified acts, such as murder, torture or rape. Contemporary 
case law of the International Criminal Court is refining and clarifying the meaning 
of such terms, relying to a degree on the jurisprudence of earlier tribunals. In 
recognition that the definition contained in article 7 of the Rome Statute is now 
widely accepted among States, and out of a desire to promote harmony bet ween 
national and international efforts to address the crime, the proposed draft article 
uses the exact same definition of “crimes against humanity” as appears in article 7, 
except for three non-substantive changes that are necessary given the different 
context in which the definition is being used (such as replacing references to 
“Statute” with “present draft articles”).  
9. Finally, section VII briefly addresses the future programme of work on this 
topic. 
 
 
 II. Why a convention on crimes against humanity? 
 
 
 A. Objectives of a convention on crimes against humanity  
 
 
10. As noted in the proposal for the topic adopted by the Commission at its 
sixty-fifth session in 2013, in the field of international law three core crimes generally 
make up the jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals: war crimes; genocide; and 
crimes against humanity. Only two of these crimes (war crimes and genocide) are the 
subject of a global treaty that requires States to prevent and punish such conduct and 
to cooperate among themselves toward those ends. By contrast, there is no such treaty 
dedicated to preventing and punishing crimes against humanity.  
11. Yet crimes against humanity may be more prevalent than either genocide or 
war crimes. Such crimes may occur in situations not involving armed conflict and 
do not require the special intent that is necessary for establishing genocide. 6 
Moreover, treaties focused on prevention, punishment and inter-State cooperation 
exist for many far less egregious offences, such as corruption, bribery or organized 
crime. While some treaties address offences, such as State-sponsored torture or 
enforced disappearance of persons, which under certain conditions might also 
constitute crimes against humanity, those treaties do not address crimes against 
humanity as such. 
12. As such, a global convention on prevention, punishment and inter-State 
cooperation with respect to crimes against humanity appears to be a key missing 
piece in the current framework of international law and, in particular, internat ional 
humanitarian law, international criminal law and international human rights law. 
__________________ 
 6  See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, para. 139 (hereinafter 2015 Croatia v. Serbia 
Genocide Judgment) (“The Court recalls that, in 2007, it held that the intent to destroy a 
national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such is specific to genocide and distinguishes it 
from other related criminal acts such as crimes against humanity and persecution.”) (citing to 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro) , Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, at 
paras. 187-188 (hereinafter 2007 Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro Genocide 
Judgment)). 
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Such a convention could help to stigmatize such egregious conduct, could draw 
further attention to the need for its prevention and punishment and could help to 
adopt and harmonize national laws relating to such conduct, thereby opening the 
door to more effective inter-State cooperation on prevention, investigation, 
prosecution and extradition for such crimes. In building a network of cooperation, 
as has been done with respect to other offences, sanctuary would be denied to 
offenders, thereby — it is hoped — helping both to deter such conduct ab initio and 
to ensure accountability ex post.7  
13. Hence, the overall objective for this topic will be to draft articles for what 
could become a convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against 
humanity (hereinafter “convention on crimes against humanity” or “convention”). 
Using the definition of crimes against humanity embodied in the Rome Statute, the 
convention could require all States parties to take effective measures to prevent 
crimes against humanity in any territory under their jurisdiction. One such measure 
would be for States parties to criminalize the offence in its entirety in their national 
law, a step that most States have not yet taken. Further, the convention could require 
each State party to exercise jurisdiction not just with respect to acts that occur on its 
territory or by its nationals, but also with respect to acts committed abroad by 
non-nationals who later are present in territory under the State party’s jurisdiction. 
14. Moreover, the convention could require robust inter-State cooperation by the 
parties for investigation, prosecution and punishment of the offence, including 
through the provision of mutual legal assistance and extradition. The convention 
could also impose an aut dedere aut judicare obligation when an alleged offender is 
present in territory under a State party’s jurisdiction. The convention could also 
contain other relevant obligations, such as an obligation for compulsory dispute 
settlement between States parties whenever a dispute arises with respect to the 
interpretation or application of the convention.  
15. The convention would not address other serious crimes, such as genocide or  
war crimes, which are already the subject of widely-adhered-to global treaties 
relating to their prevention and punishment. An argument can be made that existing 
global treaties on genocide and war crimes could be updated through a new 
instrument, and there is support among some States8 and non-State actors9 for an 
__________________ 
 7  For calls within the academic community for such a convention, see M.C. Bassiouni, “‘Crimes 
against Humanity’: The Need for a Specialized Convention,” Columbia J. of Transnat’l L., 
vol. 31, p. 457 (1994); M.C. Bassiouni, “Crimes against Humanity: the Case for a Specialized 
Convention,” Washington University Global Studies L. Rev. , vol. 9, p. 575 (2010); L. Sadat 
(ed.), Forging a Convention for Crimes against Humanity (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 
(completed as part of an initiative of the Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute at Washington 
University in St. Louis); M. Bergsmo & T. Song (eds.), On the Proposed Crimes Against 
Humanity Convention (Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2014). 
 8  See “Towards a Multilateral Treaty for Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition for Domestic 
Prosecution of the Most Serious International Crimes,” a non-paper informally circulated by 
Argentina, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Slovenia at the Sixth Committee in November 2013. 
A resolution on this initiative was presented before the UN Conference on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice (CCPCJ), but was withdrawn after extensive debate in the Committee of the 
Whole, where several delegations raised “serious concerns” regarding the competence of the 
CCPCJ in this matter. See CCPCJ Report on the Twenty-Second Session (7 December 2012 and 
22-26 April 2013), Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Supp. No. 10, 
U.N. Doc. E/2013/30, paras. 64-66 (2013). 
 9  See M. Zgonec-Rožej and J. Foakes, International Criminals: Extradite or Prosecute?, Chatham 
House Briefing Paper No. IL BP 2013/01, at 16 (July 2013).  
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expanded initiative of that kind. Bearing in mind that several States have suggested 
that work on this topic should complement rather than overlap with existing legal 
regimes,
10
 the present topic focuses on the most prominent gap in such regimes, 
where the need for a new instrument appears the greatest. The Commission, of 
course, remains open to the views of States and others as it proceeds with this topic, 
and ultimately it will be for States to decide whether the scope of the Commission’s 
work is optimal. 
 
 
 B. Reactions by States  
 
 
16. In the course of the debate within the Sixth Committee in the fall of 2013, 
several delegations supported adding the topic of crimes against humanity to the 
Commission’s agenda,11 and noted the value of having such a convention. For 
example, the Nordic countries indicated that:  
 [R]obust inter-State cooperation for the purposes of investigation, prosecution 
and punishment of these crimes is crucial, as is the obligation to extradite or 
prosecute alleged offenders, regardless of their nationality. It is therefore 
important that the Commission’s work on Crimes against humanity include a 
legal analysis of the obligation to extradite or prosecute. Moreover, it is 
equally important that clear principles on the latter be identified. Additional 
clarity on the scope of application of this obligation would help to ensure 
maximum effect and compliance with existing rules.12  
17. At the same time, other delegations cautioned that such a convention must be 
addressed in a prudent manner,13 with a particular emphasis on avoiding any 
conflicts with existing international regimes, including the International Criminal 
Court.14 A few delegations expressed doubts about whether a convention on this 
__________________ 
 10  See, e.g., Topical Summary, supra note 2, at 18, para. 72. 
 11  Austria (A/C.6/68/SR.17, para. 74); Czech Republic (A/C.6/68/SR.18, para. 102); Italy 
(A/C.6/68/SR.19, para. 10); Japan (available at https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/ 
703457/japan-part-1.pdf); Mongolia (A/C.6/68/SR.19, para. 79); Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway and Sweden (per Norway, A/C.6/68/SR.17, para. 36); Peru (A/C.6/68/SR.18, para. 28); 
United States (A/C.6/68/SR.17, para. 51). 
 12  Statement to the Sixth Committee by Norway on behalf of the Nordic Countries, at 5 (Oct. 28, 
2013), available at https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/703463/norway-part-1.pdf. 
 13  China (A/C.6/68/SR.19, para. 61); India (ibid., para. 21); Malaysia (ibid., para. 33); Romania 
(A/C.6/68/SR.18, para. 116); Spain (A/C.6/68/SR.17, para. 133); United Kingdom 
(A/C.6/68/SR.18, para. 22). 
 14  See, e.g., Statement to the Sixth Committee by Malaysia, para. 3 (Oct. 30, 2013), available at 
https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/703723/malaysia-rev.pdf (“Malaysia is of the view 
that the study should not undermine the intended universality of the Rome Statute. In addition, 
any further work on this should not overlap with existing regimes, but rather to complement 
it.”); Statement to the Sixth Committee by the United Kingdom (Oct. 28-30, 2013), available at 
https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/703573/uk-rev.pdf (stressing “that any new 
conventions in this area must be consistent with and complementary to the ICC Statute”); 
Statement to the Sixth Committee by Spain, at 2 (Oct. 28, 2013), available at 
https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/703785/spain-e.pdf (“should [this ILC topic] be 
undertaken, it will require a careful analysis both of the specific limitation aspects to be 
included in the relevant Convention and, particularly, its precise relationship with the Rome 
Statute and the role of the International Criminal Court without overstepping their provisions. ”); 
Statement to the Sixth Committee by Norway (on behalf of the Nordic countries), supra note 12: 
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topic was really needed,15 while a few others supported the drafting of a new 
convention but with a scope wider than crimes against humanity.16  
18. Most of the 23 States that addressed the issue before the Sixth Committee in 
the fall of 2014 welcomed the inclusion of this topic on the Commission’s current 
programme of work.17 Three States did not expressly support the topic, but 
acknowledged that a gap exists in current treaty regimes with respect to crimes 
against humanity, which can benefit from further study,18 while yet another State 
maintained that the topic should be “treated with great caution”.19 Four States, 
however, expressed the view that there exists no lacuna in the existing international 
law framework in relation to crimes against humanity, given the existence of the 
Rome Statute.20 Finally, two States favoured pursuing a new convention, but in an 
alternative forum and with an alternative approach that would emphasize a wider 
range of crimes, but for narrower purposes limited to extradition and mutual legal 
assistance.21 
19. In commenting favourably, States mentioned that work on this topic would 
help develop international criminal law22 and would build upon the Commission’s 
prior work,23 such as by considering how an extradite-or-prosecute regime might 
operate for crimes against humanity.24 At the same time, several States expressed 
the view that work on this topic must avoid conflicts with existing legal 
instruments, notably the Rome Statute.25 On balance, the views of Governments at 
present appear to be that there is value in developing a new convention, but that it 
must be pursued carefully, with particular attention to its relationship to existing 
international regimes, especially the Rome Statute.  
__________________ 
   [W]hile development on this topic towards a further operationalization of the recognition 
of a duty of prevention and obligations of inter-state cooperation is highly welcome, the 
Nordic states underline that no such obligations can be construed so as to limit either 
already existing, similar obligations vis-à-vis other crimes, or already existing legal 
obligations in this field. 
 15  France (A/C.6/68/SR.17, para. 106); Iran (Islamic Republic of) (available at 
https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/1156427/iran.pdf, at 7); Russian Federation 
(A/C.6/68/SR.19, para. 56); South Africa (A/C.6/68/SR.18, paras. 51-58). 
 16  Netherlands (A/C.6/68/SR.18, para. 37); Slovenia (A/C.6/68/SR.21, para. 56). 
 17  Austria (A/C.6/69/SR.19, para. 111); Croatia (A/C.6/69/SR.20, paras. 92-93); Czech Republic 
(ibid., para. 10); El Salvador (ibid., para. 91); Finland on behalf of the Nordic countries 
(A/C.6/69/SR.19, para. 81); Israel (A/C.6/69/SR.20, para. 67); Jamaica (A/C.6/69/SR.27, 
para. 33); Japan (A/C.6/69/SR.20, para. 49); Republic of Korea (A/C.6/69/SR.21, para. 45); 
Mongolia (A/C.6/69/SR.24, para. 94); New Zealand (A/C.6/69/SR.21, para. 33); Poland 
(A/C.6/69/SR.20, para. 36); Spain (A/C.6/69/SR.21, para. 42); Trinidad and Tobago 
(A/C.6/69/SR.26, para. 118); United States (A/C.6/69/SR.20, para. 121). 
 18  Chile (A/C.6/69/SR.24, para. 52); Italy (A/C.6/69/SR.22, para. 53); United Kingdom 
(A/C.6/69/SR.19, para. 160). 
 19  Romania (A/C.6/69/SR.19, para. 147). 
 20  France (A/C.6/69/SR.22, para. 37); Malaysia (A/C.6/69/SR.27, para. 54); Netherlands 
(A/C.6/69/SR.20, paras. 15-16); South Africa (ibid., para. 114). 
 21  The Netherlands (A/C.6/69/SR.20, paras. 15-17); Ireland (A/C.6/69/SR.19, para. 177). 
 22  Croatia (A/C.6/69/SR.20, para. 94); Japan (ibid., para. 49). 
 23  Croatia (ibid., paras 94-97); Czech Republic (ibid., para. 10). 
 24  Chile (A/C.6/69/SR.24, para. 52); Finland (on behalf of the Nordic countries) (A/C.6/69/SR.19, 
para. 82); United Kingdom (ibid., para. 159). 
 25  Chile (A/C.6/69/SR.24, para. 52); Italy (A/C.6/69/SR.22, para. 53); Mongolia (A/C.6/69/SR.24, 
paras 94-95); Romania (A/C.6/69/SR.19, para. 147;) Trinidad and Tobago (A/C.6/69/SR.26, 
para. 118); United Kingdom (A/C.6/69/SR.19, para. 160). 
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 C. Relationship of a convention on crimes against humanity to other 
treaties, including the Rome Statute 
 
 
20. The relationship of a convention on crimes against humanity to other treaties 
is an extremely important issue that will guide the Commission in its work. Many of 
the acts that fall within the scope of crimes against humanity (when they are done as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population) are 
also acts addressed in existing treaty regimes, such as the 1948 Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide26 and the 1984 Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 27 
A convention on crimes against humanity should build upon the text and techniques 
of relevant existing treaty regimes, but should also avoid any conflicts with those 
regimes. 
21. In particular, a convention on crimes against humanity should avoid any 
conflicts with the Rome Statute. Certainly the drafting of a new convention should 
draw upon the language of the Rome Statute, as well as associated instruments and 
jurisprudence, whenever appropriate. But the new convention should avoid any 
conflicts with the Rome Statute, given the large number of States that have adhered 
to it. For example, in the event that a State party to the Rome Statute receives a 
request from the International Criminal Court for the surrender of a person to the  
Court and also receives a request from another State for extradition of the person 
pursuant to the proposed convention, article 90 of the Rome Statute pro vides a 
procedure to resolve the competing requests. The draft articles should be crafted to 
ensure that States parties to the Rome Statute can follow that procedure even after 
joining the convention on crimes against humanity. Moreover, in several ways the 
adoption of a convention could promote desirable objectives not addressed in the 
Rome Statute, while simultaneously supporting the mandate of the International 
Criminal Court. 
22. First, the Rome Statute regulates relations between its States parties and  the 
International Criminal Court, but does not regulate matters among the parties 
themselves (nor among parties and non-parties). In other words, the Rome Statute is 
focused on the “vertical” relationship of States to the International Criminal Court, 
but not the “horizontal” relationship of inter-State cooperation. Part 9 of the Rome 
Statute on “International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance” implicitly 
acknowledges that inter-State cooperation on crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court should continue to operate outside the Rome Statute, 
but does not direct itself to the regulation of that cooperation. A convention on 
crimes against humanity could expressly address inter-State cooperation on the 
investigation, apprehension, prosecution and punishment in national legal systems 
of persons who commit crimes against humanity,28 an objective fully consistent 
with the Rome Statute’s object and purpose. 
23. Second, the International Criminal Court is focused upon punishment of 
persons for the crimes within its jurisdiction, not upon steps that should be taken by 
__________________ 
 26  Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 1021 (hereinafter Genocide Convention). 
 27  Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (hereinafter Convention against Torture).  
 28  See L. Olson, “Re-enforcing Enforcement in a Specialized Convention on Crimes Against 
Humanity: Inter-State Cooperation, Mutual Legal Assistance, and the Aut Dedere Aut Judicare 
Obligation,” in L. Sadat (ed.), Forging a Convention for Crimes against Humanity , supra 
note 7, p. 323. 
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States to prevent such crimes before they happen. As discussed in greater detail in 
section V below, a new convention on crimes against humanity could include 
obligations relating to prevention that draw upon comparable obligations in other 
treaties, such as the Genocide Convention and the Convention against Torture. As 
such, a convention on crimes against humanity could clarify a State ’s obligation to 
prevent crimes against humanity and provide a basis for holding States accountable 
in that regard. 
24. Third, while the International Criminal Court is a key international institution 
for prosecution of high-level persons who commit these crimes, the Court was not 
designed (nor given the resources) to prosecute all persons responsible for crimes 
against humanity. Rather, the Court is predicated on the notion that, in the first 
instance, national jurisdictions are the proper place for prosecution in the event that 
appropriate national laws are in place (the principle of complementarity).29 Further, 
in some circumstances the Court may wish to transfer a suspect in its custody for 
prosecution in a national jurisdiction, but may be unable to do so if the national 
jurisdiction is not capable of charging the suspect with crimes against humanity.30 
Given that the Court does not have the capacity to prosecute all persons responsible 
for crimes against humanity, or to strengthen national legal systems in this regard, a 
new convention could help reinforce the Court by developing greater capacity at the 
national level for prevention and punishment of such crimes.31  
25. Fourth, and relatedly, a convention on crimes against humanity would require 
the enactment of national laws that criminalize crimes against humanity, something 
which, as discussed in section II, currently many States have not done, including 
many States parties to the Rome Statute. In particular, a convention could require 
States to exercise jurisdiction over an offender present in it s territory even when the 
offender is a non-national and committed the crime abroad.32 Upon joining the 
convention, States without such laws would be expressly obliged to enact them. 
States with such laws would be obliged to review them to determine whether  they 
encompass the full range of heinous conduct covered by the convention, and allow 
for the exercise of jurisdiction over offenders.  
__________________ 
 29  M. El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law: Origin, 
Development and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008); J. Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome 
Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions  (Oxford, 2008). 
 30  Such circumstances arose, for example, before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
in the Bagaragaza case. See Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Appeals Chamber, Decision on 
Rule 11bis Appeal, Case No. ICTR-05-86-AR11bis, para. 18 (Aug. 30, 2006) (“the Appeals 
Chamber cannot sanction the referral of a case to a jurisdiction for trial where the conduct 
cannot be charged as a serious violation of international humanitarian law”). 
 31  See Statement to the Sixth Committee by Austria, at 5 (Oct. 28, 2013), available at 
https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/703455/austria-part-1.pdf (“The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court certainly cannot be the last step in the endeavor to prosecute such 
crimes and to combat impunity. The Court is only able to deal with a few major perpetrators, but 
this does not take away the primary responsibility of states to prosecute crimes against 
humanity.”). 
 32  See P. Akhavan, “The Universal Repression of Crimes against Humanity before National 
Jurisdictions: The Need for a Treaty-Based Obligation to Prosecute,” in L. Sadat (ed.), Forging 
a Convention for Crimes against Humanity , supra note 7, p. 28, at 31 (noting that “whatever 
implicit duty to prosecute may arguably exist [in the Rome Statute] does not extend to universal 
jurisdiction” and that, as of 2009, only eleven European Union and eight African Union States 
have enacted laws allowing for such jurisdiction with respect to crimes against humanity). 
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26. As such, rather than conflict with other treaty regimes, a well -designed 
convention on crimes against humanity could help fill a gap33 in existing treaty 
regimes and, in doing so, simultaneously reinforce those regimes.  
 
 
 III. Background to crimes against humanity 
 
 
 A. Concept of crimes against humanity  
 
 
27. The concept of “crimes against humanity” is generally seen as having two 
broad features. First, the crime is so heinous that it is viewed as an attack on the 
very quality of being human.34 Second, the crime is so heinous that it is an attack 
not just upon the immediate victims, but also against all humanity, and hence the 
entire community of humankind has an interest in its punishment. It has been noted:  
 Whilst rules proscribing war crimes address the criminal conduct of a 
perpetrator towards an immediate protected object, rules proscribing crimes 
against humanity address the perpetrator ’s conduct not only towards the 
immediate victim but also towards the whole of humankind … Because of 
their heinousness and magnitude they constitute egregious attacks on human 
dignity, on the very notion of humaneness. They consequently affect, or should 
affect, each and every member of mankind, whatever his or her nationality, 
ethnic group and location.35  
28. As discussed below, the concept “crimes against humanity” has evolved over 
the past century, with watershed developments in the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Charter) and the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Charter), and important refinements in the statutes 
and case law of contemporary international criminal tribunals, including the 
International Criminal Court.36 Although the codification and application of the 
__________________ 
 33  See, e.g., Statement to the Sixth Committee by Slovenia, at 7 (Oct. 30, 2013),  available at 
https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/703847/slovenia.pdf (“This legal gap in the 
international law has been recognised for some time and is particularly evident in the field of 
State cooperation, including mutual legal assistance and extradition. We believe all efforts 
should be directed at filling this gap.”) 
 34  Hannah Arendt characterized the Holocaust as a “new crime, the crime against humanity — in 
the sense of a crime ‘against human status,’ or against the very nature of mankind.” H. Arendt, 
Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil , at 268 (Viking Press, 1965). 
 35  Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, ICTY Case No. IT-96-22-A, para. 21  
(Oct. 7, 1997) (hereinafter “Erdemović 1997”) (Joint Separate Opinion of Judges McDonald and 
Judge Vohrah); see D. Luban, “A Theory of Crimes against Humanity,” Yale J. of Int’l L., vol. 29, 
at 85, para. 90 (2004) (“We are creatures whose nature compels us to live socially, but who cannot 
do so without artificial political organization that inevitably poses threats to our well -being, and, 
at the limit, to our very survival. Crimes against humanity represent the worst of those threats; 
they are the limiting case of politics gone cancerous.”); see also R. Vernon, “What is Crime 
against Humanity?”, J. of Pol. Phil., vol. 10, p. 231 (2002); C. Macleod, “Towards a Philosophical 
Account of Crimes against Humanity,” European J. of Int’l L., vol. 21, p. 281 (2010). 
 36  See generally B. Ricci, Crimes against Humanity: A Historical Perspective (iUniverse, 2004); 
O. López Goldaracena, Derecho internacional y crímenes contra la humanidad (Asociación 
Americana de Juristas, 2006); P. Parenti (ed.), Los crímenes contra la humanidad y el genocidio 
en el derecho internacional: origen y evolución de las figuras, elementos típicos, jurisprudencia 
internacional (Ad-Hoc, 2007); M.C. Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity: Historical Evolution 
and Contemporary Application (Cambridge University Press, 2011); N. Geras, Crimes against 
Humanity: Birth of a Concept (Manchester University Press, 2011). 
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crime has led to some doctrinal divergences, the concept contains several basic 
elements that are common across all formulations of the crime. The crime i s an 
international crime; it matters not whether the national law of the territory in which 
the act was committed has criminalized the conduct. The crime is directed against a 
civilian population and hence has a certain scale or systematic nature that gene rally 
extends beyond isolated incidents of violence or crimes committed for purely 
private purposes. The crime can be committed within the territory of a single State 
or can be committed across borders. Finally, the crime concerns the most heinous 
acts of violence and persecution known to humankind. A wide range of scholarship 
has analysed these various elements.37 
__________________ 
 37  E. Schwelb, “Crimes against Humanity,” British Yearbook of International Law , vol. 23, p. 181 
(1946); J. Dautricourt, “Crime against Humanity: European Views on its Conception and its 
Future,” J. of Crim. L. and Criminology, vol. 40, p. 170 (1949); J. Graven, “Les Crimes contre 
l’Humanité,” Recueil des Cours, vol. 1950-I, p. 433 (1950); E. Aronéanu, Le Crime Contre 
l’Humanité (Dalloz, 1961); P. Ramella, Crímenes contra la humanidad (Ediciones Depalma, 
1986); P. Ramella, Crimes contra a humanidade (Forense, 1987); P. Sturma, “Knávrhu kodexu 
zlocinu proti míru a bezpecnosti lidstva,” Praìvniìk, vol. 128 (9/10), p. 879 (1989); G. Richard 
(ed.), L’Histoire Inhumaine: Massacres et Génocides des Origines à Nos Jours (A. Colin, 
1992); M. Delmas-Marty et al., “Le crime contre l’humanité, les droits de l’homme et 
l’irréductible humain,” Revue de Science Criminelle et de Droit Pénal Comparé, vol. 11, p. 477 
(1994); A. Becker, Der Tatbestand des Verbrechens gegen die Menschlichkeit – Überlegungen 
zur Problematik eines völkerrechtlichen Strafrechts  (Duncker & Humblot, 1996); Y. Dinstein, 
“Crimes against Humanity,” in J. Makarczyk (ed.), Theory of International Law at the Threshold 
of the 21
st
 Century, Essays in Honor of Krzysztof Skubiszewski , p. 891 (Kluwer, 1996); 
M. Lippman, “Crimes Against Humanity,” Boston College Third World L. Rev., vol. 17, p. 171 
(1997); S. Chalandon & P. Nivelle, Crimes contre l’Humanité: Barbie, Bouvier, Bousquet, 
Capon (Plon, 1998); B. Van Schaack, “The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving 
the Incoherence,” Columbia J. Transnat’l L., vol. 37, p. 787 (1999); M.C. Bassiouni, Crimes 
against Humanity in International Law (Kluwer, 2d ed. 1999); J. Bazelaire & T. Cretin, 
La justice internationale, son évolution, son avenir, de Nuremberg à La Haye  (Presses 
Universitaires de France, 2000); A. Gil Gil, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, 
vol. 112, p. 381 (2000); E. Greppi, I crimini di guerra e contro l’umanità nel diritto 
internazionale (UTET, 2001); K. Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law, p. 85 (2001); 
Y. Jurovics, Réflexions sur la spécificité du crime contre l’humanité (LGDJ, 2002); 
F. Palombino, “The Overlapping between War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in 
International Criminal Law,” Italian Y.B. Int’l L., vol. 12, p. 123 (2002); A. Cassese, “Crimes 
against Humanity,” in A. Cassese et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: A Commentary, p. 375 (Oxford University Press, 2002); M. Lattimer and P. Sands (eds.), 
Justice for Crimes against Humanity (Hart Publishing, 2003); G. Manske, Verbrechen gegen die 
Menschlichkeit als Verbrechen an der Menschheit  (Duncker & Humblot, 2003); A. Romero 
Mendoza (ed.), Crímenes de lesa humanidad: un enfoque venezolano (El Nacional, 2004); 
S. Meseke, Der Tatbestand der Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit nach dem Römischen 
Statut des IStGH (Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2004); K. Ambos, Estudios de derecho 
penal internacional, p. 303 (Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, 2005); D.L. Shelton (ed.), 
Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity (Macmillan Reference, 2005); L. May, 
Crimes against Humanity: A Normative Account (Cambridge University Press, 2005);  
M Capellà i Roig, La tipificación internacional de los crímenes contra la humanidad  (Tirant lo 
Blanch, 2005); L. Moir, “Crimes against Humanity in Historical Perspective,” N.Z. Y.B. Int’l L., 
vol. 3, p. 101 (2006); K. Ambos and S. Wirth, “El Derecho Actual sobre Crímenes en Contra de 
la Humanidad,” in K. Ambos (ed.), Temas de Derecho Penal Internacional y Europeo, p. 167 
(Pons, 2006); R. C. Slye, “Refugee Jurisprudence, Crimes against Humanity, and Customary 
International Law,” in A.F. Bayefsky (ed.), Human Rights and Refugees, Internally Displaced 
Persons and Migrant Workers (2006); A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, p. 98 (Oxford 
University Press, 2nd ed. 2008); M. del Carmen Márquez Carrasco, El proceso de codificación y 
desarrollo progresivo de los crímenes contra la humanidad  (Universidad de Sevilla, 
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 B. Historical emergence of the prohibition of crimes against humanity 
 
 
29. An important forerunner of the concept of “crimes against humanity” is the 
“Martens clause” of the Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land and the Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
(1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions), the latter of which made reference to the 
“laws of humanity and the … dictates of public conscience” when crafting 
protections for persons in time of war.38 That clause is typically understood as 
indicating that, until there exists a comprehensive codification of the laws of war, 
principles of “humanity” offer residual protection.39  
30. The Hague Conventions addressed conduct occurring in inter-State armed 
conflicts, not violence by a Government directed against its own people. In the 
aftermath of the First World War, further thought was given to whether international  
law regulated atrocities inflicted domestically by a Government. In 1919, a 
__________________ 
Secretariado de Publicaciones, 2008); C. Eboe-Osuji, “Crimes against Humanity: Directing 
Attacks against a Civilian Population,” African J. of Legal Stud., vol. 2, p. 188 (2008); 
A. Morlachetti, “Imprescriptibilidad de los Crímenes de Lesa Humanidad,” in H. Romero 
Villanueva, La Prescripción Penal, p. 137 (Abeledo Perrot, 2008); M. Delmas-Marty et al., 
Le crime contre l’humanité (Presses Universitaires de France, 2009); J. Doria, “Whether Crimes 
against Humanity Are Backdoor War Crimes,” in J. Doria et al. (eds.), The Legal Regime of the 
International Criminal Court: Essays in Honor of Professor Igo Blishchenko, p. 645 (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2009); S. Kirsch, Der Begehungszusammenhang der Verbrechen gegen die 
Menschlichkeit (Peter Lang, 2009); S. Kirsch, “Two Kinds of Wrong: On the Context Element 
of Crimes against Humanity,” Leiden J. of Int’l L., vol. 22, p. 525 (2009); B. Kuschnik, Der 
Gesamttatbestand des Verbrechens gegen die Menschlichkeit: Herleitungen, Ausprägungen, 
Entwicklungen (Duncker & Humblot, 2009); S. Garibian, Le crime contre l’humanité, au regard 
des principes fondateurs de l’Etat moderne (Schulthess Verlag, 2010); E. Amati, “I Crimini 
contro l’Umanità,” in E. Amati et al. (eds.), Introduzione al Diritto Penale Internazionale , 
p. 411 (Giuffrè, 2d ed. 2010); W. van der Wolf (ed.), Crimes Against Humanity and 
International Law (International Courts Association, 2011); L. van den Herik, “Using Custom to 
Reconceptualize Crimes Against Humanity,” in S. Darcy and J. Powderly (eds.), Judicial 
Creativity at the International Criminal Tribunals (2010); M. DeGuzman, “Crimes against 
Humanity,” in B. Brown (ed.), Research Handbook on International Criminal Law , p. 62 (Edgar 
Elgar Publishing, 2011); G. Acquaviva & F. Pocar, “Crimes against Humanity,” Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law , vol. II, p. 855 (2012); J. Dondé Matute, Tipos 
Penales en el Ámbito Internacional, p. 97 (Instituto Nacional de Ciencias Penales, 2d ed. 2012); 
M. Bettati, “Le crime contre l’humanité,” in H. Ascensio et al. (eds.), Droit international pénal, 
p. 103 (Pedone, 2d ed. 2012); H.D. Bosly & D. Vandermeersch, Génocide, crimes contre 
l’humanité et crimes de guerre face à la justice (LGDJ, 2012); P.M. Dhena, Droit d’ingérence 
humanitaire et normes internationales impératives: Essai sur les crimes de guerre, crimes 
contre l’humanité et crime de génocide (l’Harmattan, 2012); C. Focarelli, Diritto 
Internazionale, vol. I, p. 485 (CEDAM, 2d ed. 2012); A. Valencia Villa, “Los Crímenes de Lesa 
Humanidad: Su Calificación en América Latina y algunos Comentarios en el Caso Colombiano, ” 
in H. Olásolo Alonso et al. (coord.), Perspectiva Iberoamericana sobre la Justicia Penal 
Internacional, vol. I, p. 119 (Tirant lo Blanch, 2012); L. Sadat, “Crimes Against Humanity in 
the Modern Age,” American J. Int’l L., vol. 107, p. 334 (2013). 
 38  Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, preamble, 
36 Stat. 2277, 187 Consol. T.S. 227. The 1907 version of the clause provides:   
   Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the high contracting 
Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted 
by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of 
the principles of the laws of nations, as they result from the usages established among 
civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience. 
 39  See T. Meron, “The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public 
Conscience,” Am. J. of Int’l L., vol. 94, p. 78 (2000). 
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Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of War and on Enforcement of 
Penalties presented a report to the post-First World War Paris Peace Conference 
which, after referencing the Martens clause, identified various crimes for which 
persons might be prosecuted with respect to conduct during the war. 40 The 
Commission advocated including atrocities by a Government against its own people 
within the scope of what would become the Treaty of Versailles, so that prosecutions 
before international and national tribunals would address crimes in violation of both 
“the established laws and customs of war” and “the elementary laws of humanity”.41 
The Commission therefore called for the establishment of an international 
commission to prosecute senior leaders, with the applicable law being “the principles 
of the law of nations as they result from the usages established among civilized 
peoples, from the laws of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience”.42 
31. No “crimes against humanity”, however, were ultimately included in articles 
228 and 229 of the Treaty of Versailles;43 those provisions relate solely to war 
crimes. As such, no prosecutions for crimes against humanity occurred rela ting to 
the First World War,44 but the seeds were sown for such prosecutions in the 
aftermath of the Second World War.45 The Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal established at Nuremberg,46 as amended by the Berlin Protocol,47 included 
“crimes against humanity” as a component of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The 
Nuremberg Charter defined such crimes in article 6(c) as:  
 murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or 
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in 
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or 
not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.  
__________________ 
 40  Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference by the Commission on the 
Responsibilities of the Authors of War and on Enforcement of Penalties (Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, Division of International Law Pamphlet No. 32, 1919), partially 
reprinted in Am. J. of Int’l L., vol. 14, p. 95 (1920). 
 41  Ibid., at 115. 
 42  Ibid., at 122; see M.C. Bassiouni, “World War I: ‘The War to End All Wars’ and the Birth of a 
Handicapped International Criminal Justice System,” Denver J. of Int’l L. & Policy, vol. 30, 
p. 244 (2002). 
 43  Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers of Germany, Arts. 228-29, June 28, 
1919, 225 C.T.S. 188, 285, 2 Bevans 43, at 136-37. 
 44  The Treaty of Peace between the Allies and Turkey, American J. of Int’l L., vol. 15, p. 179, at 
235 (Supp. 1921), included a provision on prosecution for “crimes against humanity,” but that 
treaty never entered into force. 
 45  See R. Clark, “History of Efforts to Codify Crimes Against Humanity,” in L. Sadat (ed.), 
Forging a Convention for Crimes against Humanity , supra note 7, p. 8. On the role of 
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht in developing crimes against humanity as one of the headings for 
prosecutions at Nürnberg, see E. Lauterpacht, The Life of Hersch Lauterpacht, p. 272 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010) and the review by S. Schwebel at British Yearbook 
International Law, vol. 83, p. 143 (2013). 
 46  Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European 
Axis, Annex, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6(c), Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 
280 (hereinafter Nürnberg Charter). 
 47  Protocol Rectifying Discrepancy in Text of Charter, October 6, 1945, published in Trial of the 
Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal , vol. 1 (Nürnberg 1947). The 
Berlin Protocol replaced a semi-colon after “during the war” with a comma, so as to harmonize 
the English and French texts with the Russian text. The effect of doing so was to link the first 
part of the provision to the latter part of the provision (“in connection with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal”), and hence to the existence of an international armed conflict.  
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32. This definition of crimes against humanity was linked to the existence of an 
international armed conflict; the acts only constituted crimes under international law 
if committed in execution of or in connection with “any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal”, meaning a crime against peace or a war crime. As 
such, the justification for intruding into matters that traditionally were within the 
national jurisdiction of a State was based on the crime’s connection to inter-State 
conflict. That connection, in turn, suggested heinous crimes occurring on a large-
scale, perhaps as part of a pattern of conduct.48 The International Military Tribunal, 
charged with trying the senior political and military leaders of the Third Reich, 
convicted several defendants for crimes against humanity committed during the 
war,49 though in some instances the connection of those crimes with other crimes in 
the Tribunal’s jurisdiction was tenuous.50  
33. After the first trial of senior German leaders,51 further individuals were 
convicted of crimes against humanity during the trials conducted by the occupation 
authorities pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10.52 For example, crimes against 
humanity played a part in all 12 of the subsequent trials conducted by occupation 
authorities of the United States of America.53 Control Council Law No. 10 did not 
expressly provide that crimes against humanity must be connected with a crime 
against peace or a war crime; while some of the trials maintained that connection, 
__________________ 
 48  See United Nations War Crimes Commission, History of the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission and the Development of the Laws of War , p. 179 (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 
1948) (“Only crimes which either by their magnitude and savagery or by their large number or 
by the fact that a similar pattern was applied at different times and places, endangered the 
international community or shocked the conscience of mankind, warranted intervention by 
States other than that on whose territory the crimes had been committed, or whose subjects had 
become their victims.”). 
 49  See R. Clark, “Crimes against Humanity at Nuremberg,” in G. Ginsburgs & V.N. Kudriavtsev 
(eds.), The Nuremberg Trial and International Law , p. 177 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990); 
L. Mansfield, “Crimes against Humanity: Reflections on the Fiftieth Anniversary of Nuremberg 
and a Forgotten Legacy,” Nordic J. Int’l L., vol. 64, p. 293 (1995). 
 50  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Trial Chamber, Judgment, ICTY Case No. IT-95-16-T, 
para. 576 (Jan. 24, 2000) (noting the tenuous link between the crimes against humanity 
committed by Baldur von Schirach and the other crimes within the IMT ’s jurisdiction) 
(hereinafter “Kupreškić 2000”). 
 51  Crimes against humanity were also within the jurisdiction of the Tokyo Tribunal. See Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, art. 5(c), Jan. 19, 1946, 4 Bevans 20, at 20 
(amended Apr. 26, 1946) (hereinafter Tokyo Charter). No persons, however, were convicted of 
this crime by that tribunal; rather, the convictions concerned war crimes against persons other 
than Japanese nationals that occurred outside Japan. See N. Boister & R. Cryer, The Tokyo 
International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal , at 32, 194, 328-30 (Oxford University Press, 
2008). 
 52  Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against 
Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, in Official Gazette Control Council for Germany, 
vol. 3, p. 50 (1946). Control Council Law No. 10 recognized crimes against humanity as: 
“Atrocities and offences, including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian 
population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in violation 
of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated.” Ibid., art. II(1)(c). 
 53  T. Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuernberg War Crimes Trials Under 
Control Council Law No. 10, at 69, 92, 118-19 (1949); see J. Brand, “Crimes against Humanity 
and the Nürnberg Trials,” Oregon L. Rev., vol. 28, p. 93 (1949); J. Heller, The Nuremberg 
Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law , p. 85 (Oxford University 
Press, 2011). 
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others did not.54 The Justice Case did not maintain the connection, but did 
determine that crimes against humanity entail more than isolated cases of atrocity or 
persecution and require “proof of conscious participation in systematic government 
organized or approved procedures”.55 German national courts also applied Control 
Council Law No. 10 in hundreds of cases and in doing so did not require a 
connection with war crimes or crimes against peace.56  
34. The principles of international law recognized in the Nuremberg  Charter were 
noted and reaffirmed in 1945-1946 by the General Assembly,57 which also directed 
the International Law Commission to “formulate” those principles and to prepare a 
draft code of offences.58 The Commission then studied and distilled these principles 
in 1950 as the “Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal”, which defined crimes 
against humanity in Principle VI(c) as: “Murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation and other inhuman acts done against any civilian population, or 
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or 
such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connection with any crime 
against peace or any war crime”.59 In its commentary to this principle, the 
Commission emphasized that the crime need not be committed during a war, but 
maintained that pre-war crimes must nevertheless be in connection with a crime 
against peace.60 At the same time, the Commission maintained that “acts may be 
crimes against humanity even if they are committed by the perpetrator against his 
own population”.61 
35. Although the Commission’s 1950 Nuremberg Principles continued to require a 
connection between crimes against humanity and war crimes or crimes against the 
peace, that connection was omitted in the Commission’s 1954 draft Code of 
Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind. That draft code identified as 
one of the offences against the peace and security of mankind: “Inhuman acts such 
as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or persecutions, committed 
against any civilian population on social, political, racial, religious or cultural 
grounds by the authorities of a State or by private individuals acting at the 
instigation or with the toleration of such authorities”.62 When explaining the final 
clause of that offence, the Commission said that:  
__________________ 
 54  See, e.g., United States of America v. Flick et al., 3 L.R.T.W.C. 1212–14 (1952). 
 55  See, e.g., United States of America v. Altstoetter et al.  (“Justice Case”), 3 L.R.T.W.C. 974, 982 
(1951). 
 56  See U. Vultejus, “Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit,” Strafverteidiger, vol. 12, p. 602 (1992). 
 57  See Extradition and Punishment of War Criminals , G.A. Res. 3(I), at 9-10 (Feb. 13, 1946); 
Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nürnberg 
Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1, at 188 (Dec. 11, 1946). 
 58  G.A. Res. 177(II) (Nov. 21, 1947). 
 59  Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the 
Judgment of the Tribunal, with Commentaries,  Report of the International Law Commission on 
the Work of its Second Session, U.N. GAOR, 5
th
 Sess., Supp. No. 12, principle 6(c), U.N. Doc. 
A/1316 (1950), reprinted in Yearbook of the International Law Commission , vol. 2, p. 374 (1950). 
 60  Ibid., para. 123. 
 61  Ibid., para. 124. 
 62  Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind , with Commentaries, Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of its Sixth Session, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., 
Supp. No. 9, ch. 3, art. 2(11), U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954); see D. Johnson, “The Draft Code of 
Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind,” International and Comparative Law, 
vol. 4, p. 445 (1955). 
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 in order not to characterize any inhuman act committed by a private individual 
as an international crime, it was found necessary to provide that such an act 
constitutes an international crime only if committed by the private individual 
at the instigation or with the toleration of the authorities of a State. 63 
36. There was hope that in the 1950s it would be possible to establish a permanent 
international criminal court, but the General Assembly deferred action on the 
Commission’s 1954 draft code of offences, indicating that first the crime of 
aggression should be defined.64 Some attention then focused on developing national 
laws with respect to the crime. In that regard, the 1968 Convention on the 
Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against 
Humanity called upon States to criminalize nationally “crimes against humanity” 
and to set aside statutory limitations on prosecuting the crime. 65 As the first 
definition of crimes against humanity in a multilateral convention drafted and 
adhered to by several States, it bears noting that article 1(b) referred to “[c]rimes 
against humanity whether committed in time of war or in time of peace as they are 
defined in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, of  
8 August 1945 and confirmed by resolutions 3 (I) of 13 February 1946 and 95 (I) of 
11 December 1946 of the General Assembly of the United Nations ….” 
37. Consisting of just four substantive articles, the 1968 Convention is narrowly 
focused on statutory limitations; while it does call upon States parties to take steps 
“with a view to making possible” extradition for the crime, the convention does not 
expressly obligate a party to exercise jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. As 
at January 2015, the convention has attracted adherence by 55 States.  
38. In 1981, the General Assembly invited the Commission to resume its work on 
the draft code of offences.66 In 1991, the Commission completed on first reading a 
draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind.67 The Assembly 
then invited the Commission, within the framework of the draft code, to consider 
further the question of establishing an international criminal juri sdiction to address 
such crimes, including proposals for a permanent international criminal court. 68 
Completion of the project became especially pertinent after the establishment of the 
ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and R wanda 
(discussed below), and the emergence of greater support for a permanent 
international criminal court. In 1996, the Commission completed a second reading  
 
__________________ 
 63  Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. 2, p. 150 (1954). 
 64  G.A. Res. 898 (IX) (Dec. 14, 1954); G.A. Res. 1187 (XII) (Dec. 11, 1957).  
 65  Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73; see R. Miller, “The Convention on the Non-Applicability of 
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity,” American J. of Int’l L., 
vol. 65, p. 476 (1971). For a regional convention of a similar nature, see European Convention 
on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes, 
Jan. 25, 1974, E.T.S. No. 82. As of January 2015, there are seven States Parties to this 
Convention. 
 66  G.A. Res. 36/106 (Dec. 10, 1981). 
 67  Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. 
A/46/10, at 265 (1991) (hereinafter 1991 ILC Report). The 1991 draft Code contained twenty-
six categories of crimes. 
 68  G.A. Res. 46/54 (Dec. 9, 1991). 
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of the draft code of crimes.69 The 1996 draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind listed in article 18 a series of acts that constituted crimes 
against humanity “when committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale and 
instigated or directed by a Government or by any organization or group ”.70 In 
explaining that opening clause, the Commission commented: 
  (3) The opening clause of this definition establishes the two general 
conditions which must be met for one of the prohibited acts to qualify as a 
crime against humanity covered by the Code. The first condition requires that 
the act was “committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale”. This first 
condition consists of two alternative requirements. The first alternative 
requires that the inhumane acts be “committed in a systematic manner” 
meaning pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy. The implementation of this 
plan or policy could result in the repeated or continuous commission of 
inhumane acts. The thrust of this requirement is to exclude a random act which 
was not committed as part of a broader plan or policy. The Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal did not include such a requirement. Nonetheless the 
Nuremberg Tribunal emphasized that the inhumane acts were committed as 
part of the policy of terror and were “in many cases … organized and 
systematic” in considering whether such acts constituted crimes against 
humanity. 
  (4) The second alternative requires that the inhumane acts be 
committed “on a large scale” meaning that the acts are directed against a 
multiplicity of victims. This requirement excludes an isolated inhuma ne act 
committed by a perpetrator acting on his own initiative and directed against a 
single victim. The Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal did not include this 
second requirement either. Nonetheless the Nuremberg Tribunal further 
emphasized that the policy of terror was “certainly carried out on a vast scale” 
in its consideration of inhumane acts as possible crimes against humanity. The 
term “mass scale” was used in the text of the draft code as adopted on first 
reading to indicate the requirement of a multiplicity of victims. This term was 
replaced by the term “large scale” which is sufficiently broad to cover various 
situations involving a multiplicity of victims, for example, as a result of the 
cumulative effect of a series of inhumane acts or the singular effect of an 
inhumane act of extraordinary magnitude. The first condition is formulated in 
terms of the two alternative requirements. Consequently, an act could 
constitute a crime against humanity if either of these conditions is met.  
  (5) The second condition requires that the act was “instigated or 
directed by a Government or by any organization or group”. The necessary 
instigation or direction may come from a Government or from an organization 
or a group. This alternative is intended to exclude the si tuation in which an 
individual commits an inhumane act while acting on his own initiative 
__________________ 
 69  Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind , Report of the International 
Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1996, vol. II (Part Two), at 17 (1996). The 1996 draft Code contained f ive 
categories of crimes. See E. Vargas Carreño, “El Proyecto de Código de Crímenes contra la Paz 
y la Seguridad de la Humanidad de la Comisión de Derecho Internacional,” in Liber Amicorum: 
Héctor Fix Zamudio, vol. II, p. 1523 (Secretaría de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos 
Humanos, 1998). 
 70  Ibid., at 47. 
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pursuant to his own criminal plan in the absence of any encouragement or 
direction from either a Government or a group or organization. This type of 
isolated criminal conduct on the part of a single individual would not 
constitute a crime against humanity. It would be extremely difficult for a 
single individual acting alone to commit the inhumane acts as envisaged in 
article 18. The instigation or direction of a Government or any organization or 
group, which may or may not be affiliated with a Government, gives the act its 
great dimension and makes it a crime against humanity imputable to private 
persons or agents of a State. 
  (6) The definition of crimes against humanity contained in article 18 
does not include the requirement that an act was committed in time of war or 
in connection with crimes against peace or war crimes as in the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal. The autonomy of crimes against humanity was 
recognized in subsequent legal instruments which did not include this 
requirement. … The absence of any requirement of an international armed 
conflict as a prerequisite for crimes against humanity was also confirmed by 
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: ‘It is by now a settled 
rule of customary international law that crimes against humanity do not 
require a connection to international armed conflict. ’71  
39. Since 1996, the Commission on occasion has addressed crimes against 
humanity. In 2001 the Commission indicated that the prohibition of crimes against 
humanity was “clearly accepted and recognized” as a peremptory norm of 
international law.72 The International Court of Justice has also indicated that the 
prohibition on certain acts, such as State-sponsored torture, has the character of jus 
cogens,73 which a fortiori suggests that a prohibition of the perpetration of that act 
on a widespread or systematic basis would also have the character of jus cogens. 
 
 
__________________ 
 71  Ibid., at 47-48 (footnotes omitted). 
 72  Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 26, para. 5, in Official Records of 
the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, p. 283 (2001) (maintaining that 
those “peremptory norms that are clearly accepted and recognized include the prohibition  
of … crimes against humanity”); see also Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law , Report of the Study Group 
of the International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, para. 374 (Apr. 13, 2006), as 
corrected by U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682/Corr.1 (Aug. 11, 2006) (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi) 
(identifying crimes against humanity as one of the “most frequently cited candidates for the 
status of jus cogens”); see also Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy; Greece 
intervening), I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 99, at para. 95 (indicating that the crimes against humanity 
at issue in the Arrest Warrant case “undoubtedly possess the character of jus cogens”); Case of 
Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judgment, Preliminary Objections, 
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 154, para. 96 (Sept. 26, 2006) (acknowledging the 
jus cogens status of crimes against humanity). 
 73  Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite  (Belgium v. Senegal), I.C.J. 
Reports 2012, p. 422, at para. 99; see also Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 
ICTY Case No. IT-95-17/1, para. 153 (1998); Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, E.Ct.H.R., 
Judgment, App. No. 35763/97, para. 61 (2001). 
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 C. Crimes against humanity before contemporary international and 
special courts and tribunals 
 
 
40. By its resolution 827 (1993), the Security Council established the International 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991 (International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia) and 
adopted the statute of the Tribunal. Article 5 of the statute includes “crimes against 
humanity” as part of the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia.74 That article reads: 
 
   Article 5 
   Crimes against humanity 
 
  The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons 
responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, 
whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian 
population: 
  (a) murder; 
  (b) extermination; 
  (c) enslavement; 
  (d) deportation; 
  (e) imprisonment; 
  (f) torture; 
  (g) rape; 
  (h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; 
  (i) other inhumane acts. 
Although the Secretary-General’s report proposing this article indicated that crimes 
against humanity “refer to inhumane acts of a very serious nature … committed as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on 
national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds,”75 that particular language 
was not included in the text of article 5. The formulation used in article 5 retained a 
connection to armed conflict by criminalizing specified acts “when committed in 
armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against 
any civilian population.” This formulation is best understood contextually, having 
been developed in 1993 with an understanding that armed conflict in fact existed in 
the former Yugoslavia (which had led to the exercise of the Council ’s Chapter VII 
enforcement powers), and as designed principally to dispel the notion that crimes 
against humanity had to be linked to an international armed conflict. To the extent 
that this formulation might be read to suggest that customary international law 
requires a nexus to armed conflict, the Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal later 
clarified that there was “no logical or legal basis” for retaining a connection to 
__________________ 
 74  Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (S/25704, annex), at art. 5. 
 75  Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, 
U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 13, para. 48 (May 3, 1993). 
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armed conflict, since “it has been abandoned” in State practice since Nuremberg. 
The Appeals Chamber also noted that the “obsolescence of the nexus requirement is 
evidenced by international conventions regarding genocide and apartheid, both of 
which prohibit particular types of crimes against humanity regardless of any 
connection to armed conflict”.76 Indeed, the Appeals Chamber later maintained that 
such a connection in the Statute of the Tribunal was simply circumscribing the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal, not codifying customary international 
law.77 Through its jurisprudence, the Tribunal also developed important guidance as 
to what elements must be proven when prosecuting an individual for crimes against 
humanity.78 Thereafter, a large number of defendants before the Tribunal were 
convicted of crimes against humanity.79 
41. By its resolution 955 (1994), the Security Council established the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and 
Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide And Other 
Such Violations Committed in the Territory Of Neighbouring States between 
1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 (International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda) and adopted the statute of the Tribunal. Article 3 of the statute includes 
“crimes against humanity” as part of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda.80 Although article 3 retained the same list of conduct (murder, 
extermination, etc.), the chapeau language did not retain the reference to armed 
conflict, and instead introduced the formulation from the 1993 report of the 
Secretary-General (S/25704, para. 48) of “crimes when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, 
political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds”. As such, the statute expressly provided 
that a discriminatory motive was required in order to establish the crime. Like that 
of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the jurisprudence of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda further developed the key elements that  
 
__________________ 
 76  Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 140 (Oct. 2, 1995) (hereinafter “Tadić 1995”). 
 77  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-A, paras. 
249-51 (July 15, 1999) (hereinafter Tadić 1999) (“The armed conflict requirement is satisfied by 
proof that there was an armed conflict; that is all that the Statute requires, and in so doing, it 
requires more than does customary international law”); see also Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, 
Trial Chamber, Judgment, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, para. 33 (Feb. 26, 2001) (hereinafter 
Kordić 2001). 
 78  See, e.g., Tadić 1999, paras. 227-29. 
 79  See, e.g., M.C. Roberge, “Jurisdiction of the Ad Hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda over Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide,” International Review of the Red Cross, 
vol. 321, p. 651 (1997); G. Mettraux, “Crimes against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda,” Harvard Int’l L. J., 
vol. 43, p. 237 (2002); S. Meseke, “La contribution de la jurisprudence des tribunaux pénaux 
internationaux pour l’ex-Yougoslavie et le Rwanda à la concrétisation de l’incrimination du 
crime contre l’humanité,” in M. Chiavario (ed.), La justice pénale internationale entre passé et 
avenir, p. 173 (2003); Sadat, supra note 37, at 342-46. 
 80  Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955, 
Annex at art. 3 (Nov. 8, 1994); see generally L.J. van den Herik, The Contribution of the 
Rwanda Tribunal to the Development of International Law  (Brill, 2005). 
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must be proven when prosecuting an individual for crimes against humanity.81 Here, 
too, defendants before the Tribunal were regularly convicted of crimes aga inst 
humanity.82 
42. Also in 1994, the Commission completed a draft statute for a permanent 
international criminal court, which included in article 20(d) crimes against humanity 
as part of the jurisdiction of the proposed court. In its commentary on that 
provision, the Commission noted: 
  It is the understanding of the Commission that the definition of crimes 
against humanity encompasses inhumane acts of a very serious character 
involving widespread or systematic violations aimed at the civilian population 
in whole or in part. The hallmarks of such crimes lie in their large -scale and 
systematic nature. The particular forms of unlawful act (murder, enslavement, 
deportation, torture, rape, imprisonment, etc.) are less crucial to the definition 
than the factors of scale and deliberate policy, as well as in their being targeted 
against the civilian population in whole or in part. This idea is sought to be 
reflected in the phrase “directed against any civilian population” in article 5 of 
the statute of the [International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia], but it is 
more explicitly brought out in article [18]83 of the draft code. The term 
“directed against any civilian population” should be taken to refer to acts 
committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian 
population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds. The 
particular acts referred to in the definition are acts deliberately committed as 
part of such an attack.84 
43. Thereafter, the General Assembly decided to establish an ad hoc committee to 
review the major substantive and administrative issues arising out of the draft 
statute prepared by the Commission and to consider arrangements for the convening 
of an international conference of plenipotentiaries.85 That led, in turn, to the 
establishment of a preparatory committee to discuss further the major issues arising 
out of the draft statute prepared by the Commission, with a view to preparing a 
widely acceptable consolidated text,86 which was then considered and revised 
__________________ 
 81  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Trial Chamber, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, paras. 578-98 
(Sept. 2, 1998) (hereinafter Akayesu 1998); see also van den Herik, supra note 80, at 160-96;  
R. Kolb, “The Jurisprudence of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Criminal Tribunals on their 
Jurisdiction and on International Crimes,” British Yearbook of Int’l L., vol. 71 (2000), pp. 259, 
291-300; R. Kolb, “The Jurisprudence of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Criminal Tribunals on their 
Jurisdiction and on International Crimes (2000-2004),” British Yearbook of Int’l L., vol. 75 
(2004), pp. 269, 310-326; R. Kolb, “The Jurisprudence of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Criminal 
Tribunals on their Jurisdiction and on International Crimes (2004-2013),” British Yearbook of 
Int’l L., vol. 84 (2014), p. 131 at 163-72. 
 82  See, e.g., Akayesu 1998, para. 23; see also van den Herik, supra note 80, at 151-98, 270-73; 
G. Mettraux & J. Cerone, “The Jurisprudential Contributions of the ICTR to the Legal 
Definition of Crimes against Humanity — The Evolution of the Nexus Requirement,” New 
England J. of Int’l and Comp. L., vol. 14, p. 191 (2008); Sadat, supra note 37, at 346-49. 
 83  At the time of this commentary, the relevant article in the draft Code was Article 21, as adopted 
at first reading, and subsequently renumbered to be Article 18 at second reading.  
 84  Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. 
GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10, at 40 (1994). 
 85  G.A. Res. 49/53 (Dec. 9, 1994). 
 86  G.A. Res. 50/46 (Dec. 11, 1995). 
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further at a diplomatic conference.87 That conference led to the adoption in Rome 
on 17 July 1998 of the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court.88 
As at January 2015, 122 States are parties to the Rome Statute.  
44. Article 5(1)(b) of the Rome Statute includes crimes against humanity within the  
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.89 Article 7(1) defines the crime as a 
series of acts “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack”.90 Article 7(2) further 
clarifies that such an attack “means a course of conduct involving the multiple 
commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, 
pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such 
acts”.91 Article 7, which is addressed in greater detail in section VI below, does not 
retain the nexus to an armed conflict that characterized the statute of the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, nor the discriminatory motive 
requirement that characterized the statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (except with respect to acts of persecution).  
45. In preparation for the entry into force of the Rome Statute, States developed 
the document entitled Elements of Crimes, which sets forth important guidance as to 
what must be proven when prosecuting an individual for crimes against humanity.92 
__________________ 
 87  G.A. Res. 51/207 (Dec. 17, 1996). 
 88  Rome Statute, supra note 5. 
 89  Ibid., art. 5(b). 
 90  Ibid., art. 7(1). For discussion of the new phrase “with knowledge of the attack,” see infra  
Part VI(D). For general commentary on the adoption of Article 7, see P. Hwang, “Defining 
Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” Fordham 
Int’l L. J., vol. 22, p. 457, at 497-501 (1998); D. Robinson, “Defining ‘Crimes against 
Humanity’ at the Rome Conference,” American J. of Int’l L., vol. 93, p. 43 (1999); H. von 
Hebel, “Crimes Against Humanity under the Rome Statute,” in P. van Krieken (ed.), Refugee 
Law in Context: The Exclusion Clause, p. 105 (T.M.C. Asser Press, 1999); D. Cattin, “A General 
Definition of Crimes against Humanity under International Law,” Revue de Droit Penal et des 
Droits de l’Homme, vol. 8, p. 83 (1999); H. von Hebel and D. Robinson, “Crimes within the 
Jurisdiction of the Court,” in R. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court: The Making of the 
Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results, p. 79 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999); R. Clark, 
“Crimes against Humanity and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” in 
R. Clark et al. (eds.), International and National Law in Russia and Eastern Europe: Essays 
in Honor of George Ginsburgs, p. 139 (Kluwer Law International, 2001); D. Robinson, “The 
Elements of Crimes against Humanity,” in R. Lee et al. (eds.), The International Criminal 
Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence , p. 57 (Transnational 
Publishers, Ardsley, 2001); A. Gil Gil, “Los Crímenes contra la Humanidad y el Genocidio en el 
Estatuto de la Corte Penal Internacional a la luz de ‘los Elementos de los Crímenes,’” in 
K. Ambos (coord.), La Nueva Justicia Penal Supranacional: Desarrollos Post-Roma, at 65, 
68-94, 104 (Tirant lo Blanch, 2002); T. McCormack, “Crimes Against Humanity,” in D. 
McGoldrick, et al. (eds.), The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy 
Issues, p. 179 (Hart Publishing, 2004); P. Currat, Les crimes contre l’humanité dans le Statut de 
la Cour pénale internationale (Schulthess, 2006); C.K. Hall et al., “Article 7, Crimes against 
Humanity,” in O. Triffterer & K. Ambos (eds.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, p. 159 (Hart Publishing, 
2d ed. 2008); W. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome 
Statute, at 137-87 (Oxford University Press, 2010); Sadat, supra note 37, at 350-55. 
 91  Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 7(2). 
 92  See International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000) 
(hereinafter ICC, Elements of Crimes). Article 9(1) of the Rome Statute provides that Elements 
of Crimes “shall assist the Court in the interpretation and application of [article 7]”. See 
generally S. Chesterman, “An Altogether Different Order: Defining the Elements of Crimes 
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Since the entry into force of the Rome Statute in July 2002, several defendants have 
been indicted and some convicted by the International Criminal Court for crimes 
against humanity.93 For example, in March 2014, the Court’s Trial Chamber II 
issued its judgment that Germain Katanga had committed, through other persons, 
murder as a crime against humanity during an attack in February 2003 on the village 
of Bogoro in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.94 
46. Crimes against humanity have also featured in the jurisdiction of “hybrid” 
tribunals that contain a mixture of international law and national law elements. The  
agreement between Sierra Leone and the United Nations which established the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone in 2002 includes crimes against humani ty as a part of 
the Special Court’s jurisdiction.95 Article 2 of the Court’s statute provides that the 
“Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who committed the 
following crimes as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civil ian 
population”, and then lists nine categories of acts. Several defendants have been 
indicted and some convicted by the Special Court for crimes against humanity, 
including the former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor.96 
47. By contrast, the statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon does not include 
crimes against humanity within the scope of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, which 
was established in 2007 by the Security Council and charged with applying 
Lebanese law rather than international law.97 The Secretary-General considered that 
the pattern of terrorist attacks at issue for that tribunal “could meet the prima facie 
definition of the crime, as developed in the jurisprudence of international criminal 
__________________ 
against Humanity,” Duke J. of Comp. and Int’l L., vol. 10, p. 307 (2000); R. Lee et al. (eds.), 
The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence  
(2001); M. Badar, “From the Nuremberg Charter to the Rome Statute: Defining the Elements of 
Crimes against Humanity,” San Diego Int’l L. J., vol. 5, p. 73 (2004). Consistent with article 7, 
the two elements that must exist to establish a crime against humanity, in conjunction with the 
various proscribed acts, are: (1) the conduct was committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against a civilian population; and (2) the perpetrator knew that the 
conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack 
against a civilian population. The Elements of Crimes have been amended to take account of 
further elements adopted at the 2010 ICC Review Conference. See Elements of Crimes,  
ICC-PIDS-LT-03-002/11_Eng (2011). 
 93  Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Trial Chamber I, Judgment, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2842 (Mar. 14, 
2012); Prosecutor v. Katanga, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/07 (Mar. 7, 2014) 
(hereinafter “Katanga 2014”); Sadat, supra note 37, at 355-68. 
 94  Katanga 2014, 1691. Since all appeals have been discontinued, this judgment is final.  
 95  Agreement on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone-U.N., art. 2, 
Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138. 
 96  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Taylor, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, SCSL-03-01-T (May 18, 2012); 
Prosecutor v. Taylor, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, SCSL-03-01-PT (Sept. 26, 2013); see also 
Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, SCSL-04-14-A (May 28, 
2008); Proseutor v. Brima et al., Appeals Chamber, Judgment, SCSL-04-16-A (Feb. 22, 2008); 
see generally W. Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, 
Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, at 40 (Cambridge University Press, 2006); C. C. Jalloh & S. 
Meisenberg (eds.), The Law Reports of the Special Court for Sierra Leone  (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2012) (2 vols.); R.W.F. van der Wolf (ed.), The Case Against Charles Taylor (2013); 
Sadat, supra note 37, at 349-50. 
 97  S.C. Res. 1757 (May 30, 2007). 
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tribunals”.98 However, there was insufficient support within the Security Council 
for including crimes against humanity in the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.99 
48. Special courts have been set up within a few national legal systems (at times 
with international judges participating) and some of these courts have  exercised 
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. The Special Panels for Serious Crimes, 
established in 2000, had jurisdiction over crimes against humanity committed 
between 1 January and 25 October 1999 in East Timor. The relevant language was 
an almost verbatim repetition of article 7 of the Rome Statute100 and the Special 
Panels convicted several defendants.101 Likewise, the Extraordinary Chambers in 
__________________ 
 98  Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 
U.N. Doc. S/2006/893, at 6, para. 24 (Nov. 15, 2006). 
 99  See ibid., para. 25; Statement by Mr. Nicholas Michel, Under-Secretary-General for Legal 
Affairs, U.N. Doc. S/2006/893/Add.1, at 2 (Nov. 21, 2006) (“The text of the statute, the language 
of the report, the preparatory work and the background of the negotiations clearly demonstrate 
that the tribunal will not be competent to qualify the attacks as crimes against humanity. ”). 
 100  See U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor Regulation 2000/15, On the Establishment 
of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences, § 5, UNTAET/REG/2000/15  
(2000); see also K. Ambos & S. Wirth, “The Current Law of Crimes against Humanity: An 
Analysis of UNTAET Regulation 15/2000,” Criminal Law Forum, vol. 13, p. 1, at 2 (2002). 
 101  Prosecutor v. Marques et al., East Timor Special Panel for the Trial of Serious Crimes, 
Judgment, Case No. 9/2000 (Dec. 11, 2001); Deputy Prosecutor General v. Pedro, ibid., 
Judgment, Case No. 1/2001 (Apr. 14, 2005); Prosecutor v. Leite, ibid., Judgment, Case 
No. 04b/2001 (Dec. 7, 2002); Prosecutor v. Cardoso, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 04c/2001, 
(Apr. 5, 2003); Prosecutor v. Carvalho, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 10/2001 (Mar. 18, 2004); 
Prosecutor v. Martins et al., ibid., Judgment, Case No. 11/2001 (Nov. 13, 2003); Prosecutor v. 
Santos, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 16/2001 (Sept. 9, 2002); Prosecutor v. Sarmento et al., ibid., 
Judgment, Case No. 18./2001 (July 16, 2003); Prosecutor v. Sarmento, ibid., Judgment, Case 
No. 18a/2001 (Aug. 12, 2003); Prosecutor v. Mendonça, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 18b/2001 
(Oct. 13, 2003); Prosecutor v. Correia, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 19/2001 (Mar. 29, 2004); 
Prosecutor v. Tacaqui, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 20/2001 (Dec. 9, 2004); Prosecutor v. Soares, 
ibid., Judgment, Case No. 02/2002-B (Dec. 1, 2004); Prosecutor v. Ena et al., ibid., Judgment, 
Case No. 5/2002 (Mar. 23, 2004); Prosecutor v. Soares, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 7a/2002 
(Dec. 9, 2003); Prosecutor v. Olivera et al., ibid., Judgment, Case No. 12/2002 (Feb. 23, 2004); 
Prosecutor v. Da Costa Nunes, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 1/2003 (Dec. 10, 2003); Prosecutor v. 
Atolan, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 3/2003 (June 9, 2003); Prosecutor v. Cloe et al., ibid., 
Judgment, Case No. 4/2003 (Nov. 16, 2004); Prosecutor v. Sufa, ibid., Judgment, Case 
No. 4a/2003 (Nov. 25, 2004); Prosecutor v. Beno, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 4b/2003 (Nov. 16, 
2004); Prosecutor v. Metan, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 4c/2003 (Nov. 16, 2004); Prosecutor v. 
Gusmão, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 7/2003 (Feb. 28, 2003); Prosecutor v. Mau, ibid., Judgment, 
Case No. 8/2003 (Feb. 23, 2004); Prosecutor v. Lao, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 10/2003 (Dec. 3, 
2004); Prosecutor v. Soares, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 11/2003 (Dec. 11, 2003); Prosecutor v. 
Ludji et al., ibid., Judgment, Case No. 16/2003 (May 19, 2004); Prosecutor v. Guterres, ibid., 
Judgment, Case No. 18a/2003 (Feb. 28, 2005); Prosecutor v. Da Costa et al., ibid., Judgment, 
Case No. 22/2003 (Apr. 25, 2005,); Prosecutor v. Maubere, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 23/2003 
(July 5, 2004); Prosecutor v. Fernandes, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 25/2003 (Apr. 19, 2005); 
Prosecutor v. Correia, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 27/2003 (Apr. 25, 2005); Prosecutor 
v. Mesquita et al., ibid., Judgment, Case No. 28/2003 (Dec. 6, 2004); Prosecutor v. Perreira, 
ibid., Judgment, Case No. 34/2003 (Apr. 27, 2005); Prosecutor v. De Deus, ibid., Judgment, 
Case No. 2a/2004 (Apr. 12, 2005); see also Report to the Secretary-General of the Commission 
of Experts to review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (the 
then East Timor) in 1999 (May 26, 2005) , U.N. Doc. S/2005/458, Annex II (July 15, 2005); 
C. Reiger & M. Wierda, The Serious Crimes Process in Timor-Leste: In Retrospect 
(International Center for Transitional Justice, 2006).  
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the Courts of Cambodia, established by Cambodia in 2001102 and the subject of a 
Cambodia-United Nations agreement in 2003,103 included within article 5 of their 
statute “the power to bring to trial all Suspects who committed crimes against 
humanity”, which the Court has done.104 The Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, 
established in 2003 by the Iraqi Governing Council, also had within its jurisdiction 
crimes against humanity.105 Again, unlike the Nuremberg Charter, the crime as 
formulated for these tribunals requires no link to armed conflict.106 
49. The Extraordinary African Chambers within the Senegalese judicial system,  
established in 2012-2013 pursuant to agreements between Senegal and the African 
Union, are empowered to try persons “responsible for the crimes and serious 
violations of international law, international humanitarian law and custom, and 
international conventions ratified by Chad and Senegal, that were committed in 
Chad between 7 June 1982 and 1 December 1990”.107 Article 4(b) of the statute of 
the Chambers provides that they have jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, 
which are then defined in article 6 in terms that draw upon, but do not replicate, 
article 7 of the Rome Statute. 
50. Finally, crimes against humanity have also featured at times in the 
jurisprudence of regional human rights courts and tribunals,108 such as before the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights109 and the European Court of Human 
Rights. The Grand Chamber of the European Court, for example, in 2008 analysed 
the meaning of “crimes against humanity” as the concept existed in 1956, finding 
__________________ 
 102  See G.A. Res. 57/228B (May 13, 2003). 
 103  Agreement Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During 
the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Cambodia-U.N., June 6, 2003, 2329 U.N.T.S. 117. 
 104  Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Trial Chamber, Judgment, No. 001/18-07-
2007/ECCC/TC (July 26, 2010) (hereinafter Duch Trial Chamber Judgment); Prosecutor 
v. Nuon Chea et al., Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, Closing Order, No. 002/19-09-2007-
ECCC-OCIJ (Sept. 15, 2010). 
 105  Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, art. 10(b), Dec. 10, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 231 (2004). The Iraqi 
Interim Government enacted a new statute in 2005, built upon the earlier statute, which changed 
the tribunal’s name to “Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal.” See Law of the Supreme Iraqi 
Criminal Tribunal, Law No. 10, Official Gazette of the Republic of Iraq (Oct. 18, 2005); see 
also M. Scharf, “The Iraqi High Tribunal: A Viable Experiment in International Justice?,” J. of 
Int’l Crim. Just., vol. 5, p. 258 (2007); B. Kuschnik, “The Legal Findings of Crimes against 
Humanity in the Al-Dujail Judgments of the Iraqi High Tribunal: A Forerunner for the ICC?,” 
Chinese J. of Int’l L., vol. 7, p. 459 (2008); E. van Heugten & P.A. van Laar (eds.), The Iraqi 
Special Tribunal for Crimes against Humanity: The Dujail Case  (International Courts 
Association, 2011). 
 106  See, e.g., Duch Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 104, para. 291 (“The notion of armed 
conflict also does not form part of the current-day customary definition of crimes against 
humanity.”). 
 107  Agreement on the Establishment of the Extraordinary African Chambers within the Senegalese 
Judicial System, Senegal-African Union, Aug. 22, 2012, 52 I.L.M. 1024 (2013); Agreement on 
the Statute of the Chambers, Senegal-African Union, Jan. 30, 2013, 52 I.L.M. 1028. 
 108  See A. Huneeus, “International Criminal Law by Other Means: The Quasi-Criminal Jurisdiction 
of the Human Rights Bodies,” Am. J. Int’l L., vol. 107, p. 1 (2013). 
 109  See, e.g., J. Dondé Matute, “Los Elementos Contextuales de los Crímenes de Lesa Humanidad y 
la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos,” in K. Ambos et al. (eds.), Sistema 
Interamericano de Protección de Derechos Humanos y Derecho Penal Internacional, Tomo II, 
p. 205 (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2011). 
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that even by that point the nexus with armed conflict that initially formed part of the 
customary definition of crimes against humanity may have disappeared. 110 
51. In light of such developments, it is now well settled that, under international 
law, criminal responsibility attaches to an individual for commit ting crimes against 
humanity. As the Trial Chamber in the Tadić case indicated, “since the Nuremberg 
Charter, the customary status of the prohibition against crimes against humanity and 
the attribution of individual criminal responsibility for their commission have not 
been seriously questioned”.111 
 
 
 D. Crimes against humanity in national law 
 
 
52. In its annual report for its sixty-sixth session,112 the Commission requested 
that States provide information on: (a) whether the State ’s national law at present 
expressly criminalizes “crimes against humanity” as such and, if so; (b) the text of 
the relevant criminal statute(s); (c) under what conditions the State is capable of 
exercising jurisdiction over an alleged offender for the commission of a crime 
against humanity (e.g., when the offence occurs within its territor y or when the 
offence is by its national or resident); and (d) decisions of the State ’s national courts 
that have adjudicated crimes against humanity. As at early February 2015, the 
Commission had received responses from four States. The information contained in 
those responses is incorporated in the present report.  
53. The national laws of several States address in some fashion crimes against 
humanity, thereby allowing national prosecutions falling within the scope of those 
laws.113 For example, chapter 11 of the Criminal Code of Finland codifies crimes 
against humanity (as well as genocide and war crimes).114 Section 3 of that chapter 
defines the crime, while section 4 indicates circumstances when the crime is to be 
regarded as aggravated. Generally, Finnish criminal law is only applied to crimes 
committed within the territory of Finland; crimes committed in another State ’s 
__________________ 
 110  Korbely v. Hungary, E.Ct.H.R. Grand Chamber Judgment, No. 9174/02, para. 82 (Sept. 19, 2008).  
International jurisprudence may also arise before the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
See Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, art. 28A, as 
amended at the 24th African Union Summit in Malabo (June 2014) (providing that the Court ’s 
International Criminal Law Section shall have power to try persons for crimes against humanity). 
As of January 2015, however, this Protocol and the amendments have not yet entered into force.  
 111  Prosecutor v. Tadić, Trial Chamber, Opinion & Judgment, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-T, para. 623 
(May 7, 1997) (hereinafter Tadić 1997); see also Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao (RUF 
Case), Trial Chamber I, Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, para. 58 (Mar. 2, 2009). 
 112  See 2014 Report, supra note 4, para. 34. 
 113  See generally A. Eser et al. (eds.), National Prosecution of International Crimes  
(2003-2007)(6 vols.); M. Bergsmo et al. (eds.), Importing Core International Crimes into 
National Law (Tokel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2d ed. 2010); R. Falconí, “The Codification 
of Crimes against Humanity in the Domestic Legislation of Latin American States,” 
International Criminal Law Review , vol. 10, p. 453 (2010); W.J. van der Wolf, Prosecution and 
Punishment of International Crimes by National Courts (International Courts Association, 
2011). For country-specific studies, see, e.g., C. Ferstman, “Domestic Trials for Genocide and 
Crimes against Humanity: The Example of Rwanda,” African J. of Int’l and Comp. L., vol. 9, 
p. 857 (1997); L. van den Herik, “The Dutch Engagement with the Project of International 
Criminal Justice,” Netherlands Int’l L. Rev. vol. 55, p. 303 (2010). 
 114  Criminal Code of Finland, Law No. 39/1889 (as amended 2012), available at 
http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1889/en18890039.pdf (unofficial English translation).  
 
A/CN.4/680 
 
29/88 15-02139 
 
territory by a Finnish national or resident, or by a person who is apprehended in 
Finland and is a national or permanent resident of Denmark, Iceland, Norway or 
Sweden; and crimes committed in another State’s territory that are directed against 
Finnish nationals and are punishable by more than six months in prison. There are, 
however, exceptions to this general rule. Thus, pursuant to chapter 1, section 7(1) of 
the Criminal Code, “Finnish law applies to an offence committed outside of Finland 
where the punishability of the act, regardless of the law of the place of commission, 
is based on an international agreement binding on Finland or on another statute or 
regulation internationally binding on Finland ( international offence).” Crimes 
against humanity are regarded as being such an offence.  
54. Similarly, title 12 bis of the Penal Code of Switzerland115 codifies genocide 
and crimes against humanity, with article 264a defining crimes against humanity. 
Swiss law extends to crimes committed in Switzerland (article 3) and to crimes 
committed outside Switzerland that are against the Swiss State (article 4), that are 
against minors (article 5), that Switzerland has undertaken to prosecute under an 
international agreement (article 6) or that otherwise involve an act punishable in the 
State where it was committed if the perpetrator is in Switzerland and, under Swiss 
law, the act may result in extradition, but the author is not extradited (if the 
perpetrator is not a Swiss national, and the crime was not committed against a Swiss 
national, then prosecution may only proceed if the extradition request was rejected 
for a reason other than the nature of the act or the perpetrator committed a 
particularly serious crime proscribed by the international community) (article 7).  
55. By contrast, other States do not have any national law expressly criminalizing 
“crimes against humanity,” although they may have statutes that allow for 
prosecution of conduct that, in some circumstances, amount to crimes against 
humanity. For example, the United States has no national law on crimes against 
humanity as such. While it has statutes containing criminal prohibitions on torture , 
war crimes and genocide,116 these statutes do not criminalize all conduct that might 
amount to crimes against humanity, and some of the constituent acts of crimes 
against humanity as defined in certain international texts are not found in United 
States national law. At the same time, other statutes with extraterritorial application 
might apply depending on the circumstances, such as statutes addressing terrorism 
offences or violent crime. Cuba also does not criminalize “crimes against humanity” 
as such, but its law takes account of crimes against humanity as a basis for setting 
aside limitations under national law that might otherwise apply.117 
56. In the decades following Nuremberg, various national prosecutions occurred, 
such as the Eichmann and Demjanjuk cases in Israel,118 the Menten case in The 
__________________ 
 115  Penal Code of Switzerland, Law No. 311.0 (as amended 2015), available at 
http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19370083/index.html. 
 116  See 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2012) (prohibiting torture); 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2012) (prohibiting war 
crimes); 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2012) (prohibiting genocide). 
 117  See Código Penal de la República de Cuba, Ley No. 62, art. 5, para. 3; art. 18, para. 4, available 
at http://www.tsp.cu/ley_62_codigo_penal_cuba. 
 118  Attorney General for the Government of Israel v. Eichmann , I.L.R., vol. 36, p. 1 (District of 
Jerusalem), p. 277 (Supreme Court of Israel) (1968); Attorney General for the Government of 
Israel v. Demjanjuk, Trial Judgment (Apr. 18, 1988) (Israel District Court); Demjanjuk v. State 
of Israel, Isr. S.C. 221 (1993) (Israel Supreme Court); see Hans W. Baade, “The Eichmann Trial: 
Some Legal Aspects, “ Duke Law Journal, vol. 10, p. 400 (1961); J.E.S. Fawcett, “The 
Eichmann Case,” British Year Book of Int’l L., vol. 38, p. 181 (1962); Georg Schwarzenberger, 
“The Eichmann Judgment,” Current Legal Problems, vol. 15, p. 248 (1962). 
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Netherlands,119 the Barbie and Touvier cases in France120 and the Finta, Mugesera 
and Munyaneza cases in Canada.121 Such cases can raise difficult issues concerning 
immunities, statutes of limitations and the effect of national amnesty laws. For 
example, in the Rubens Paiva case currently being prosecuted in Brazil, lower 
courts have allowed a prosecution to proceed against former military or police 
officers alleged to have committed crimes against humanity, notwithstanding 
Brazil’s 1979 amnesty law.122 In some circumstances, the issue of crimes against 
humanity arose in the context of national proceedings other than prosecutions, such 
as extradition123 or immigration124 proceedings. Under the influence of the Rome 
Statute,125 in recent years many States have adopted or amended national laws that 
criminalize crimes against humanity, as well as other crimes.126 
__________________ 
 119  Menten Case, 75 I.L.R. 362 (1987) (Dutch Supreme Court).  
 120  Barbie Case, 78 I.L.R. 125 (1988); 100 I.L.R. 331 (1995) (French Court of Cassation); Touvier 
Case, 100 I.L.R. 338 (1995) (French Court of Cassation); see L. Sadat Wexler, “The 
Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cassation: From Touvier to 
Barbie and Back Again,” Columbia J. of Transnat’l L., vol. 32, p. 289 (1994); S. Chalandon 
& P. Nivelle, Crimes contre l’humanité — Barbie, Touvier, Bousquet, Papon (1998). 
 121  Regina v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, [1997] 104 I.L.R. 284 (Supreme Court of Canada); 
Munyaneza v. R, 2014 QCCA 906 (Quebec Court of Appeal). 
 122  For the Federal Court of Appeals decision agreeing with the Court of First Instance in setting 
aside the amnesty law, see Brasil. Tribunal Regional Federal da 2
a
 Região. 2
a
 Turma 
Especializada. Habeas Corpus n.
o
 0104222-36.2014.4.02.0000. Impetrantes: Rodrigo Henrique 
Roca Pires e Outro. Impetrado: Juízo da 4
a
 Vara Federal Criminal – RJ. Autuado em 26 de 
Agosto de 2014 [Brazil. Federal Regional Court of the 2
nd
 Region. 2
nd
 Specialized Chamber. 
Habeas Corpus no. 0104222-36.2014.4.02.0000. Rodrigo Henrique Roca Pires and Another v. 
4
th
 Federal Criminal Court, Judiciary Section of Rio de Janeiro. Issued on: August 26, 2014]. 
The Supreme Federal Court, however, has suspended proceedings pending determination of the 
applicability of the amnesty law. See Brasil. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Rcl 18686 MC/RJ, 
Relator: Min. Teori Zavascki, Decisão de 29 de setembro de 2014, publicado eletronicamente no 
DJe-191 em 1 de outubro de 2014 [Brazil. Federal Supreme Court. Rcl 18686 MC/RJ, 
Rapporteur: Min. Teori Zavascki, Decision of September 29, 2014, published electronically at 
the DJe-191 on October 1st, 2014], available at http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/processo/ 
verProcessoPeca.asp?id=263694199&tipoApp=.pdf.  
 123  See, e.g., Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F. 2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 
(1986). 
 124  See, e.g., Mugesera v. Canada, [2005] 2 SCR 100 (Supreme Court of Canada). For an analysis 
of Canada’s reliance on immigration proceedings for addressing crimes against humanity, 
finding the practice to be an incomplete remedy, see J. Yap, “Aut Deportare Aut Judicare: 
Current Topics in International Humanitarian Law in Canada,” in D. Jinks et al. (eds.), Applying 
International Humanitarian Law in Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Bodies, p. 355 (TMC Asser 
Press, 2014). 
 125  For an analysis of how complementarity under the Rome Statute serves as an incentive to the 
adoption of national legislation, and reviewing the arguments for and against finding an 
obligation in the Rome Statute to adopt national legislation, see J. Kleffner, “The Impact of 
Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive Criminal Law,” J. of Int’l Crim. 
Just., vol. 1, at 91 (2003) (“The Statute is ambiguous on this issue, and States as well as 
academic writers differ on it”). 
 126  See, e.g., A. Alvarez, “The Implementation of the ICC Statute in Argentina,” J. of Int’l Crim. 
Just., vol. 5, p. 480 (2007); Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c. 24 
(CAHWCA) (Canada); F. Lafontaine, “Parties to Offences under the Canadian Crimes against 
Humanity and War Crimes Act: an Analysis of Principal Liability and Complicity,” Les Cahiers 
de Droit, vol. 50, p. 967 (2009); R.J. Currie & J. Rikhof, International and Transnational 
Criminal Law (2d ed. 2013) (surveying the treatment of international crimes under Canadian 
law); Code of Crimes against International Law, Bundesgesetzblatt, § 7, I, p. 2254 (2002) 
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57. Various studies have attempted not just to compile the existence of national 
laws on crimes against humanity, but to analyse the scope of those laws both in 
terms of the substantive crimes and the circumstances when jurisdiction may be 
exercised over such crimes.127 Important elements to consider when assessing such 
laws are: (a) whether there exists a specific law on “crimes against humanity” (as 
opposed to ordinary criminal statutes on penalizing acts of violence or persecution); 
(b) if a specific law exists on “crimes against humanity,” whether that law includes 
all the components encompassed in the most relevant contemporary definition of the 
crime, that is, article 7 of the Rome Statute; and (c) if a specific law exists on 
“crimes against humanity,” whether that law is limited only to conduct that occurs 
within the State’s territory, or whether it also extends to conduct by or against its 
nationals abroad, or even extends to acts committed abroad by non-nationals against 
non-nationals.128 
58. A relevant study completed in July 2013 reached several conclusions. First, it 
found that earlier studies, when read collectively, indicate  that at best 54 per cent of 
States Members of the United Nations (104 of 193) have some form of national law 
relating to crimes against humanity.129 The remaining Member States (89 of 193) 
appear to have no national laws relating to crimes against humanity.  Further, the 
2013 study found that earlier studies, again when read collectively, indicate that at 
best 66 per cent of Rome Statute parties (80 of 121) have some form of national law 
relating to crimes against humanity, leaving 44 per cent of Rome Statute  parties 
(41 of 121) without any such law.130 
__________________ 
(Germany), available at http://www.bmjv.de/DE/Ministerium/Abteilungen/Strafrecht/  
InternationalesStrafrechtEuropaeischeMultilateraleStrafrechtlicheZusammenarbeit/_doc/Gesetz_
zur_Einfuehrung_des_Voelkerstrafgesetzbuches_in_Kraft.html; N. Capus, Die Unverjährbarkeit 
von Verbrechen gegen die Menschheit nach schweizerischem und nach internationalem Recht, 
Zeitschrift für juristische Ausbildung und Praxis, vol. 24, p. 247 (2006); G. Werle & 
F. Jessberger, “International Criminal Justice Is Coming Home: The New German Code of 
Crimes Against International Law, Criminal Law Forum, vol. 13, p. 191 (2002); M. Roscini, 
“Great Expectations — The Implementation of the Rome Statute in Italy,” J. of Int’l Crim. Just., 
vol. 5, p. 493 (2007); Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
Act No. 27 of 2002, Rep. S. Africa Gov’t Gazette, vol. 445, No. 23642 (South Africa) (July 18, 
2002); C. Fournet, Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity — Misconceptions and confusion in 
French Law and Practice (Hart Publishing, 2013); M. du Plessis, “South Africa’s Implementation 
of the ICC Statute — An African Example,” J. of Int’l Crim. Just., vol. 5, p. 460 (2007). On 
extraterritorial application of South Africa’s statute, see National Commissioner of the South 
African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre  (485/2012) [2013] 
ZASCA 168 (Nov. 27, 2013). 
 127  See Amnesty International, Universal Jurisdiction: A Preliminary Survey of Legislation Around 
the World (2011); Bassiouni, supra note 36 (especially chapter 9 on “A Survey of National 
Legislation and Prosecutions for Crimes Against Humanity”); International Committee of the 
Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law National Implementation Database (updated 
periodically), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf; International Human Rights Law 
Clinic, George Washington University Law School, Comparative Law Study and Analysis of 
National Legislation Relating to Crimes against Humanity and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction  
(2013), updated and reprinted in part in Arturo J. Carrillo & Annalise K. Nelson, Comparative 
Law Study and Analysis of National Legislation Relating to Crimes Against Humanity and 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, The George Washington Int’l Law Rev., vol. 46, p. 481 (2014) 
(hereinafter GWU Clinic Study). 
 128  For a general discussion of national jurisdiction in the context of international  crimes, see 
generally A. Cassese & M. Delmas-Marty (eds.), Juridictions nationales et crimes 
internationaux (Presses Universitaires de France, 2002). 
 129  GWU Clinic Study, supra note 127, at 487. 
 130  Ibid at 488. 
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59. Second, the 2013 study undertook an in-depth, qualitative review of the 
national laws of a sample of 83 States ( States Members of the United Nations listed 
alphabetically from A to I). Since 12 of those States were thought by earlier studies 
to have no law relating to crimes against humanity, the qualitative review focused 
on assessing the laws of the 71 other States. That review concluded that, in fact, 
only 41 per cent of States in the sample actually possessed a national law 
specifically on “crimes against humanity” (34 of 83).131 Of the 58 Rome Statute 
parties within the sample of 83 States, the review indicated that 48 per cent of them 
possessed a national law specifically on “crimes against humanity” (28 of 58). 
60. Third, for the 34 States that possessed a national law specifically on “crimes 
against humanity”, the 2013 study analysed closely the provisions of those laws. Of 
those States, only 29 per cent adopted verbatim the text of article 7 of the Rome 
Statute when defining the crime (10 of 34).132 As such, of the 83 States within the 
sample, only about 12 per cent adopted the formulation of Rome Statute article 7 in 
its entirety (10 of 83). Instead, most of the 34 States that possessed a national law 
specifically on “crimes against humanity” deviated from the components of article 7,  
such as by omitting components of the chapeau language of article 7(1); omitting 
some prohibited acts as set forth in article 7(1)(a)–(k); or omitting the second or 
third paragraphs of article 7, including the component relating to furthering “a State 
or organizational policy.” All told, of those 34 States that possessed a national law 
specifically on “crimes against humanity”, 71 per cent of them (24 of 34) possessed 
national laws that lacked key elements of the article 7 definition, revealing a wide 
range of minor to major substantive differences.133 
61. Finally, the 2013 study analysed whether the 34 States that possess a national 
law specifically on “crimes against humanity” could exercise jurisdiction over a 
non-national offender who commits the crime abroad against non-nationals. The 
study concluded that nearly 62 per cent (21 of 34) could exercise such jurisdiction. 
However, this meant that only 25 per cent of the States within the sample were able 
to exercise such jurisdiction over “crimes against humanity” (21 of 83). Further, of 
the 58 Rome Statute parties within the sample, 33 per cent both possess a national 
law specifically on “crimes against humanity” and are able to exercise such 
jurisdiction (19 of 58).134 
62. A number of States have established specialized prosecutorial authorities or 
procedures within their legal systems to investigate and prosecute crimes against 
humanity and other international crimes.135 These authorities, in turn, have begun 
developing networks for cooperation, such as the European network of contact 
points in respect of persons responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and 
__________________ 
 131  Ibid., at 493. By contrast, 20 per cent of States in the sample possessed laws that did not 
actually address “crimes against humanity”, but that arguably contained some features in 
common with the crime, such as a prohibition of one or more of the prohibited acts listed in 
Article 7(1)(a)–(k) of the Rome Statute (17 of 83). Within this group are States possessing a law 
that is labelled “crimes against humanity”, but which in fact only covers war crimes and 
genocide. Ibid., at 490-91. The remaining 39 per cent of States in the sample had no discernible 
law relating to crimes against humanity (32 of 83).  
 132 Ibid., at 492. 
 133  Ibid., at 493-95, 497-503. 
 134  Ibid., at 505-13. 
 135  See, e.g., Canada’s Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Program, available at 
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/wc-cdg/index.html. 
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war crimes.136 The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) has 
established a fugitive investigative support subdirectorate dedicated to facilitating 
the apprehension and extradition of individuals accused of such crimes. 137 
63. Separate and apart from statutes providing for the criminal prosecution of 
crimes against humanity, some States have also included the prohibition on crimes 
against humanity in their immigration rules.138 Such provisions indicate that 
persons accused of the commission of crimes against humanity may be barred entry 
to the country in question, may be removed and/or deported and may be prosecuted 
for committing fraud upon entry. 
64. The unevenness in the adoption of national laws relating to crimes against 
humanity has collateral consequences with respect to inter-State cooperation in 
seeking to sanction offences. Existing bilateral and multilateral agreements on 
mutual legal assistance and on extradition typically require that the offence at issue 
be criminalized in the jurisdictions of both the requesting and requested States 
(referred to as “double” or “dual” criminality); if their respective national laws are 
not comparable, then cooperation usually is not required. With a large number of 
States having no national law on crimes against humanity, and with significant 
discrepancies among the national laws of States that have criminalized the offence, 
there at present exist considerable impediments to inter-State cooperation. Further, 
the absence in most States of national laws that allow for the exercise of jurisdiction 
over non-nationals for crimes against humanity inflicted upon non-nationals abroad 
means that offenders often may seek sanctuary simply by moving to a State in 
which the acts were not committed. Even in circumstances in which States have 
adopted harmonious national laws on crimes against humanity, there may exist no 
obligation as between the States to cooperate with respect to the offence, including 
by way of an obligation to extradite or prosecute the alleged offender.  
 
 
 IV. Existing multilateral conventions that promote prevention, 
criminalization and inter-State cooperation with respect 
to crimes 
 
 
65. In pursuing the objectives identified in section II above, the Commission may 
be guided by numerous existing multilateral conventions that promote prevention, 
criminalization and inter-State cooperation with respect to transnational crimes. The 
Commission has previously helped draft a convention of this nature: the 1973 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally 
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents.139 Of particular interest are the 
__________________ 
 136  This network was set up pursuant to European Council Decision 2002/494/JHA and reaffirmed 
with Council Decision 2003/335/JHA. 
 137  See INTERPOL’s War Crimes Program, available at http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/War-
crimes/War-crimes. 
 138  See, e.g., Canada, Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, C.27 (as amended on 
December 16, 2014); U.S. Presidential Proclamation 8697 (Aug. 4, 2011) — Suspension of 
Entry as Immigrants and Nonimmigrants of Persons Who Participate in Serious Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Law Violations and Other Abuses, Fed. Reg., vol. 76, p. 49277 (2011).  
 139  Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167. Draft prepared by the Commission at its twenty-fourth 
session in 1972; the Convention was then negotiated and adopted by the General Assembly in 
1973, entered into force in 1977, and as of January 2015 has 178 States Parties.  
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conventions relating to genocide and war crimes, as well as other treaties that seek 
to deal comprehensively with specific crimes, such as conventions relating to State -
sponsored torture, enforced disappearance, transnational corruption and organized 
crime and terrorist-related offences. Likewise, multilateral conventions on 
extradition, mutual legal assistance and statutes of limitation can provide important 
guidance with respect to those issues. The following discussion briefly addresses 
some aspects of these treaties. 
 
 
 A. 1948 Genocide Convention  
 
 
66. The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide140 sets forth in article I that the Contracting Parties “confirm that 
genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under 
international law which they undertake to prevent and punish”. Article II then 
defines the crime in terms that were later adopted verbatim as article 6 of the Rome 
Statute. Article III identifies that the act itself shall be punishable, but so shall 
conspiracy, incitement and attempt to commit the act, as well as complicity in the 
act. Article IV provides that persons committing genocide or any of the other acts 
enumerated in article III (such as complicity in genocide) shall be punished 
“whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private 
individuals”.  
67. Article V provides: “The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance 
with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the 
provisions of the present Convention and, in particular to provide effective penalties 
for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III. ” 
Article VI provides that persons charged with genocide shall be tried by a 
competent national tribunal “in the territory of which the act was committed, or by 
such international tribunal as may have jurisdiction”. Article VII addresses 
extradition, stating that the act of genocide shall not be considered as “political 
crimes” and that the parties “pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in 
accordance with their laws and treaties in force”. Article VIII recalls that any party 
may call upon competent United Nations organs to take action to prevent and 
suppress genocide, while article IX provides that disputes arising under the 
convention shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of 
any of the parties to the dispute. 
68. As is the case for crimes against humanity, the crime of genocide has been 
included in the statutes of various international criminal tribunals and developed in 
their jurisprudence. Moreover, the 1948 Genocide Convention has featured in 
several decisions of the International Court of Justice relevant to interpretation of 
the Convention.141 
__________________ 
 140  Genocide Convention, supra note 26; see also A. Gil Gil, El genocidio y otros crímenes 
internacionales (UNED, 1999); P. Gaeta (ed.), The UN Genocide Convention: A Commentary 
(Oxford University Press, 2009); C. Tams et al. (eds.), Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: A Commentary  (Hart Publishing, 2013). 
 141  Reservations to the Convention on Genocide , Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 15; 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Judgment on Preliminary Objections to Jurisdiction, 
I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 595; 2007 Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro Judgment, 
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 B. 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I142 
 
 
69. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949143 contain in a common article144 an 
identical mechanism for the prosecution of persons accused of having committed 
“grave breaches”145 of the Conventions. Pursuant to the first paragraph of the 
common article, the parties “undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide 
effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any  
of the grave breaches” of the Conventions. In its second paragraph, the common 
article specifies that: 
 Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for 
persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such 
grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, 
before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the 
provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another 
__________________ 
supra note 6; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment on Preliminary Objections to Jurisdiction, I.C.J. 
Reports 2008, p. 412; 2015 Croatia v. Serbia Genocide Judgment, supra note 6. 
 142  The analysis in this sub-section is drawn from Study by the Secretariat, Survey of multilateral 
conventions, which may be relevant to the work of the International Law Commission on the 
topic “The Obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare),” U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/630, at 17-18, 22-23 (June 18, 2010). 
 143  Geneva Convention relative to the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (Geneva Convention I); Geneva 
Convention relative to the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (Geneva Convention II ); 
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135  
(Geneva Convention III); Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Geneva Convention IV). 
 144  Geneva Convention I, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, art. 50; Geneva Convention III, art. 129; 
Geneva Convention IV, art. 146. 
 145  Each Convention contains an article describing what acts constitute “grave breaches” of that 
particular convention. For Geneva Conventions I and II, this article is identical (arts. 50 and 51, 
respectively): “Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving 
any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: 
wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing 
great suffering or serious injury to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of  
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.” Article 130 
of Geneva Convention III reads: “Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be 
those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by 
the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, 
wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, compelling a prisoner of war 
to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a pri soner of war of the rights 
of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention.” Article 147 of Geneva Convention IV 
reads: “Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the 
following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention: 
wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing 
great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful 
confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a 
hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial 
prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and 
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and 
wantonly.” 
A/CN.4/680 
 
 
15-02139 36/88 
 
High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has 
made out a prima facie case. 
70. This obligation to undertake measures against an alleged offender is not 
conditioned by any jurisdictional nexus of the offender to the State party in which 
the offender is present. The obligation is one of prosecution, with the possibility to 
transfer an accused person as an alternative. Further, the obligation to search for and 
prosecute an alleged offender exists irrespective of any request for transfer by 
another party.146 
71. While the obligation described above is limited to grave breaches, the common 
article further provides, in its third paragraph, that the States parties shall take 
measures to suppress all acts contrary to the Conventions other than the grave 
breaches. Finally, under its fourth paragraph, the common article stipulates that the 
accused “shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and defence” in all 
circumstances, and that those safeguards “shall not be less favourable than those 
provided by Article 105 and those following” of the Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Other articles briefly address the responsibility 
of States parties for violations of the conventions and the possibility of a procedure 
for enquiry concerning any alleged violation of the Conventions.147 
72. The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) 
builds upon the provision concerning the punishment of offenders contained in the 
common article to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.148 In essence, the common article 
is made applicable to Protocol I by renvoi; article 85(1) of Protocol I specifies that 
“[t]he provisions of the Conventions relating to the repression of breaches and grave 
breaches, supplemented by this Section, shall apply to the repression of breaches 
and grave breaches of this Protocol”.149 Protocol I also builds upon the Geneva 
Conventions with a series of articles designed to help repress breaches: article 86 
addresses a State’s failure to act; article 87 addresses the duty of commanders; 
article 88 addresses mutual assistance in criminal matters;150 article 89 addresses 
inter-State cooperation in situations of serious violations of the Geneva Conventi ons 
or Protocol I; article 90 addresses the establishment of an international fact -finding 
commission to investigate facts alleged to be a grave breach; and article 91 
addresses the responsibility of States parties to pay compensation for violations of 
the Geneva Conventions or Protocol I. 
 
 
__________________ 
 146  See J. Pictet (ed.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary , vol. IV, p. 593 
(ICRC, 1958). 
 147  See, e.g., Geneva Convention III, Arts. 131–32. 
 148  June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (Protocol I). 
 149  “Grave breaches” of Protocol I are identified at Articles 11 and 85(2)-(4) of Protocol I. 
 150  Article 88(1) provides that the States Parties “shall afford one another the greatest measure of 
assistance in connexion with criminal proceedings brought in respect of grave breaches of the 
Conventions or of this Protocol.” Article 88(2) specifies that the parties to Protocol I shall, 
when the circumstances allow, cooperate in extradition matters, including giving due 
consideration to a request received from the State in whose territory the alleged offence has 
occurred. Article 88(3) provides that the law of the requested party shall apply in all cases and 
that the paragraphs shall not “affect the obligations arising from the provisions of any other 
treaty of a bilateral or multilateral nature which governs or will govern the whole or part of the 
subject of mutual assistance in criminal matters.” 
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 C. Other potentially relevant conventions 
 
 
73. Contemporary definitions of crimes against humanity include acts such as 
“torture”, “enslavement” and “enforced disappearance of persons” as the types of 
acts that, if committed on a widespread or systematic basis against a civilian 
population, can constitute crimes against humanity. As such, when drafting a 
convention on crimes against humanity, account should be taken of conventions that 
address such acts.  
74. For example, the Convention against Torture sets forth a series of articles that 
define the crime, call upon States parties to prevent the crime, criminalize the 
conduct, establish jurisdiction over the conduct and impose an obligation to 
extradite or prosecute an offender that turns up in the State Party’s territory. 
Numerous other provisions address other aspects of the State party’s obligations, as 
well as inter-State cooperation and dispute resolution. As at January 2015, 
156 States are party to this convention. The International Court of Justice recently 
addressed at some length the aut dedere aut judicare obligation contained within 
this convention,151 which was in turn the subject of a report by the Commission in 
2014.152 
75. The 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime153 has a Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children.154 The protocol defines the crime of trafficking, 
requires States parties to incorporate the crime into their national l aws, and requires 
them to adopt prevention measures. The provisions of the convention, which apply 
mutatis mutandis to the protocol, set forth various obligations relating to 
prosecution, jurisdiction, adjudication and sanctions, as well as extradition, mu tual 
legal assistance and other matters. As of January 2015, 166 States are party to this 
protocol. 
76. Likewise, the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance155 contains provisions regarding defining the crime, 
criminalization of the act in national law, aut dedere aut judicare, mutual legal 
assistance and extradition. Notably, article 5 of the convention provides that: “The 
widespread or systematic practice of enforced disappearance constitutes a crime 
against humanity as defined in applicable international law and shall attract the 
consequences provided for under such applicable international law.”156 As at 
January 2015, 44 States are party to this convention.  
77. There are, of course, numerous other global treaties that address issues of 
prevention, criminalization in national law, aut dedere aut judicare, mutual legal 
assistance, extradition, dispute settlement and other issues potentially relevant to a 
__________________ 
 151  Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, supra note 73. 
 152  2014 Report, supra note 4, at 130-52, para. 65. 
 153  Nov. 15, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209. As of January 2015, there are 179 States Parties to this 
convention. 
 154  Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319. 
 155  Dec. 20, 2006, 2716 U.N.T.S. 3. As of January 2015, there are 44 States Parties to this 
convention. 
 156  Id., art. 5; see M. Lot Vermeulen, Enforced Disappearance: Determining State Responsibility 
under the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, at 60-62 (Intersentia, 2012). 
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convention on crimes against humanity. Moreover, there are a lso some relevant 
treaties operating at the regional or subregional levels, such as the Protocol for the 
Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes 
Against Humanity and all forms of Discrimination.157 All such treaties should be 
considered in the course of the Commission’s work, bearing in mind that the value 
and effectiveness of particular provisions must be assessed in context.  
 
 
 V. Preventing and punishing crimes against humanity 
 
 
78. Treaties that address efforts to criminalize acts are largely focused on 
punishment of individuals for the crime once committed, but many also contain an 
obligation of some type that the States parties prevent the crime as well. Such an 
obligation may be set forth in a single article that speaks broadly to the issue of 
prevention or may be embedded in several articles that collectively seek the same 
end. 
79. At the most general level, such an obligation simply requires the States parties 
to undertake to prevent (as well as punish) the acts in question. Thus, article I of the 
1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
provides: “The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in 
time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they 
undertake to prevent and to punish.”158 Much of the remainder of the convention is 
then focused on specific measures relating to punishment of individuals, although 
some provisions also relate to the issue of prevention.159 
80. This general obligation to prevent manifests itself in two ways. First, it 
imposes upon States parties an obligation not “to commit such acts through their 
own organs, or persons over whom they have such firm control that their conduct is 
attributable to the State concerned under international law”.160 Second, it imposes 
upon States parties an obligation “to employ the means at their disposal … to 
prevent persons or groups not directly under their authority from committing ” such 
acts.161 For the latter, the State party is only expected to use its best efforts (a due 
diligence standard) when it has a “capacity to influence effectively the action of 
persons likely to commit, or already committing, genocide”, which in turn depends 
__________________ 
 157  Nov. 29, 2006 (entered into force in 2008). The International Conference on the Great Lakes 
Region of Africa, which developed this protocol, consists of Angola, Burundi, the Central 
African Republic, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Republic 
of South Sudan, the Sudan, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. The 
instrument is a protocol to the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes 
Region, Dec. 15, 2006 (amended 2012). 
 158  Genocide Convention, art. I. 
 159  Article V provides: “The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their 
respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the pre sent 
Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or 
any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3.” Article VIII provides: “Any Contracting Party 
may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter 
of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of 
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3.” 
 160  2007 Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro Judgment, supra note 6, para. 166. 
 161  Ibid., para. 430; see also B. Simma, “Genocide and the International Court of Justice,” in 
C. Safferling and E. Conze (eds.), The Genocide Convention Sixty Years After its Adoption , 
p. 259, at 262 (Asser 2010). 
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on the State party’s geographic, political and other links to the persons or groups at 
issue. Further, the State party is only obligated to do what it legally can do under 
international law.162 
81. A breach of this general obligation implicates the responsibility of the State if 
the conduct at issue (either commission of the proscribed act or a failure to take 
necessary, appropriate and lawful measures to prevent the proscribed act by another) 
is attributable to the State pursuant to the rules on State responsibility. Indeed, in the 
context of disputes that may arise under the Genocide Convention, article IX refers, 
inter alia, to disputes “relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide”. 
Although much of the focus of the Genocide Convention is upon prosecuting 
individuals for the crime of genocide, the International Court of Justice has stressed 
that the breach of the obligation to prevent is not a criminal violation by the State 
but, rather, concerns a breach of international law that engages traditional State 
responsibility.163 The Court’s approach is consistent with views previously 
expressed by the Commission,164 including in commentary to the 2001 articles on 
responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts: “Where crimes against 
international law are committed by State officials, it will often be the case that the 
State itself is responsible for the acts in question or for failure to prevent or punish 
them.”165 
82. Many conventions also contain a different type of “prevention” obligation, 
which is an obligation to pursue specific measures designed to help prevent the 
offence from occurring, such as by obliging States parties to take effective 
legislative, executive, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent the 
conduct from occurring in any territory under their jurisdiction. Depending on the 
particular crime at issue, and the context in which that State party is operating, such 
measures might be pursued in various ways. The State party might be expected to 
pursue initiatives that educate governmental officials as to the State ’s obligations 
under the relevant treaty regime. Training programmes for police, military, militias 
and other personnel might be necessary to help prevent the proscribed act. National 
laws and policies will likely be necessary to establish awareness of the criminalit y 
of the act and to promote early detection of any risk of its commission. Certainly 
once the proscribed act is committed, such an obligation reinforces other obligations 
within the treaty that require the State party to investigate and prosecute or extrad ite 
offenders, since doing so serves, in part, to deter future acts by others. Here, too, 
international responsibility of the State arises if the State party has failed to use its 
best efforts to organize the governmental apparatus, as necessary and appropriate, to 
minimize the likelihood of the proscribed act being committed.  
__________________ 
 162  2007 Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro Judgment, supra  note 6, para. 430 (finding 
that “it is clear that every State may only act within the limits permitted by international law”); 
see C. Tams, “Article I,” in Tams et al., supra note 140, at 51 (“The duty to prevent may require 
state parties to make use of existing options but it does not create new rights of intervention — 
hence, to give just one example, the recognition of a duty to prevent adds very little to debates 
about the unilateral use of force to stop genocide in so-called ‘humanitarian interventions’.”). 
 163  2007 Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro Judgment, supra  note 6, para. 167 (finding 
that international responsibility is “quite different in nature from criminal responsibility”). 
 164  See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 50th session, I.L.C. 
Yearbook 1998, Vol. II, Part 2, at 65, para. 248 (finding that the Genocide Convention “did not 
envisage State crime or the criminal responsibility of States in its article  IX concerning State 
responsibility.”). 
 165  Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 53rd session, I.L.C. Yearbook 
2001, Vol. II, Part. 2, at 142 (para. 3 of the Commentary to Article 58).  
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83. For egregious offences, such provisions are often accompanied by a further 
provision indicating that no exceptional circumstances (such as the existence of an 
armed conflict or a public emergency) may be invoked as a justification for the 
offence. Such a general statement, sometimes placed at the beginning of the treaty, 
stresses that the obligation not to commit the offence is non-derogable in nature. 
84. The following discussion centres on the treatment of an “obligation to 
prevent” in a range of treaties relevant to crimes against humanity, in comments by 
treaty monitoring bodies that seek to interpret such an obligation, in General 
Assembly resolutions, in international case law and in the writings of publicists. The 
present section then concludes with a proposed draft article, consisting of three 
paragraphs, entitled “Prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity.” 
 
 
 A. Obligation to prevent crimes against humanity 
 
 
 1. Treaties 
 
85. As discussed above, and as indicated in section IV.A of this report, the 1948 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide contains 
within its title the notion that States parties are obligated not just to punish per sons 
who commit genocide, but also to take measures to prevent commission of the 
crime. As noted in section IV.B of this report, the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
identify certain acts that are grave breaches of the conventions and provide that: 
“The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to 
provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be 
committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the 
following Article.”166 The Conventions further provide that: “Each High 
Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts 
contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches 
defined in the following Article.” 167 
86. Such obligations to prevent and suppress crimes have been a feature of most 
multilateral treaties addressing transnational crimes since the 1960s. Examples 
include: 
 • Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation, 23 September 1971, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 974, 
No. 14118 (art. 10(1): “Contracting States shall, in accordance with 
international and national law, endeavour to take all practicable measures for 
the purpose of preventing the offences mentioned in Article 1.”) 
 • Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 14 December 
1973, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1035, No. 15410 (art. 4(1): “States 
Parties shall co-operate in the prevention of the crimes set forth in article 2, 
particularly by taking all practicable measures to prevent preparations in their 
respective territories for the commission of those crimes within or outside 
their territories ….”) 
__________________ 
 166  Geneva Convention I, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, art. 50; Geneva Convention III, art. 129; 
Geneva Convention IV, art. 146. 
 167  Ibid. 
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 • International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid, 30 November 1973, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1015, 
No. 14861 (art. 4(a): “The States Parties to the present Convention undertake … 
[t]o adopt any legislative or other measures necessary to suppress as well as to 
prevent any encouragement of the crime of apartheid and similar 
segregationist policies or their manifestations and to punish persons guilty of 
that crime ….”)  
 • International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 17 December 1979, 
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1316, No. 21931 (art. 4(1): “States Parties 
shall co-operate in the prevention of the offences set forth in article 1, 
particularly by: taking all practicable measures to prevent preparations in their 
respective territories for the commission of … offences … including measures 
to prohibit in their territories illegal activities of persons, groups and 
organizations that encourage, instigate, organize or engage in the perpetration 
of acts of taking of hostages.”) 
 • Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, 10 December 1984, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, 
No. 24841 (art. 2(1): “Each State Party shall take effective legislative, 
administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any 
territory under its jurisdiction.”) 
 • Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, 9 December 1985, 
OAS Treaty Series, No. 67 (art. 1: “The State Parties undertake to prevent and 
punish torture in accordance with the terms of this Convention.”; art. 6: “The 
States Parties likewise shall take effective measures to prevent and punish 
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment within their 
jurisdiction.”) 
 • Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons, 9 June 
1994, International Legal Materials, vol. XXV, 1994, p. 1529 (art. 1(c): “The 
States Parties to this Convention undertake … [t]o cooperate with one another 
in helping to prevent, punish, and eliminate the forced disappearance of 
persons; [t]o take legislative, administrative, judicial, and any other measures 
necessary to comply with the commitments undertaken in this Convention.”) 
 • Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, 
9 December 1994, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2051, No. 34547 
(art. 11: “States Parties shall cooperate in the prevention of the crimes set out 
in article 9, particularly by: (a) Taking all practicable measures to prevent 
preparations in their respective territories for the commission of those crimes 
within or outside their territories; and (b) Exchanging information in 
accordance with their national law and coordinating the taking of 
administrative and other measures as appropriate to prevent the commission of 
those crimes.”) 
 • International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 
15 December 1997, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2149, No. 37517  
(art. 15(a): “States Parties shall cooperate in the prevention of the offences set 
forth in article 2 ….”) 
 • United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,  
15 November 2000, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2225, No. 39574  
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(art. 9(1): “In addition to the measures set forth in article 8 of this Convention, 
each State Party shall, to the extent appropriate and consistent with its legal 
system, adopt legislative, administrative or other effective measures to 
promote integrity and to prevent, detect and punish the corruption of public 
officials”; art. 9(2): “Each State Party shall take measures to ensure effective 
action by its authorities in the prevention, detection and punishment of the 
corruption of public officials, including providing such authorities with 
adequate independence to deter the exertion of inappropriate influence on their 
actions”; art. 29(1): “Each State Party shall, to the extent necessary, initiate, 
develop or improve specific training programmes for its law enforcement 
personnel, including prosecutors, investigating magistrates and customs 
personnel, and other personnel charged with the prevention, detection and 
control of the offences covered by this Convention”; art. 31(1): “States Parties 
shall endeavour to develop and evaluate national projects and to establish and 
promote best practices and policies aimed at the prevention of transnational 
organized crime”.) 
 • Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, 15 November 2000, United Nations , Treaty 
Series, vol. 2237, No. 39574 (art. 9(1): “States Parties shall establish 
comprehensive policies, programmes and other measures: (a) To prevent and 
combat trafficking in persons; and (b) To protect victims of trafficking in 
persons, especially women and children, from revictimization.”) 
 • Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 18 December 2002, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 2375, No. 24841 (preamble: “Recalling that the effective 
prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment requires education and a combination of various legislative, 
administrative, judicial and other measures”; art. 3 “Each State party shall set 
up, designate or maintain at the domestic level one or several visiting bodies 
for the prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment ...”) 
 • International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, 20 December 2006, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2716, 
No. 48088 (preamble: “Determined to prevent enforced disappearances and to 
combat impunity for the crime of enforced disappearance”; art. 23: “1. Each 
State Party shall ensure that the training of law enforcement personnel, civil or 
military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons who may be 
involved in the custody or treatment of any person deprived of liberty includes 
the necessary education and information regarding the relevant provis ions of 
this Convention, in order to: (a) Prevent the involvement of such officials in 
enforced disappearances; (b) Emphasize the importance of prevention and 
investigations in relation to enforced disappearances; (c) Ensure that the 
urgent need to resolve cases of enforced disappearance is recognized. 2. Each 
State Party shall ensure that orders or instructions prescribing, authorizing or 
encouraging enforced disappearance are prohibited. Each State Party shall 
guarantee that a person who refuses to obey such an order will not be 
punished. 3. Each State Party shall take the necessary measures to ensure that 
the persons referred to in paragraph 1 of this article who have reason to 
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believe that an enforced disappearance has occurred or is planned report the 
matter to their superiors and, where necessary, to the appropriate authorities or 
bodies vested with powers of review or remedy.”)168 
 • Protocol for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War 
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity and all forms of Discrimination,  
29 November 2006 (art. 8(1): “The Member States recognise that the crime of 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are crimes under 
international law and are crimes against people’s rights which they undertake 
to prevent and punish.”) 
87. Some multilateral human rights treaties, even though not focused on the 
prevention and punishment of crimes as such, contain relevant obligations to 
prevent and suppress serious human rights violations. Examples include:  
 • International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, 21 December 1965, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, 
No. 9464 (art. 3: “States Parties particularly condemn racial segregation and 
apartheid and undertake to prevent, prohibit and eradicate all practices of this 
nature in territories under their jurisdiction.”) 
 • Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
18 December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, No. 20378 (art. 2: 
“States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree 
to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating 
discrimination against women”; art. 3: “States Parties shall take in all fields, in 
particular in the political, social, economic and cultural fields, all appropriate 
measures, including legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement  
of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men”) 
 • Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against 
Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention), May 11, 2011, Council 
of Europe Treaty Series No. 210 (art. 4(2): “Parties condemn all forms of 
discrimination against women and take, without delay, the necessary 
legislative and other measures to prevent it, in particular by: embodying in 
their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation the principle of 
equality between women and men and ensuring the practical realisation of this 
principle; prohibiting discrimination against women, including through the use 
of sanctions, where appropriate; abolishing laws and practices which 
discriminate against women.”)  
Some treaties do not refer expressly to “prevention” or “elimination” of the act but, 
rather, focus on an obligation to take appropriate legislative, administrative and 
other measures to “give effect” to or to “implement” the treaty, which may be seen 
as encompassing necessary or appropriate measures to prevent the act. 169 Examples 
include: 
__________________ 
 168  See Vermeulen, supra note 156, at 66-76. 
 169  See, e.g., U. Kriebaum, “Prevention of Human Rights Violations,” Austrian Review of 
International and European Law, vol. 2, p. 156 (1997) (viewing ICCPR Article 2(2) as entailing 
“preventive measures to ensure the necessary conditions for unimpeded enjoyment of the rights 
enshrined in the Covenant.”). 
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 • International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, No. 14668: “Where not already 
provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the 
present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to 
adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant.”) 
 • Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 1577, No. 27531 (art. 4: “States Parties shall undertake all 
appropriate legislative, administrative, and other measures for the 
implementation of the rights recognized in the present Convention.”) 
88. As such, in treaties relating to crimes of the type enumerated in the definition 
of crimes against humanity (such as torture or apartheid), treaties relating to 
transnational crimes (such as transnational organized crime) and human rights 
treaties, an obligation to prevent the act at issue is commonly included. The 
obligation may be stated in a general fashion or may indicate, with a greater or 
lesser degree of specificity, that the State party shall take effective legislative, 
administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent the proscribed acts.  
 
 2. Comments by treaty bodies  
 
89. In some instances, committees established by such treaties have addressed the 
meaning of the obligation to prevent as contained in the relevant treaty. 170 Thus, in 
its general comment No. 2, the Committee against Torture addressed a State party ’s 
obligation to prevent State-sponsored torture under article 2 of the 1984 Convention 
against Torture. The Committee stated in part:  
 2. Article 2, paragraph 1 obliges each State party to take actions that 
will reinforce the prohibition against torture through legislative, 
administrative, judicial, or other actions that must, in the end, be effective in 
preventing it. To ensure that measures are in fact taken that are known to 
prevent or punish any acts of torture, the Convention outlines in subsequent 
articles obligations for the State party to take measures specified therein. 
 3. The obligation to prevent torture in article 2 is wide-ranging.… 
 4. States parties are obligated to eliminate any legal or other obstacles 
that impede the eradication of torture and ill-treatment; and to take positive 
effective measures to ensure that such conduct and any recurrences thereof are 
effectively prevented. States parties also have the obligation continually to 
keep under review and improve their national laws and performance under the 
Convention in accordance with the Committee’s concluding observations and 
views adopted on individual communications. If the measures adopted by the 
State party fail to accomplish the purpose of eradicating acts of torture, the 
Convention requires that they be revised and/or that new, more effective 
measures be adopted. Likewise, the Committee’s understanding of and 
__________________ 
 170  See B. Ramcharan, The Fundamentals of International Human Rights Treaty Law, at 100-04 
(Martinus Nijhoff, 2011). 
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recommendations in respect of effective measures are in a process of continual 
evolution, as, unfortunately, are the methods of torture and ill -treatment.171 
90. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination addressed a State 
party’s obligation to prevent racial discrimination in its general recommendation 
No. 31. In that recommendation, the Committee provided guidance on strategies 
States could employ to uphold their obligation to prevent discrimination, such as 
implementing national strategies or “plans of action aimed at the elimination of 
structural racial discrimination”,172 eliminating laws that target specific segments of 
the population173 and developing “through appropriate education programmes, 
training in respect for human rights, tolerance and friendship among racial or ethnic 
groups, as well as sensitization to intercultural relations, for law enforcement 
officials”.174 
91. Likewise, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
addressed a State party’s obligation to prevent violations of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, principally in its 
general recommendations Nos. 6, 15 and 19. In general recommendation No. 6, the 
Committee recommended that States parties “[e]stablish and/or strengthen effective 
national machinery, institutions and procedures, at a high level of Government, and 
with adequate resources, commitment and authority to … [m]onitor the situation of 
women comprehensively; [h]elp formulate new policies and effectively carry out 
strategies and measures to eliminate discrimination” and also “[t]ake appropriate 
steps to ensure the dissemination of the Convention”.175 In general recommendation 
No. 15, the Committee recommended that States parties report on their efforts to 
prevent specific discrimination against women who have contracted AIDS. 176 In 
general recommendation No. 19, the Committee emphasized that:  
under article 2(e) the Convention calls on States parties to take all appropriate 
measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, 
organization or enterprise. Under general international law and specific human 
rights covenants, States may also be responsible for private acts if they fail to 
act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and 
punish acts of violence, and for providing compensation.177 
92. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in its report on “Citizen 
security and human rights”, noted that one of the main obligations of the state in 
upholding human rights “is linked to the judicial clarification of criminal conduct 
__________________ 
 171  See Committee Against Torture, General Comment No. 2, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2/CRP.1/Rev.4, 
paras. 2-4 (Nov. 2007). For an assessment of the Committee’s practice with respect to Article 2, 
see M. Nowak & E. McArthur, The United Nations Convention against Torture: A Commentary , 
at 94-107 (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
 172  Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation XXXI on the 
prevention of racial discrimination in the administration and functioning of the criminal justice 
system, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/GC/31/Rev.4, para. 5(i) (2005). 
 173  Ibid., para. 5(a). 
 174  Ibid., para. 5(b). 
 175  Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation 
No. 6, U.N. Doc. A/43/38, paras. 1-2 (1988). 
 176  Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation 
No. 15, U.N. Doc. A/45/38, para. (d) (1990). 
 177  Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation 
No. 19, U.N. Doc. A/47/38, para. 9 (1992). 
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with the view to eliminating impunity and preventing the recurrence of violence … 
[u]ndoubtedly the adequate and effective administration of justice on the part of the 
judicial branch and to an appropriate extent, of disciplinary entities, has a 
fundamental role … in terms of the lessening of the risk and the scope of 
violence.”178 
93. With respect to treaties that focus on an obligation to take appropriate 
legislative, administrative and other measures to “give effect” to or to “implement” 
the treaty, the relevant treaty bodies have also issued comments. Thus, the Human 
Rights Committee, in its general comment No. 3, emphasized, in part, “that all 
administrative and judicial authorities should be aware of the obligations which the 
State party has assumed under the Covenant. To this end, the Covenant should be 
publicized in all official languages of the State and steps should be taken to 
familiarize the authorities concerned with its contents as part of their training”.179 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child, in general comment No. 5, sought to 
clarify what was meant by “general measures of implementation” and determined 
that they: 
are intended to promote the full enjoyment of all rights in the Convention … 
through legislation, the establishment of coordinating and monitoring  
bodies … comprehensive data collection, awareness-raising and training and 
the development and implementation of appropriate policies, services and 
programmes.180 
In general comment No. 6, the Committee provided guidance on various measures 
for preventing mistreatment of unaccompanied and separated children located 
outside their country of origin, including prevention of trafficking and sexual 
exploitation, prevention of their military recruitment and prevention of their 
detention.181 
 
 3. United Nations resolutions 
 
94. The General Assembly has periodically made reference to an obligation of 
States to prevent crimes against humanity. For example, in its 1973 Principles of 
international co-operation in the detection, arrest, extradition and punishment of 
persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity, the Assembly recognized 
a general responsibility for inter-State cooperation and intra-State action to prevent 
the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Among other things, the 
Assembly declared that “States shall co-operate with each other on a bilateral and 
multilateral basis with a view to halting and preventing war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, and shall take the domestic and international measures necessary 
for that purpose”.182 In its 2005 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
__________________ 
 178  Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 57, para. 36 (2009). 
 179  Human Rights Committee, General Comment 3, Article 2 Implementation at the National Level , 
para. 2 (July 29, 1981), in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations 
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, vol. 1, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9, p. 175 (2008). 
 180  Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 5, General Measures of 
implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, arts. 4, 42 and 44 , U.N. Doc. 
CRC/GC/2003/5, para. 9 (Nov. 27, 2003). 
 181  Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6, U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2005/6, 
paras. 50-63 (2005). 
 182  G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVIII), para. 3 (1973). 
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Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human 
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, the 
Assembly stated that the “obligation to respect, ensure respect for and implement 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law as provided for 
under the respective bodies of law, includes, inter alia, the duty to … [t]ake 
appropriate legislative and administrative and other appropriate measures to prevent 
violations”.183 
 
 4. Case law 
 
95. In Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) , the 
International Court of Justice analysed the meaning of “undertake to prevent” as 
contained in article I of the 1948 Genocide Convention. At the provisional measures 
phase, the Court determined that the undertaking in article I imposes “a clear 
obligation” on the two parties “to do all in their power to prevent the commission of 
any such acts in the future”.184 At the merits phase, the Court described such an 
undertaking as “a formal promise … not merely hortatory or purposive … and is not 
to be read merely as an introduction to later express references to legislation, 
prosecution and extradition”.185 
96. The Court then indicated two types of obligations associated with article I, 
beginning with the obligation that a State itself not commit genocide:  
 Under Article I the States parties are bound to prevent such an act, which 
it describes as “a crime under international law”, being committed. The Article 
does not expressis verbis require States to refrain from themselves committing 
genocide. However, in the view of the Court, taking into account the 
established purpose of the Convention, the effect of Article I is to prohibit 
States from themselves committing genocide. Such a prohibition follows, first, 
from the fact that the Article categorizes genocide as “a crime under 
international law”: by agreeing to such a categorization, the States parties must 
logically be undertaking not to commit the act so described. Secondly, it 
follows from the expressly stated obligation to prevent the commission of acts 
of genocide. That obligation requires the States parties, inter alia, to employ 
the means at their disposal, in circumstances to be described more specifically 
later in this Judgment, to prevent persons or groups not directly under their 
authority from committing an act of genocide or any of the other acts 
mentioned in Article III. It would be paradoxical if States were thus under an 
obligation to prevent, so far as within their power, commission of genocide by 
persons over whom they have a certain influence, but were not forbidden to 
commit such acts through their own organs, or persons over whom they have 
such firm control that their conduct is attributable to the State concerned under 
international law. In short, the obligation to prevent genocide necessarily 
implies the prohibition of the commission of genocide.186 
__________________ 
 183  G.A. Res. 60/147, Annex, para. 3(a) (Dec. 16, 2005). 
 184  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Order on Provisional Measures, I.C.J. Reports 1993, 
p. 3, at p. 22. 
 185  2007 Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro Judgment, supra  note 6, para. 162. 
 186  Ibid., para. 166. 
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97. The Court also decided that the substantive obligation reflected in article I wa s 
not, on its face, limited by territory but, rather, applied “to a State wherever it may 
be acting or may be able to act in ways appropriate to meeting the obligation[] in 
question.”187 Later in the judgment, the Court addressed in greater depth the 
obligation that a State party employ the means at its disposal to prevent persons or 
groups not under its authority from committing genocide. The Court said:  
it is clear that the obligation in question is one of conduct and not one of 
result, in the sense that a State cannot be under an obligation to succeed, 
whatever the circumstances, in preventing the commission of genocide: the 
obligation of States parties is rather to employ all means reasonably available 
to them, so as to prevent genocide so far as possible. A State does not incur 
responsibility simply because the desired result is not achieved; responsibility 
is however incurred if the State manifestly failed to take all measures to 
prevent genocide which were within its power, and which might have 
contributed to preventing the genocide. In this area the notion of “due 
diligence,” which calls for an assessment in concreto, is of critical importance. 
Various parameters operate when assessing whether a State has duly 
discharged the obligation concerned. The first, which varies greatly from one 
State to another, is clearly the capacity to influence effectively the action of 
persons likely to commit, or already committing, genocide. This capacity itself 
depends, among other things, on the geographical distance of the State 
concerned from the scene of the events, and on the strength of the political 
links, as well as links of all other kinds, between the authorities of that State 
and the main actors in the events. The State’s capacity to influence must also 
be assessed by legal criteria, since it is clear that every State may only act 
within the limits permitted by international law; seen thus, a State ’s capacity to 
influence may vary depending on its particular legal position vis -à-vis the 
situations and persons facing the danger, or the reality, of genocide. On the 
other hand, it is irrelevant whether the State whose responsibility is in issue 
claims, or even proves, that even if it had employed all means reasonably at its 
disposal, they would not have sufficed to prevent the commission of genocide. 
As well as being generally difficult to prove, this is irrelevant to the breach of 
the obligation of conduct in question, the more so since the possibility remains 
that the combined efforts of several States, each complying with its obligation 
to prevent, might have achieved the result — averting the commission of 
genocide — which the efforts of only one State were insufficient to produce. 188 
98. In this context, the Court continued, 
a State’s obligation to prevent, and the corresponding duty to act, arise at the 
instant that the State learns of, or should normally have learned of, the 
existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed. From that moment 
onwards, if the State has available to it means likely to have a  deterrent effect 
on those suspected of preparing genocide, or reasonably suspected of 
harbouring specific intent (dolus specialis), it is under a duty to make such use 
of these means as the circumstances permit. 189 
__________________ 
 187  Ibid., para. 183. 
 188  Ibid., para. 430. 
 189  Ibid., para. 431. 
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99. The Court stressed that breach of this type of obligation to prevent “results 
from mere failure to adopt and implement suitable measures to prevent genocide 
from being committed. In other words … violation of the obligation to prevent 
results from omission” and, as such, “the duty to prevent places States under 
positive obligations, to do their best to ensure that such acts do not occur”.190 To 
incur responsibility, “it is enough that the State was aware, or should normally have 
been aware, of the serious danger that acts of genocide would be co mmitted”.191 At 
the same time, the Court maintained that “a State can be held responsible for 
breaching the obligation to prevent genocide only if genocide was actually 
committed”.192 
100. The Court also addressed the distinction between prevention and punishment. 
While “one of the most effective ways of preventing criminal acts, in general, is to 
provide penalties for persons committing such acts, and to impose those penalties 
effectively on those who commit the acts one is trying to prevent”,193 the Court 
found that “the duty to prevent genocide and the duty to punish its perpetrators … 
are … two distinct yet connected obligations.”194 Indeed, the “obligation on each 
contracting State to prevent genocide is both normative and compelling. It is not 
merged in the duty to punish, nor can it be regarded as simply a component of that 
duty.”195 
101. The Court cautioned that the “content of the duty to prevent varies from one 
instrument to another, according to the wording of the relevant provisions, and 
depending on the nature of the acts to be prevented”, and hence the Court’s decision 
did not “purport to establish a general jurisprudence applicable to all cases where a 
treaty instrument, or other binding legal norm, includes an obligation for States to 
prevent certain acts”.196 
102. The 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms197 contains no express obligation to “prevent” violations of 
the Convention, but the European Court of Human Rights has construed individual 
articles to contain such an obligation. Thus, in Kilic v. Turkey, the Court found that 
article 2(1) of the Convention, on the right to life, obliged a State party not only to 
refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate 
steps within its domestic legal system to safeguard the lives of those within its 
jurisdiction.198 Construing the same article in Makaratzis v. Greece, the Court 
determined that this “involves a primary duty on the State to secure the right to life 
by putting in place an appropriate legal and administrative framework to deter the 
__________________ 
 190  Ibid., para. 432. 
 191  Ibid. 
 192  Ibid., para. 431; see Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 72, Article 14, para. 3 
(maintaining that “[t]he breach of an international obligation requiring a State to prevent a given 
event occurs when the event occurs….”); J. Salmon, “Duration of the Breach,” in J. Crawford 
et al. (eds.), The Law of International Responsibility, p. 383 (Oxford University Press, 2010); 
C. Economides, “Content of the Obligation: Obligations of Means and Obligations of Result,” in 
ibid., p. 371. 
 193  2007 Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro Judgment, supra  note 6, para. 426. 
 194  Ibid., para. 425. 
 195  Ibid., para. 427. 
 196  Ibid., para. 429. 
 197  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5 as amended by E.T.S. No. 155. 
 198  Kiliç v. Turkey, E.Ct.H.R., Judgment, App. No. 22492/93, para. 62 (2000).  
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commission of offences against the person, backed up by law-enforcement 
machinery for the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such 
provisions”.199 
103. At the same time, the Court has recognized that the State party’s obligation in 
this regard is limited. In Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, the Court found: 
Bearing in mind the difficulties in policing modern societies, the 
unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be 
made in terms of priorities and resources, the positive obligation [of article 2(1)]  
must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or 
disproportionate burden on the authorities. Accordingly, not every claimed risk 
to life can entail for the authorities a Convention requirement to take 
operational measures to prevent that risk from materialising. For a positive 
obligation to arise, it must be established that the authorities knew or ought to 
have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life 
of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party 
and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, 
judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk.200 
104. The 1969 American Convention on Human Rights201 also contains no express 
obligation to “prevent” violations of the Convention. Even so, when construing the 
obligation of the States parties to “ensure” the free and full exercise of the rights 
recognized by the Convention,202 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has 
found that this obligation implies a “duty to prevent”, which in turn requires the 
State party to pursue certain steps. Specifically, the Court in Velasquez Rodriguez v. 
Honduras found: 
166. … This obligation implies the duty of the States parties to organize the 
governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which 
public power is exercised, so that they are capable of juridically ensuring the 
free and full enjoyment of human rights. As a consequence of this obligation, 
the States must prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights 
recognized by the Convention and, moreover, if possible attempt to restore the 
right violated and provide compensation as warranted for damages resulting 
from the violation. 
174. The State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human 
rights violations and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious 
investigation of violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those 
responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim 
adequate compensation. 
__________________ 
 199  Makaratzis v. Greece, E.Ct.H.R., Judgment, App. No. 50385/99, para. 57 (2004). 
 200  Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, E.Ct.H.R., Judgment, App. No. 22535/93, para. 86 (2000); see also 
Osman v. United Kingdom, E.Ct.H.R., Judgment, App. No. 87/1997/871/1083, para. 116 (1998); 
Kerimova a.o. v. Russia, E.Ct.H.R., Judgment, App. Nos. 17170/04, 22448/04, 3360/04, 5681/05 
and 5684/05, para. 246 (2011). 
 201  American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Official Records OEA/Ser. K/XVI/1.1, Doc. 65, 
Rev. 1, Corr. 1 (Jan. 7, 1970). 
 202  Article 1(1) reads: The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and 
freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and 
full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination ….” 
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175. This duty to prevent includes all those means of a legal, political, 
administrative and cultural nature that promote the protection of human rights 
and ensure that any violations are considered and treated as illegal acts, which, 
as such, may lead to the punishment of those responsible and the obligation to 
indemnify the victims for damages. It is not possible to make a detail ed list of 
all such measures, since they vary with the law and the conditions of each 
State party. Of course, while the State is obligated to prevent human rights 
abuses, the existence of a particular violation does not, in itself, prove the 
failure to take preventive measures. On the other hand, subjecting a person to 
official, repressive bodies that practice torture and assassination with impunity 
is itself a breach of the duty to prevent violations of the rights to life and 
physical integrity of the person, even if that particular person is not tortured or 
assassinated, or if those facts cannot be proven in a concrete case. 203 
105. Similar reasoning has animated the Court’s approach to interpretation of 
article 6 of the 1966 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. For 
example, in Tibi v. Ecuador, the Court found that Ecuador violated article 6 when it 
failed to initiate formal investigations after complaints of maltreatment of 
prisoners.204 
 
 5. Publicists 
 
106. Publicists have also analysed these treaty obligations concerning prevention. 
With respect to the general obligation to prevent, a central focus of recent 
scholarship has been the 2007 judgment of the International Court of Justice in 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) .205 Owing to the 
absence of an express statement in the Genocide Convention that States parties shall 
not commit genocide, some scholars have debated whether the Court was correct in 
maintaining that the obligation is implicit in the obligation to “prevent”.206 
Reflecting on a judgment in which he participated, however, former Judge Bruno 
Simma has indicated: “One of the more interesting questions finally put to rest in 
the 2007 judgment concerned whether States parties to the Convention are 
__________________ 
 203  Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, 4 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), paras. 166, 174–75; see also 
Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judgment (Ser. C), no. 99, para. 137, 
142 (2003); see also Gómez-Paquiyauri Brothers v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judgment 
(Ser. C), no. 110, para. 155 (2004) (finding that the State’s failure to effectively investigate 
allegations of torture and leaving acts unpunished meant that they had failed to take effective 
measures to prevent such acts from occurring, in violation of its obligations under the provisions 
of Article 6 of the Inter-American Torture Convention). 
 204  Tibi v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judgment (Ser. C) No. 114, para. 159 (2004); see also 
Gómez-Paquiyauri Brothers v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judgment (Ser. C) No. 110, para. 155 
(2004). 
 205  See, e.g., M. Piqué, “Beyond Territory, Jurisdiction, and Control: Towards a Comprehensive 
Obligation to Prevent Crimes Against Humanity,” in Bergsmo & Song, supra note 7, p. 135; 
T. Weber, “The Obligation to Prevent in the Proposed Convention Examined in Light of the 
Obligation to Prevent in the Genocide Convention, ibid., p. 173. 
 206  Compare P. Gaeta, “On What Conditions Can a State Be Held Responsible for Genocide?,” 
European J. Int’l L., vol. 18, p. 631 (2007), with C. Tams, “Article I,” in Tams et al., supra 
note 140, at 56-60; A. Seibert-Fohr, “The ICJ Judgment in the ‘Bosnian Genocide’ Case and 
Beyond: A Need to Reconceptualise?,” in Safferling & Conze, (eds.), The Genocide Convention 
Sixty Years After its Adoption, p. 245 (Asser 2010). 
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themselves under an obligation not to commit genocide. The Court ’s answer is a 
clear ‘yes’.”207 
107. With respect to the obligation to pursue specific measures of prevention, 
publicists tend to characterize the obligation as an obligation of conduct or means. 
Thus, 
in relation to an obligation of means, the State may be bound to take positive 
measures of prevention or protection in order to obtain a particular goal …. 
The expressions used vary from one treaty to another (“take all measures”, “all 
appropriate measures to protect”, “necessary measures”, “effective measures”, 
“appropriate measures”, “do everything possible”, “do everything in its 
power”, “exercise due diligence”), but their common feature is their general 
formulation and their lack of precise stipulation of the means to achieve the 
specified result.208  
108. Other publicists have focused on the obligation to prevent as it exists in 
particular treaties, such as article I of the Genocide Convention209 or article 2(1) of 
the Convention against Torture. For example, two participants in the drafting of 
article 2(1) of the Convention against Torture have analysed it as follows:  
According to paragraph 1 of the article, … each State party shall take effective 
measures to prevent torture. The character of these measures is left to the 
discretion of the State concerned. It is merely indicated that the measures may 
be legislative, administrative, judicial or of some other kind, but in any case 
they must be effective. The paragraph should also be compared with article 4 
of the Convention, which specifically requires legislative measures in order to 
make all acts of torture criminal offences punishable by appropriate penalties 
which take into account their grave nature. 
 The obligation under article 2 is not only to prohibit but to prevent acts 
of torture. This further emphasizes that the measures shall be effective: a 
formal prohibition is not sufficient, but the acts shall actually be prevented.  
 This does not mean, of course, that a State can guarantee that no act of 
torture will ever be committed in its territory. It is sufficient that the State does 
what can reasonably be expected from it in order to prevent such acts from 
occurring. If nevertheless such acts occur, other obligations under the 
Convention become applicable, and the State may then be obliged under  
article 2, paragraph 1, to take further effective measures in order to prevent a 
repetition. Such measures may include changes of personnel in a certain unit, 
stricter supervision, the issue of new instructions, etc.210 
__________________ 
 207  Simma, supra note 161, at 264. 
 208  C. Economides, supra note 192, at 378. 
 209  See, e.g., W. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes , at 520-25 
(Cambridge University Press, 2d ed. 2009); C. Tams, “Article I,” in Tams et al., supra note 140, 
at 45-54; O. Ben-Naftali, “The Obligation to Prevent and Punish Genocide,” in Gaeta, supra 
note 140, p. 26, at 33-44. 
 210  J. Burgers and H. Danelius, The United Nations Convention against Torture: A Handbook on the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment , 
at 48, 123 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988) (Bergers, a member of the Netherlands delegation  
to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, served as chairman of the working group charged 
with drawing up the initial draft of the Convention; Danelius, a member of the Swedish 
delegation, was a member of that working group and wrote the initial draft).  
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109. Still other publicists have analysed the obligation to prevent as expressed in 
case law. For example, one analysis of the Velasquez Rodriguez case finds:  
 The duty to prevent includes all those means of a legal, political, 
administrative and cultural nature that promote the protection of human rights 
and ensure that any violations are considered and treated as illegal acts, which, 
as such, may lead to the punishment of those responsible and the obligation to 
indemnify the victims for damages. The Court clarified, however, that while 
the State is obligated to prevent human rights abuses, the existence of a 
particular violation did not, in itself, prove the failure to take pr eventive 
measures. On the other hand, subjecting a person to official, repressive bodies 
that practiced torture and assassination with impunity was itself a breach of the 
duty to prevent violations of the rights to life and physical integrity of the 
person, even if that particular person was not tortured or assassinated, or if 
those facts could not be proven in a concrete case.211  
110. Publicists appear to recognize that the obligation to pursue specific measures 
to prevent does not actually dictate the specific steps that must be taken and instead 
accepts that such steps may vary according to the nature of the conduct being 
regulated and the context in which the State party is operating. Thus, one publicist 
has analysed the obligation to prevent as expressed by treaty-monitoring bodies, in 
case law, and in other sources so as to sketch out specific measures that should be 
undertaken by a State party to the International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance. Those measures included: (a) protective 
measures to prevent the enforced disappearance of persons not in detention;  
(b) safeguards surrounding arrest and detention to prevent subsequent enforced 
disappearance; and (c) measures to prevent repetition of enforced disappeara nce of 
persons when it occurs.212 
 
 
 B. Obligation to prevent and punish crimes against humanity 
 
 
111. In light of the above, there appear to be three important elements that might be 
captured in an initial draft article for a convention on crimes against humanity. First, 
the draft article could contain an opening provision that speaks generally to the 
obligation of a State party both to prevent and to punish crimes against humanity. 
Such a provision would signal at the outset the broad obligation being undertaken 
by States parties with respect to the particular offence of crimes against humanity. 
Second, the draft article could contain a further provision addressing the obligation 
of the State party to pursue specific measures of prevention in the form of 
appropriate legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures. Consistent with 
prior treaties, this provision would only address the issue of prevention, since most 
of the remainder of the convention on crimes against humanity will address in 
greater detail specific measures that must be taken by the State party to punish 
crimes against humanity, including the obligations to incorporate crimes against 
humanity into national law and to exercise national jurisdiction over alleged 
offenders. Finally, a third provision of the draft article could address the  
non-derogable nature of the prohibition on crimes against humanity, an important 
__________________ 
 211  Ramcharan, supra note 170, at 99. For an analysis of the “reasonableness” standard articulated 
by both the European and Inter-American Courts, see Vermeulen, supra note 156, at 265–68. 
 212  Vermeulen, supra note 156, at 268–312. 
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statement at the outset of the convention that would highlight the seriousness of this 
offence. Each of these elements is discussed below. 
 
 1. General obligation to prevent and punish 
 
112. Based on the prior treaty practice recounted above, there are various ways that 
a general obligation to prevent and punish might be expressed in a convention on 
crimes against humanity. The provisions contained in the 1948 Convention against 
Genocide and the 1949 Geneva Conventions were early efforts at identifying such 
an obligation. Even so, the approach in article I of the Genocide Convention — 
“confirming” genocide to be a crime under international law and calling upon States 
parties to pursue steps to prevent and punish such conduct — remains a useful 
model for a general obligation in a convention to prevent crimes against humanity. 
Again, that formulation is: 
The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of 
peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they 
undertake to prevent and to punish. 
Using such a formulation would “confirm” that crimes against humanity currently 
violate customary international law; would clearly confirm its historical 
development as a crime that arises whether committed in time of peace or war; and 
would generally presage what follows in subsequent provisions that call upon States 
parties to take specific steps, such as adopting any necessary national criminal 
legislation. Further, using such a formulation would help in harmonizing the present 
draft articles with a widely-adhered-to convention on another core crime of 
international law (as at January 2015, there are 146 States parties to the Genocide 
Convention). 
113. The words “undertake to” remain appropriate, given the analysis of the 
International Court of Justice that “the ordinary meaning of the word ‘undertake’ is 
to give a formal promise, to bind or engage oneself, to give a pledge or promise, to 
agree, to accept an obligation”.213 As discussed above, this obligation consists of 
two types of obligations: (a) an obligation by the State not to commit such acts 
through its own organs, or persons over whom they have control such that their 
conduct is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) an obligation for 
the State to employ the reasonable means at its disposal, when necessary, 
appropriate and lawful, to prevent others not directly under its authority from 
committing such acts.214 The formulation contained in article I of the Genocide 
Convention is not, by its terms, limited in geographic scope. As such, it prohibits a 
State party from committing genocide outside territory under its jurisdiction, an d 
imposes an obligation to act with respect to other actors outside such territory, 
subject to the important parameters discussed above.  
 
 2. Specific measures for prevention 
 
114. At the same time, as noted above, an obligation exists in numerous treatie s 
that requires States Parties to pursue specific types of measures to prevent the 
crime. One widely-adhered-to formulation is found in article 2(1) of the 1984 
__________________ 
 213  2007 Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro Judgment, supra  note 6, para. 162. 
 214  Ibid., para. 166. 
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Convention against Torture (as at January 2015, 156 States have adhered to this 
convention), which provides that: 
Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or 
other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its 
jurisdiction.215 
115. During the drafting of the Convention against Torture, this language was 
understood to provide flexibility and discretion to each State party as to the 
character of the measures to be taken, so long as they promote the basic objectives 
of the treaty.216 By referring to acts occurring “in any territory under its 
jurisdiction”, the language is broader than a reference solely to conduct occurring in 
the State’s “territory”,217 but narrower than language that could suggest an 
obligation upon the State to develop legislative, administrative, judicial or other 
measures to prevent any conduct worldwide. “Territory under its jurisdiction” 
includes sovereign territory, vessels and aircraft of the State ’s nationality and 
occupied and other territory under its jurisdiction.218 Such a geographic formulation 
appears to be supported in many contemporary treaties in addition to the 
Convention against Torture;219 by establishing an obligation upon States to take 
specific measures to prevent conduct “in territory under its jurisdiction”, the 
language focuses the obligation on areas where the State has a day-to-day ability to 
act and avoids suggesting a more open-ended and therefore perhaps less clear 
obligation with respect to the adoption of specific measures.  
116. As noted above, the specific measures that must be taken will depend in part 
on the context and risks at issue for any given State party. Nevertheless, such an 
obligation normally would oblige the State party to: (a) adopt national laws, 
institutions and policies necessary to establish awareness of the criminality of the 
act and to promote early detection of any risk of its commission; (b) continually to 
keep those laws and policies under review and as necessary improve them;  
(c) pursue initiatives that educate governmental officials as to the State ’s obligations 
under the convention; (d) develop training programmes for police, military, militia 
and other relevant personnel as necessary to help prevent the commission of crimes 
against humanity; and (e) once the proscribed act is committed, fulfil in good faith 
other obligations within the convention that require the State party to investigate 
and either prosecute or extradite offenders, since doing so serves, in part, to deter 
__________________ 
 215  Article 2(3) provides: “An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be 
invoked as a justification of torture.” The issue raised by this provision will be addressed in a 
future report of the Special Rapporteur in the context of the State Party ’s obligation to ensure 
that a crime against humanity constitutes an offence under its criminal law.  
 216  See ibid. 
 217  See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally 
Protected Persons, art. 4(1), Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 (obliging States to take “all 
practicable measures to prevent preparations in their respective territories for the commission 
of” offences); Convention against the Taking of Hostages, art. 4(1), Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 
U.N.T.S. 205 (same); Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, 
art. 11(a), Dec. 9, 1994, 2051 U.N.T.S. 363 (same). 
 218  Nowak and McArthur, supra note 171, at 116-17. 
 219  See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, art. 3, Dec.  21, 
1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (obliging States to “undertake to prevent … all practices of this nature 
in territories under their jurisdiction”); Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish 
torture), art. 6, O.A.S. Official Records OAS/Ser.L.V.1.4, Doc. 67, Rev. 9 (Dec. 9, 1985 
(obliging States to “take effective measures to prevent … torture within their jurisdiction”). 
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future acts by others. Such measures, of course, may already be in place for most 
States, since the underlying wrongful acts associated with crimes against humanity 
(murder, torture, etc.) are already proscribed in most national legal systems.  
117. The general and more specific obligations to prevent crimes against humanity 
on the basis of the above-quoted texts would build upon obligations that already 
exist to prevent the underlying wrongful acts from occurring even on an isolated 
basis. When combining them in a single draft article, the texts might be harmonized 
by referring to “Each State Party” (used in the Convention against Torture) rather 
than “The Contracting Parties” (used in the Genocide Convention). 
 
 3. Non-derogation provision 
 
118. As previously noted, general and specific obligations on prevention are often 
accompanied by a further provision indicating that no exceptional circumstances 
(such as the existence of an armed conflict or a public emergency) may be invoked 
as a justification for the offence. Such a general statement is often placed at the 
outset of the treaty that addresses serious crimes, which has the advantage of 
stressing that the obligation not to commit the offence is non-derogable in nature. 
119. For example, article 2(2) of the Convention against Torture makes clear that 
no exceptional situation may be invoked to justify acts of torture; hence, the 
obligation set forth is non-derogable in nature.220 Specifically, that paragraph 
provides: 
No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of 
war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be 
invoked as a justification of torture.221 
Comparable language may be found in other treaties addressing serious crimes at 
the global or regional level. For example, article 1(2) of the 2006 International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance contains 
the same language, while article 5 of the 1985 Inter-American Convention to 
Prevent and Punish Torture contains comparable language. One advantage of this 
formulation with respect to crimes against humanity is that it is drafted in a manner 
that can speak to the conduct of either State or non-State actors. 
 
 
__________________ 
 220  See Burgers and Danelius, supra note 21010, at 124; Nowak and McArthur, supra note 171, 
at 116-17. 
 221  Convention against Torture, supra note 27, art. 2(2). Article 2(3) of the Convention against 
Torture provides: “An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as 
a justification of torture.” The issue raised by this provision will be addressed in a future report 
of the Special Rapporteur in the context of the State Party’s obligation to ensure that a crime 
against humanity constitutes an offence under its criminal law.  
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 C. Draft article 1: Preventing and punishing crimes against humanity 
 
 
120. Bearing these considerations in mind, the Special Rapporteur proposes the 
following draft article: 
 
  Draft article 1 
  Prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity 
 
 1. Each State Party confirms that crimes against humanity, whether 
committed in time of peace or in time of war, are crimes under international 
law which it undertakes to prevent and punish. 
 2. Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, 
judicial or other measures to prevent crimes against humanity in any territory 
under its jurisdiction. 
 3. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or 
a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, 
may be invoked as a justification of crimes against humanity.  
 
 
 VI. Definition of crimes against humanity 
 
 
121. As indicated in section III above, the definition of crimes agains t humanity has 
been the subject of different formulations over the past century. The most widely 
accepted formulation, however, is that of article 7 of the Rome Statute, which was 
built upon the formulations articulated in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters,  the 
Nuremberg Principles, the 1954 draft Code of Offences against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind, the 1993 statute of the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia , the 1994 statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the 
1994 draft statute for an international criminal court, of the International Law 
Commission, and the Commission’s 1996 draft Code of Crimes against the Peace 
and Security of Mankind. Article 7 of the Rome Statute reflects an agreement 
reached among the 122 States that were parties to the statute as at January 2015.  
122. While from time to time the view is expressed that article 7 might be 
improved, and although disagreements may exist regarding whether it reflects 
customary international law222 or what constitutes the best interpretation of some of 
its aspects,223 there can be little doubt that article 7 has very broad support among 
States as a definition of crimes against humanity. Indeed, every State that addressed 
this issue before the Sixth Committee in the fall of 2014 maintained that the 
__________________ 
 222  See, e.g., A. Cassese, “Crimes against Humanity,” supra note 37, at 375. For example, while a 
“policy” element appears in Article 7, the ICTY Appeals Chamber maintained in 2002 in the 
Kunarac case that there is “nothing” in customary international law that requires a policy 
element and, rather, an “overwhelming” case against it. Kunarac 2002, para. 98; see also 
Mettraux, supra note 79, pp. 270−82. Yet with the passage of time and the adherence of a large 
number of States to the Rome Statute, it seems likely that Article 7 is having an effect in 
crystalizing customary international law. See generally R. Baxter, “Multilateral Treaties as 
Evidence of Customary International Law”, British Yearbook of Int’l L., vol. 41 (1965), p. 275.  
 223  See, e.g., D. Robinson, “The Draft Convention on Crimes Against Humanity: What to Do with 
the Definition?,” in Bergsmo & Song, supra note 7, at 103, 105 (but concluding that “the 
arguments for crafting a new definition are widely seen to be outweighed by the benefits of 
using the established definition in Article 7” of the Rome Statute). 
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Commission should not adopt a definition of “crimes against humanity” for a new 
convention that differs from article 7 of the Rome Statute.224 Moreover, any 
convention that seeks in part to promote the complementarity regime of the  Rome 
Statute should use the article 7 definition so as to foster national laws that are in 
harmony with the Rome Statute. More generally, using the article 7 definition would 
help minimize undesirable fragmentation in the field of international criminal l aw. 
123. Article 7 of the Rome Statute provides: 
 
   Article 7 
Crimes against humanity 
 
  1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crimes against humanity” means 
any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of 
the attack: 
  (a) Murder; 
  (b) Extermination; 
  (c) Enslavement; 
  (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;  
  (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in 
violation of fundamental rules of international law; 
  (f) Torture; 
  (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable 
gravity; 
  (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in 
paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible 
under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this 
paragraph or in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;  
  (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; 
  (j) The crime of apartheid; 
  (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing 
great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.  
__________________ 
 224  See Austria (A/C.6/69/SR.19, para. 111); Croatia (A/C.6/69/SR.20, para. 94); Finland on behalf 
of the Nordic countries (A/C.6/69/SR.19, para. 81); Italy (A/C.6/69/SR.22, para. 53); Poland 
(A/C.6/69/SR.20, para. 36); New Zealand (A/C.6/69/SR.21, para. 33); Republic of Korea (ibid., 
para. 45); and Mongolia (A/C.6/69/SR.24, para. 94). Similar views were expressed in the 
interventions made in 2013 on this issue. See, e.g., Statement to the Sixth Committee by 
Norway (on behalf of the Nordic countries), supra note 12: (“[I]t is the firm opinion of the 
Nordic countries that agreed language within the Rome Statute cannot be opened for 
reconsideration in this process. Notably, the definition of crimes against humanity in Article 7 of 
the Rome Statute must be retained as the material basis for any further work of the ILC on this 
topic.”).  
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 2. For the purpose of paragraph 1: 
  (a)  “Attack directed against any civilian population” means a course 
of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragrap h 1 
against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or 
organizational policy to commit such attack; 
  (b) “Extermination” includes the intentional infliction of conditions of 
life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to 
bring about the destruction of part of a population;  
  (c) “Enslavement” means the exercise of any or all of the powers 
attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of 
such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and 
children;  
  (d) “Deportation or forcible transfer of population” means forced 
displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts 
from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted 
under international law;  
  (e) “Torture” means the intentional infliction of severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under 
the control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions;  
  (f) “Forced pregnancy” means the unlawful confinement of a woman 
forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of 
any population or carrying out other grave violations of international law. This 
definition shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws 
relating to pregnancy;  
  (g) “Persecution” means the intentional and severe deprivation of 
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of 
the group or collectivity;  
  (h) “The crime of apartheid” means inhumane acts of a character 
similar to those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context of an 
institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial 
group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention 
of maintaining that regime;  
  (i) “Enforced disappearance of persons” means the arrest, detention or 
abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, 
a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that 
deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of 
those persons, with the intention of removing them from the pro tection of the 
law for a prolonged period of time.  
  3. For the purposes of this Statute, it is understood that the term 
“gender” refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of 
society. The term “gender” does not indicate any meaning different from the 
above.  
124. As noted in section III above, early definitions of crimes against humanity 
required that the underlying acts be accomplished in connection with armed 
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conflict, most likely in part to address concerns about whether the crime was  well-
settled in international law, and in part to distinguish international crimes from 
large-scale, violent national crimes.225 While the statute of the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia maintained the armed conflict connection 
because that statute was crafted in the context of such a conflict, since 1993 that 
connection has disappeared from the statutes of international criminal tribunals, 
including the Rome Statute.226 In its place are the “chapeau” requirements that the 
crime be committed within the context of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to 
commit such an attack.  
 
 
 A. “Widespread or systematic” attack 
 
 
125. The requirement that there be a “widespread or systematic attack” first 
appeared in the statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 227 though 
some decisions of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia maintained 
that the requirement was implicit even in the that court ’s statute, given the inclusion 
of such language in the report of the Secretary-General proposing the statute.228 
Jurisprudence of both courts maintained that the conditions of “widespread” and 
“systematic” were disjunctive rather than conjunctive requirements; either condition 
may be met to establish the existence of the crime.229 For example, the Trial 
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the case Prosecutor 
v. Akayesu found: “The act can be part of a widespread or systematic attack and 
need not be a part of both.”230 This reading of the widespread/systematic 
requirement is also reflected in the Commission’s commentary to the 1996 draft 
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, where it stated that “an  
 
__________________ 
 225  Bassiouni, supra note 36, at 21. 
 226  Ambos & Wirth, supra note 99, at 3–13. 
 227  See infra Part II. Unlike the English version the French version of Article 3 the ICTR Statute 
used a conjunctive formulation (“généralisée et systématique”). In the Akayesu case, the Trial 
Chamber indicated: “In the original French version of the Statute, these requirements were 
worded cumulatively …, thereby significantly increasing the threshold for application of this 
provision. Since Customary International Law requires only that the attack be either widespread 
or systematic, there are sufficient reasons to assume that the French version suffers from an 
error in translation.” Akayesu 1998, para. 579, footnote 144. 
 228  Tadić 1997, para. 648; Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Judgment, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14-T, para. 202 
(Mar. 3, 2000) (hereinafter Blaškić 2000); see G. Sluiter, “‘Chapeau Elements’ of Crimes 
Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the UN Ad Hoc Tribunals,” in L. Sadat (ed.), Forging 
a Convention for Crimes against Humanity , supra note at 102. 
 229  See, e.g., Akayesu 1998, para. 579; Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Trial Chamber, Judgment, Case 
No. ICTR-95-1, para. 123 (May 21, 1999) (hereinafter Kayishema 1999) (“The attack must 
contain one of the alternative conditions of being widespread or systematic.”); Prosecutor v. 
Mrkšić, Trial Chamber, Judgment, ICTY Case No. IT-95-13/1, para. 437 (Sept. 27, 2007) 
(hereinafter Mrkšić 2007) (“[T]he attack must be widespread or systematic, the requirement 
being disjunctive rather than cumulative”); Tadić 1997, para. 648 (“[E]ither a finding of 
widespreadness…or systematicity…fulfills this requirement.”). 
 230  Akayesu 1998, para. 579. 
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act could constitute a crime against humanity if either of these conditions [of 
systematicity or scale] is met”.231 
126. When this standard was considered for the Rome Statute, some States 
expressed the view that the conditions of “widespread” and “systematic” should be 
conjunctive requirements — that they both should be present to establish the 
existence of the crime — because otherwise the standard would be overinclusive.232 
Indeed, if “widespread” commission of acts alone were sufficient, these States 
maintained that spontaneous waves of widespread, but unrelated, crimes would 
constitute crimes against humanity.233 Owing to that concern, a compromise was 
developed that involved adding to article 7(2)(a) a definition of “attack” which, as 
discussed below, contains a policy element.234  
127. Case law of the International Criminal Court has affirmed that the conditions 
of “widespread” and “systematic” are disjunctive. For example, in its Decision 
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation 
into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya (hereinafter Kenya Authorization 
Decision 2010), Pre-Trial Chamber II of the Court stated that “this contextual 
element [of widespread or systematic] applies disjunctively, such that the alleged  
 
__________________ 
 231  Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission, 1996, vol. II (Part Two), at 47 (hereinafter “1996 ILC 
Report”). See also Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent 
International Criminal Court, GAOR, 50
th
 Session Supplement No. 22, U.N. Doc. A/50/22, at 
17 (1995) (hereinafter “1995 Ad Hoc Comm. Report”) (“elements that should be reflected in the 
definition of crimes against humanity included…[that] the crimes usually involved a widespread 
or systematic attack”) (emphasis added); Report of the International Law Commission on the 
work of its forty-seventh session, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1995 , vol. II 
(Part Two), at 25 (hereinafter “1995 ILC report”) (“the concepts of ‘systematic’ and ‘massive’ 
violations were complementary elements of the crimes concerned”); Report of the International 
Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1994, vol. II (Part Two), at 40 (hereinafter “1994 ILC Report”) (“the definition of 
crimes against humanity encompasses inhumane acts of a very serious character involving 
widespread or systematic violations”) (emphasis added); Report of the International Law 
Commission on the work of its forty-third session, Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1991, vol. II (Part Two) at 103 (hereinafter “1991 ILC Report”) (“[e]ither one of 
these aspects — systematic or mass scale — in any of the acts enumerated … is enough for the 
offence to have taken place”). 
 232  See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II), at 148 (India), at 150 (United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France), at 151 (Thailand, Egypt), at 152 (Islamic 
Republic of Iran), at 154 (Turkey), at 155 (Russian Federation), at 156 (Japan); B. Van Schaack, 
“The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence,” Columbia J. of 
Transnat’l L., vol. 37, at 787, 844 (1999). 
 233  D. Robinson, “Defining Crimes against Humanity at the Rome Conference,” supra note 90, at 
47. 
 234  P. Hwang, “Defining Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court,” Fordham Int’l L. J., vol. 22, at 457, 497 (1998); M. deGuzman, “The Road 
from Rome: The Developing Law of Crimes Against Humanity”, Human Rights Quarterly,  
vol. 22, at 335, 372 (2000) (citing the author ’s notes of debate, Committee of the Whole 
(June 17, 1998), taken while the author was a legal advisor on the delegation of Senegal to 
the Rome Conference); Van Schaack, supra note 37, at 844-45. 
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acts must be either widespread or systematic to warrant classification as crimes 
against humanity”.235  
128. The first condition requires that the attack be “widespread”. According to the 
Trial Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Kunarac, 
“the adjective ‘widespread’ connotes the large-scale nature of the attack and the 
number of targeted persons”.236 As such, this requirement refers to a “multiplicity 
of victims”237 and excludes isolated acts of violence,238 such as murder directed 
against individual victims by persons acting on their own volition rather than as part 
of a broader initiative. At the same time, a single act committed by an individual 
perpetrator can constitute a crime against humanity if it occurs within the context of 
a broader campaign.239 There is no specific numerical threshold of victims that must 
be met for an attack to be “widespread”; rather, the determination is dependent on 
the size of the civilian population that was allegedly attacked.240 For example, in 
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia identified the following test for determining whether an attack is 
widespread: 
 A Trial Chamber must therefore “first identify the population which is the 
object of the attack and, in light of the means, methods, resources and result of 
the attack upon the population, ascertain whether the attack was indeed 
widespread ...” The consequences of the attack upon the targeted population, 
the number of victims, the nature of the acts … could be taken into account to 
determine whether the attack satisfies either or both requirements of a 
“widespread” or “systematic” attack vis-à-vis this civilian population.241  
__________________ 
 235  See Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation 
into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber, ICC-01/09, para. 94 (Mar. 31, 2010) 
(hereinafter Kenya Authorization Decision 2010) (emphasis in original); see also Prosecutor v. 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) 
of the Rome Statute on the Charges, ICC-01/05-01/08, para. 82 (June 15, 2009) (hereinafter 
Bemba 2009). 
 236  Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Trial Chamber, Judgment, ICTY Case No. IT-96-23, para. 428 (Feb. 22, 
2001) (Kunarac 2001); see Prosecutor v. Katanga, Pre-Trial Chamber Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges, ICC-01/04-01/07, para. 394 (Sept. 30, 2008) (hereinafter Katanga 
2008); see also Prosecutor v. Kordić and Ćerkez, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, IT-95-14/2-A, 
para. 94 (Dec. 17, 2004); Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Jokić, Trial Chamber, Judgment, ICTY 
Case No. IT-02-60-T, para. 545-46 (Jan. 17, 2005). 
 237  Bemba 2009, para. 83; 1996 ILC Report, at 47 (using the phrase “on a large scale” instead of 
widespread); Akayesu 1998, para. 580; Kayishema 1999, para. 123; see also Mrkšić 2007, 
para. 437 (“widespread refers to the large scale nature of the attack and the number of victims ”). 
 238  See Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Prosecutor ’s 
Application under Article 58, ICC-01/04-02/06, para. 19 (July 13, 2012) (hereinafter Ntaganda 
2012); Prosecutor v. Harun, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Prosecution Application 
under Article 58(7) of the Statute, ICC-02/05-01/07, para. 62 (Apr. 27, 2007) (hereinafter Harun 
2007); see also Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Trial Chamber, Judgment, ICTR-96-3-T, para. 67-69 
(Dec. 6, 1999); Kayishema 1999, paras. 122-23; 1996 ILC Report, at 47; 1991 ILC Report, at 103. 
 239  Kupreškić 2000, para. 550; Tadić 1997, para. 649. 
 240  See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, ICTY Case No. IT-96-23, para. 95 
(June 12, 2002) (hereinafter Kunarac 2002). 
 241  Ibid. (citations omitted). 
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129. “Widespread” can also have a geographical dimension, with the attack 
occurring in different locations.242 Thus, in the Bemba case, Pre-Trial Chamber II of 
the International Criminal Court found that there was sufficient evidence to 
establish that an attack was “widespread” on the basis of reports of attacks in 
various locations over a large geographical area, including evidence of thousands of 
rapes, mass grave sites and a large number of victims.243 Yet a large geographic area 
is not required; the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has found that 
the attack can be in a small geographic area against a large number of civilians.244  
130. In its Kenya Authorization Decision 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the 
International Criminal Court indicated that “[t]he assessment is neither exclusively 
quantitative nor geographical, but must be carried out on the basis of the individual 
facts”.245 An attack may be widespread owing to the cumulative effect of multiple 
inhumane acts or the result of a single inhumane act of great magnitude. 246  
131. The second, alternative condition requires that the attack be “systematic”. In 
its commentary to the 1996 draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind, the Commission stated that the requirement of “systematic” means that 
the inhumane acts are committed “pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy” and 
that the “implementation of this plan or policy could result in the repeated or 
continuous commission of inhuman acts”.247 Like “widespread”, the term 
“systematic” excludes isolated or unconnected acts of violence,248 and 
jurisprudence from the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Court 
reflects a similar understanding of what is meant by the term. The International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia defined “systematic” as “the organized nature of 
the acts of violence and the improbability of their random occurrence”249 and found 
that evidence of a pattern or methodical plan establishes that an attack was 
systematic.250 Thus, the Appeals Chamber in Kunarac confirmed that “patterns of 
crimes — that is the non-accidental repetition of similar criminal conduct on a 
regular basis — are a common expression of such systematic occurrence”.251 The 
Trial Chamber in Kunarac found that there was a systematic attack on the Muslim 
civilian population on the basis of evidence of a consistent pattern: once the Serb 
forces had control of a town or village, they would ransack or burn down Muslim 
apartments or houses; they would then round up or capture Muslim villagers, who 
were sometimes beaten or killed during the process; and the men and women would 
__________________ 
 242  See, e.g., Ntaganda 2012, para. 30; Prosecutor v. Ruto, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision  
on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute,  
ICC-01/09-01/11, para. 177 (Jan. 23, 2012) (hereinafter Ruto 2012). 
 243  Bemba 2009, paras. 117-124. 
 244  Blaškić 2000, para. 206; Prosecutor v. Kordić and Ćerkez, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, ICTY 
Case No. IT-95-14-/2-A, para. 94 (Dec. 17, 2004) (hereinafter Kordić 2004). 
 245  Kenya Authorization Decision 2010, para. 95. 
 246  1996 ILC Report, at 47; see also Bemba 2009, para. 83 (finding that widespread “entails an 
attack carried out over a large geographical area or an attack in a small geographical area 
directed against a large number of civilians.”). 
 247  1996 ILC Report, at 47; see also 1991 ILC Report, at 103 (“The systematic element relates to a 
constant practice or to a methodical plan to carry out such violations.”). 
 248  See 1996 ILC Report, at 47; 1991 ILC Report, at 103. 
 249  Mrkšić 2007, para. 437; Kunarac 2001, para. 429. 
 250  See, e.g., Tadić 1997, para. 648. 
 251  Kunarac 2002, para. 94. 
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be separated and kept in various detention centres or prisons.252 Likewise, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has defined “systematic” as organized 
conduct following a consistent pattern or pursuant to a policy or plan.253  
132. Consistent with jurisprudence of the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Pre -Trial Chamber I 
of the International Criminal Court found in Harun that “‘systematic’ refers to ‘the 
organized nature of the acts of violence and improbability of their random 
occurrence’”.254 Pre-Trial Chamber I found in Katanga that the term “has been 
understood as either an organized plan in furtherance of a common policy, which 
follows a regular pattern and results in a continuous commission of acts, or as 
‘patterns of crimes’ such that the crimes constitute a ‘non-accidental repetition of 
similar criminal conduct on a regular basis’”.255 In applying the standard in 
Ntaganda, Pre-Trial Chamber II found an attack to be systematic since “the 
perpetrators employed similar means and methods to attack the different locations: 
they approached the targets simultaneously, in large numbers, and from different 
directions, they attacked villages with heavy weapons, and systematically chased 
the population by similar methods, hunting house by house and into the bushes, 
burning all properties and looting”.256  
 
 
 B. “Directed against any civilian population”  
 
 
133. The second general requirement of article 7 of the Rome Statute is that the act 
must be committed as part of an attack “directed against any civilian population”. 
Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute defines “attack directed against any civilian 
population” for the purpose of paragraph 1 as “a course of conduct involving the 
multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian 
population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to 
commit such attack”.257 Moreover, jurisprudence from the International Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the 
International Criminal Court has construed the meaning of each of those terms: 
“directed against”, “any”, “civilian” and “population”. 
134. The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has established that the 
phrase “directed against” requires that a civilian population be the intended primary 
target of the attack, rather than an incidental victim.258 Pre-Trial Chamber II of the 
International Criminal Court subsequently adopted this interpretation in the Bemba 
__________________ 
 252  Kunarac 2001, paras. 573, 578. 
 253  Akayesu 1998, para. 580 (“systematic may be defined as thoroughly organized and following a 
regular pattern on the basis of a common policy”); Kayishema 1999, para. 123 (“systematic 
attacks means an attack carried out pursuant to a preconceived policy or plan”). 
 254  Harun 2007, para. 62 (citing to Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Appeal Judgment, Case  
No. IT-95-14/2-A, para. 94 (Dec. 17, 2004), which in turn cites to Kunarac 2001, para. 429); 
see also Kenya Authorization Decision 2010, para. 96; Ruto 2012, para. 179; Katanga 2008, 
para. 394. 
 255  Katanga 2008, para. 397. 
 256  Ntaganda 2012, para. 31; see also Ruto 2012, para. 179. 
 257  See also ICC, Elements of Crimes, supra note 92, at 5. 
 258  See, e.g., Kunarac 2001, para. 421 (“The expression ‘directed against’ specifies that in the 
context of a crime against humanity the civilian population is the primary object of the attack.”). 
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case and the Kenya Authorization Decision 2010.259 In the Bemba case, the 
Chamber found that there was sufficient evidence showing the attack was “directed 
against” the civilian population of the Central African Republic.260 The Chamber 
concluded that Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) soldiers were 
aware that their victims were civilians, based on direct evidence of civilians being 
attacked inside their houses or in their courtyards.261 The Chamber further found 
that MLC soldiers targeted primarily the civilian population, demonstrated by an 
attack at one locality where the MLC soldiers did not find any rebel troops that they 
claimed to be chasing.262 The term “directed” places its emphasis on the intention 
of the attack rather than the physical result of the attack.263 It is the attack, not the 
acts of the individual perpetrator, which must be “directed against” the target 
population.264  
135. The word “any” indicates that “civilian population” is to have a wide 
definition and should be interpreted broadly.265 An attack can be committed against 
any civilian population, “regardless of their nationality, ethnicity or any other 
distinguishing feature”,266 and can be committed against either national or foreign 
populations.267 Those targeted may “include a group defined by its (perceived) 
political affiliation”.268 In order to qualify as a civilian population during a time of 
armed conflict, the targeted population must be of a “predominantly” civilian 
nature;269 the presence of certain combatants within the population does not change 
its character.270 This approach is in accordance with other rules arising under 
international humanitarian law. For example, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions states: “The presence within the civilian population of individuals who 
do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its  
 
__________________ 
 259  Bemba 2009, para. 76; Kenya Authorization Decision 2010, para. 82. 
 260  Bemba 2009, para. 94; see also Ntaganda 2012, paras. 20-21. 
 261  Bemba 2009, para. 94. 
 262  Ibid., paras. 95-98. The Pre-Trial Chamber also relied on evidence that at the time of the arrival 
of the MLC soldiers in this locality, rebel troops had already withdrawn. Ibid., para. 98. 
 263  See, e.g., Blaškić 2000, n. 401. 
 264  Kunarac 2002, para. 103. 
 265  See, e.g., Mrkšić 2007, para. 442; Tadić 1997, para. 643; Kupreškić 2000, para. 547 (“[A] wide 
definition of civilian and population is intended. This is warranted first of all by the object and 
purpose of the general principles and rules of humanitarian law, in particular by the rules 
prohibiting crimes against humanity.”); Kayishema 1999, para. 127. 
 266  Katanga 2008, para. 399 (quoting Prosecutor v. Tadic, Trial Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1, 
para. 635 (May 7, 2991)). 
 267  See, e.g., Kunarac 2001, para. 423. 
 268  Ruto 2012, para. 164. 
 269  See, e.g., Mrkšić 2007, para. 442; Tadić 1997, para. 638; Kunarac 2001, para. 425; Kordić 2001, 
para. 180; Kayishema 1999, para. 128. 
 270  See, e.g., Mrkšić 2007, para. 442; Tadić 1997, para. 638; Kunarac 2001, para. 425 (“the 
presence of certain non-civilians in its midst does not change the character of the population”); 
Blaškić 2000, para. 214 (“the presence of soldiers within an intentionally targeted civilian 
population does not alter the civilian nature of that population”); Kupreškić 2000, para. 549 
(“the presence of those actively involved in the conflict should not prevent the characterization 
a population as civilian”); Kordić 2001, para. 180; Akayesu 1998, para. 582 (“Where there are 
certain individuals within the civilian population who do not come within the definition of 
civilians, this does not deprive the population of its civilian character.”); Kayishema 1999,  
para. 128. 
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civilian character.”271 During a time of peace, “civilian” shall include all persons 
except those individuals who have a duty to maintain public order and have 
legitimate means to exercise force to that end at the time they are being attacked. 272 
The status of any given victim must be assessed at the time the offence is 
committed;273 a person should be considered a civilian if there is a doubt as to his 
or her status.274  
136. “Population” does not mean that the entire population of a given geographical 
location must be subject to the attack;275 rather, the term implies the collective 
nature of the crime as an attack upon multiple victims.276 Any particular victim 
must be targeted not because of his or her individual characteristics, but because of 
his or her membership in a targeted civilian population.277 International Criminal 
Court decisions in the Bemba case and the Kenya Authorization Decision 2010 have 
adopted a similar approach, declaring that the Prosecutor must establish that the 
attack was directed against the population, rather than a limited group of 
individuals.278  
137. Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute defines “attack directed against any 
civilian population” for the purpose of paragraph 1. The first part of this definition 
refers to “a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to 
in paragraph 1 against any civilian population”. Although no such language was 
contained in the statutory definition of crimes against humanity for the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, this language reflects jurisprudence from both these tribunals.279 The 
Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court provides that the “acts” 
referred to in article 7(2)(a) “need not constitute a military attack”.280  
__________________ 
 271  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 50(3), June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 272  Kayishema 1999, para. 127. 
 273  Blaškić 2000, para. 214 (“[T]he specific situation of the victim at the moment the crimes were 
committed, rather than his status, must be taken into account in determining his standing as a 
civilian.”); see also Kordić 2001, para. 180 (“[I]ndividuals who at one time performed acts of 
resistance may in certain circumstances be victims of a crime against humanity.”); Akayesu 
1998, para. 582 (finding that civilian population includes “members of the armed forces who 
laid down their arms and those persons placed hors de combat”). 
 274  Kunarac 2001, para. 426. 
 275  See Kenya Authorization Decision 2010, para. 82; Bemba 2009, para. 77; Kunarac 2001, 
para. 424; Tadić 1997, para. 644; see also 1994 ILC Report, at 40 (defining crimes against 
humanity as “inhumane acts of a very serious character involving widespread or systematic 
violations aimed at the civilian population in whole or in part”) (emphasis added). 
 276  See Tadić 1997, para. 644. 
 277  Ibid.; see also Kunarac 2001, para. 90; Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Trial Chamber, Judgment, ICTY 
Case No. IT-06-90-T, para. 1704 (Apr. 15, 2011) (finding that the attack must be directed at a 
civilian population, “rather than against a limited and randomly selected number of individuals”). 
 278  Bemba 2009, para. 77; Kenya Authorization Decision 2010, para. 81. 
 279  See, e.g., Kunarac 2001, para. 415 (defining attack as “a course of conduct involving the 
commission of acts of violence”); Kayishema 1999, para. 122 (defining attack as the “event in 
which the enumerated crimes must form part”); Akayesu 1998, para. 581 (“The concept of attack 
may be defined as a unlawful act of the kind enumerated [in the Statute]. An attack may also b e 
nonviolent in nature, like imposing a system of apartheid ... or exerting pressure on the 
population to act in a particular manner …”). 
 280  ICC, Elements of Crimes, supra note 92, at 5. 
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138. The second part of this definition requires that the attack be “pursuant to or in 
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such an attack”. The 
requirement of a policy element did not appear as part of the definition of crimes 
against humanity in the statutes of international tribunals until the adoption of the 
Rome Statute.281 The statutes of the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda contain no policy 
requirement in their definition of crimes against humanity,282 although some early 
jurisprudence required it.283 Later jurisprudence, however, downplayed the policy 
element, regarding it as sufficient simply to prove the existence of a widespread or 
systematic attack.284 
139. Prior to the Rome Statute, the work of the International Law Commission in its 
draft codes tended to require a policy element. The Commission ’s 1954 draft Code 
of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind defined crimes against 
humanity as “Inhuman acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation 
or persecutions, committed against any civilian population on social, political, racial 
or cultural grounds by the authorities of a State or by private individuals acting at 
the instigation or with the toleration of such authorities”.285 The Commission 
decided to include the State instigation or tolerance requirement in order to exclude 
inhuman acts committed by private persons on their own without any State 
involvement.286 At the same time, the definition of crimes against humanity 
included in the 1954 draft code did not include any requirement of scale 
(“widespread”) or systematicity.  
__________________ 
 281  Article 6(c) of the Nürnberg Charter contains no explicit reference to a plan or policy. The 
Nürnberg Judgment, however, did use a “policy” descriptor when discussing article 6(c) in the 
context of the concept of the “attack” as a whole. See IMT, Judgment (Oct. 1, 1946), in The 
Trial of German Major War Criminals. Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal 
sitting at Nürnberg, Germany, Part 22, at 468 (Aug. 22, 1946 to Oct. 1, 1946) (“The policy of 
terror was certainly carried out on a vast scale, and in many cases was organized and systematic. 
The policy of persecution, repression and murder of civilians in Germany before the war of 
1939, who were likely to be hostile to the Government, was most ruthlessly carried out.”) 
Article II(1)(c) of Control Council Law No. 10 also contains no reference to a plan or polic y in 
its definition of crimes against humanity. See generally G. Mettraux, “The Definition of Crimes 
Against Humanity and the Question of a ‘Policy’ Element, in L. Sadat (ed.), Forging a 
Convention for Crimes against Humanity, supra note 7, at 142. 
 282  The ICTY Appeals Chamber has determined that there is no policy element on crimes against 
humanity in customary international law, see Kunarac 2002, para. 98 (“There was nothing in the 
Statute or in customary international law at the time of the alleged acts which required proof of 
the existence of a plan or policy to commit these crimes.”), although that position that has been 
criticized in writings. See, e.g., W. Schabas, “State Policy as an Element of International 
Crimes,” 98 J. Crim. L. & Criminology, vol. 98, p. 953, at 954 (2008). 
 283  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1, paras. 644, 653-55, 626 (May 7, 1997) 
(“‘directed against a civilian population’” … requires that the acts be undertaken on a 
widespread or systematic basis and in furtherance of a policy.”(emphasis added)). 
 284  See, e.g., Kordić 2001, para. 182 (finding that “the existence of a plan or policy should better be 
regarded as indicative of the systematic character of offences charged as crimes against 
humanity”); Kunarac 2002, para. 98; Akayesu 1998, para. 580; Kayishema 1999, para. 124 (“For 
an act of mass victimisation to be a crime against humanity, it must include a policy element. 
Either of the requirements of widespread or systematic are enough to exclude acts not 
committed as part of a broader policy or plan.”). 
 285  Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixth session, Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 1954, vol. II, at 150 (hereinafter “1954 ILC Report”) (emphasis 
added). 
 286  Ibid., at 150. 
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140. The Commission’s 1994 draft statute for an international criminal court did not 
contain a definition of crimes against humanity. Rather, the draft statute referenced 
the definitions in article 5 of the statute of the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia and article 21 of the 1991 draft code of crimes against the peace and 
security of mankind, neither of which contained a State policy requirement. 287 Even 
so, the Commission did mention the issue of policy when it stated: “The particular 
forms of unlawful act … are less crucial to the definition than the facts of scale and 
deliberate policy, as well as in their being targeted against the civilian population in 
whole or in part.”288 The Commission’s 1996 draft Code of Crimes against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind also recognized a policy requirement, defining 
crimes against humanity as “any of the following acts, when committed in a 
systematic manner or on a large scale and instigated or directed by a Government or 
by an organization or group”.289 The Commission included this requirement in 
order to exclude inhumane acts committed by an individual “acting on his own 
initiative pursuant to his own criminal plan in the absence of any encouragement or  
direction from either a Government or a group or organization”.290 In other words, 
the policy element sought to exclude “ordinary” crimes of individuals acting on 
their own initiative and without any connection to a State or organization. 291 
141. Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute uses the “policy” element in its definition 
of an “attack directed against any civilian population”. The International Criminal 
Court’s Elements of Crimes further provides that “policy to commit such attack” 
requires that “the State or organization actively promote or encourage such an attack 
against a civilian population”.292 In a footnote, Elements of Crimes provides that “a 
policy may, in exceptional circumstances, be implemented by a deliberate failure to 
take action, which is consciously aimed at encouraging such attack”.293 Other 
precedents also emphasize that deliberate failure to act can satisfy the policy 
element.294 
142. This “policy” element has been addressed in several cases at the International 
Criminal Court.295 For example, in its Kenya Authorization Decision 2010,  
Pre-Trial Chamber II of the Court suggested that the meaning of “State” in article 
7(a)(2) is “self-explanatory”.296 The Chamber went on to note that a policy adopted 
by regional or local organs of the State could satisfy the requirement of State 
policy.297 Judge Hans-Peter Kaul argued in his dissent that, while acts of regional or 
__________________ 
 287  1994 ILC Report, at 40. 
 288  Ibid. 
 289  1996 ILC Report, at 47 (emphasis added). 
 290  Ibid. In explaining its inclusion of the policy requirement, the Commission notes “It would be 
extremely difficult for a single individual acting alone to commit the inhumane acts as 
envisaged in article 18.” 
 291  See M.C. Bassiouni, “Revisiting the Architecture of Crimes Against Humanity: Almost a 
Century in the Making, with Gaps and Ambiguities Remaining — the Need for a Specialized 
Convention,” in Forging a Convention, supra note 7, at 54-55. 
 292  ICC, Elements of Crimes, supra note 92, at 5. 
 293  Ibid. 
 294  Kupreškić 2000, paras. 551-55 (“approved,” “condoned,” “explicit or implicit approval”); 1954 
ILC Draft Code (“toleration”); Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. Doc. S/1994/674, para. 85 (27 May 1994); Ambos 
& Wirth, supra note 99, at 31-34.  
 295  See, e.g., Ntaganda 2012, para. 24; Katanga 2008, para. 396; Bemba 2009, para. 81. 
 296  Kenya Authorization Decision 2010, para. 89. 
 297  Ibid. 
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local organs could be imputed to the State, nevertheless “considerations of 
attribution do not answer the question of who can establish a Sta te policy”.298 Even 
so, he found that, “considering the specific circumstances of the case, a policy may 
also be adopted by an organ which, albeit at the regional level, such as the highest 
official or regional government in a province, has the means to establish a policy 
within its sphere of action”.299 
143. In its Katanga 2014 decision, Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal 
Court found that the policy need not be formally established or promulgated in 
advance of the attack, and can be deduced from the repetition of acts, from 
preparatory activities or from a collective mobilization.300 Moreover, the policy 
need not be concrete or precise, and may evolve over time as circumstances 
unfold.301 The Trial Chamber stressed that the policy requirement should not  be 
seen as synonymous with “systematic”, since doing so would contradict the 
disjunctive requirement in article 7 of a “widespread” or “systematic” attack.302 
Rather, while “systematic” refers to a repetitive scheme of acts with similar 
features, the “policy” requirement points more toward such acts being intended as a 
collective attack on the civilian population.303 
144. In its decision confirming the indictment of Laurent Gbagbo, Pre -Trial 
Chamber I of the International Criminal Court found that  
 the “policy”, for the purposes of the Statute, must be understood as the active 
promotion or encouragement of an attack against a civilian population by a 
State or organisation. The Chamber observes that neither the Statute nor the 
Elements of Crimes include a certain rationale or motivations of the policy as 
a requirement of the definition. Establishing the underlying motive may, 
however, be useful for the detection of common features and links between 
acts. Furthermore, in accordance with the Statute and the Elements of Crimes, 
it is only necessary to establish that the person had knowledge of the attack in 
general terms. Indeed, the Elements of Crimes clarify that the requirement of 
knowledge “should not be interpreted as requiring proof that the perpetrator 
had knowledge of all characteristics of the attack or the precise details of the 
plan or policy of the State or organization”.304 
In the Bemba case, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court found 
that the attack was pursuant to an organizational policy on the basis of evidence 
__________________ 
 298  Kenya Authorization Decision 2010, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hans-Peter Kaul, Situation in 
the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09, para. 43 (Mar. 31, 2010) (hereinafter Kenya Authorization 
Decision 2010, Dissent). 
 299  Ibid., para. 43. 
 300  Katanga 2014, para. 1109; see also Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on 
the Confirmation of Charges against Laurent Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11, paras. 211-12, 215 
(June 12, 2014) (hereinafter Gbagbo 2014). 
 301  Katanga 2014, para. 1110. 
 302  Ibid., para. 1112; see also ibid. para. 1101; Gbagbo 2014, para. 208. 
 303  Katanga 2014, para. 1113 (“Établir une « politique » vise uniquement à démontrer que l’État ou 
l’organisation entend mener une attaque contre une population civile.”); Gbagbo 2014, para. 216 
(“evidence of planning, organisation or direction by a State or organisation may be relevant to 
prove both the policy and the systematic nature of the attack, although the two concepts should 
not be conflated as they serve different purposes and imply different thresholds under article 7(1)  
and (2)(a) of the Statute”). 
 304  Gbagbo 2014, para. 214 (footnotes omitted). 
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establishing that the MLC troops “carried out attacks following the same 
pattern”.305 Such decisions are being thoughtfully analysed in the scholarly 
literature.306 
 
 
 C. Non-State actors 
 
 
145. The Commission, commenting in 1991 on the draft provision on crimes 
against humanity for what would become the 1996 draft code of crimes, stated that 
“the draft article does not confine possible perpetrators of the crimes to public 
officials or representatives alone” and that it “does not rule out the possibility that 
private individuals with de facto power or organized in criminal gangs or groups 
might also commit the kind of systematic or mass violations of human rights 
covered by the article; in that case, their acts would come under the d raft Code”.307 
Even so, a debate existed within the Commission with respect to this issue. The 
1995 ILC Report discusses the debate, with some members taking the position that 
the code should only apply to State actors and others favouring the inclusion of 
non-State perpetrators.308 As discussed previously, the 1996 Draft Code added the 
requirement that, to be crimes against humanity, the inhumane acts must be 
“instigated or directed by a Government or by any organization or group ”.309 In its 
commentary to this requirement, the Commission noted: “The instigation or 
direction of a Government or any organization or group, which may not be affiliated 
with a Government, gives the act its great dimension and makes it a crime against 
humanity imputable to private persons or agents of a State.”310 
146. Jurisprudence of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia accepted 
the possibility of non-State actors being prosecuted for crimes against humanity. For 
__________________ 
 305  Bemba 2009, para. 115. 
 306  See, e.g., M. Halling, “Push the Envelope — Watch It Bend: Removing the Policy Requirement 
and Extending Crimes Against Humanity,” Leiden J. Int’l L., vol. 23, p. 827 (2010); W. Schabas, 
“Prosecuting Dr. Strangelove, Goldfinger, and the Joker at the International Criminal Court: 
Closing the Loopholes,” Leiden J. Int’l L., vol. 23, p. 847 (2010); C. Kress, “On the Outer 
Limits of Crimes against Humanity: The Concept of Organization within the Policy 
Requirement: Some Reflections on the March 2010 ICC Kenya Decision,” Leiden J. Int’l L., 
vol. 23, p. 855 (2010); G. Mettraux, “The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity and the 
Question of a ‘Policy’ Element,” in Forging a Convention, supra note 7, at 142; C. Jalloh, “Case 
Report: Situation in the Republic of Kenya,” American J. Int’l L., vol. 105, p. 540 (2011); T. 
Hansen, “The Policy Requirement in Crimes Against Humanity: Lessons from and for the Case 
of Kenya,” George Washington University Int’l L. Rev., vol. 43, p. 1 (2011); G. Werle & 
B. Burghardt, “Do Crimes Against Humanity Require the Participation of a State or a ‘State-
like’ Organization?,” J. Int’l Crim. Just., vol. 10, p. 1151 (2012); Sadat, supra note 37, at 335-36, 
368-74; C. Jalloh, “What Makes a Crime Against Humanity a Crime Against Humanity,” 
American University Int’l L. Rev., vol. 28, p. 381 (2013); D. Robinson, “The Draft Convention 
on Crimes Against Humanity: What to Do With the Definition?”, in Bergsmo & Song, supra 
note 7, p. 103; D. Robinson, “Crimes Against Humanity: A Better Policy on ‘Policy,’” in 
C. Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court  (Oxford University 
Press, 2015) (forthcoming). 
 307  1991 ILC Report, at 103-04. 
 308  1995 ILC Report, at 25 (“While some members held that the Code should only deal with crimes 
committed by agents or representatives of the State or by individuals acting with the  
authorization, the support or the acquiescence of the State, other members favoured 
encompassing the conduct of individuals even if they had no link with the State.”). 
 309  1996 ILC Report, at 47. 
 310  Ibid. 
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example, the Trial Chamber in the Tadić case stated that “the law in relation to 
crimes against humanity has developed to take into account forces which, although 
not those of the legitimate government, have de facto control over, or are able to 
move freely within, defined territory”.311 That finding was echoed in the Limaj 
case, where the Trial Chamber viewed the defendant members of the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) as prosecutable for crimes against humanity. Among other 
things, the Trial Chamber stated: 
 Although not a legal element of Article 5 [of the statute of the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia], evidence of a policy or plan is an 
important indication that the acts in question are not merely the workings of 
individuals acting pursuant to haphazard or individual design,  but instead have 
a level of organisational coherence and support of a magnitude sufficient to 
elevate them into the realm of crimes against humanity. It stands to reason that 
an attack against a civilian population will most often evince the presence of 
policy when the acts in question are performed against the backdrop of 
significant State action and where formal channels of command can be 
discerned. … Special issues arise, however, in considering whether a sub -state 
unit or armed opposition group, whether insurrectionist or trans-boundary in 
nature, evinces a policy to direct an attack. One requirement such an 
organisational unit must demonstrate in order to have sufficient competence to 
formulate a policy is a level of de facto control over territory.312 
Ultimately, the Trial Chamber found that while “the KLA evinced a policy to target 
those Kosovo Albanians suspected of collaboration with the Serbian authorities, … 
there was no attack directed against a civilian population, whether of Serbian or 
Albanian ethnicity.”313 
147. Since article 7(a)(2) of the Rome Statute requires that the attack be “pursuant 
to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such an attack”, 
article 7 expressly contemplates crimes against humanity by non-State perpetrators. 
Jurisprudence from the International Criminal Court suggests that “organizational” 
includes any organization or group with the capacity and resources to plan and carry 
out a widespread or systematic attack. For example, Pre-Trial Chamber I stated in 
Katanga: “Such a policy may be made either by groups of persons who govern a 
specific territory or by any organization with the capability to commit a widespread 
or systematic attack against a civilian population.”314 
148. In its Kenya Authorization Decision 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the 
International Criminal Court took a similar approach, stating “the formal nature of a 
group and the level of its organization should not be the defining criterion. Instead, 
as others have convincingly put forward, a distinction should be drawn about 
whether a group has the capability to perform acts which infringe on basic human 
values”.315 In 2012, the Pre-Trial Chamber stated that, when determining whether a 
particular group qualifies as an “organization” under Rome Statute article 7, 
__________________ 
 311  Tadić 1997, para. 654. For further discussion of non-State perpetrators, see ibid., para. 655. 
 312  Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., ICTY Trial Chamber II, Case No. IT-03-66-T, para. 212-13 (Nov. 30, 
2005). 
 313  Ibid., para. 228. 
 314  Katanga 2008, para. 396 (citing to ICTY and ICTR case law, as well as the Commission’s 1991 
Draft Code); see also Bemba 2009, para. 81. 
 315  Kenya Authorization Decision 2010, para. 90. 
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 the Chamber may take into account a number of factors, inter alia: (i) whether 
the group is under a responsible command, or has an established hierarchy; 
(ii) whether the group possesses, in fact, the means to carry out a widespread 
or systematic attack against a civilian population; (iii) whether the group 
exercises control over part of the territory of a State; (iv) whether the group 
has criminal activities against the civilian population as a primary purpose; 
(v) whether the group articulates, explicitly or implicitly, an intention to attack 
a civilian population; (vi) whether the group is part of a larger group, which 
fulfils some or all of the abovementioned criteria.316 
149. In its 2010 decision, the majority expressly rejected the idea that “only State-
like organizations may qualify” as organizations for the purpose of article 7(a)(2).317 
In his dissent, Judge Kaul agreed that “it is permissive to conclude that an 
‘organization’ may be a private entity (a nonstate actor) which is not an organ of a 
State or acting on behalf of a State”, but he argued that “those ‘organizations’ 
should partake of some characteristics of a State”.318 
150. In the Ntaganda case, charges were confirmed against a defendant associated 
with two paramilitary groups, the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) and the 
Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC) in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo. In that instance, the prosecutor contended “that the UPC/FPLC was a 
sophisticated and structured political-military organization, akin to the government 
of a country, through which Mr. Ntaganda was able to commit crimes against 
humanity”.319 Similarly, in Callixte Mbarushimana, the prosecutor pursued charges 
against a defendant associated with the Forces Démocratiques pour la Liberation du 
Rwanda (FDLR), described as an “armed group seeking to ‘reconquérir et défendre 
la souveraineté nationale’ of Rwanda.”320 While in that case the majority and the 
dissent disagreed on whether there existed a policy of FDLR to attack the c ivilian 
population, there appeared to be common ground that FDLR, as a group, could fall 
within the scope of article 7. In the case against Joseph Kony relating to the 
situation in Uganda, the defendant is allegedly associated with the Lord ’s Resistance 
Army, “an armed group carrying out an insurgency against the Government of 
Uganda and the Ugandan Army”321 which “is organised in a military-type hierarchy 
and operates as an army”.322 With respect to the situation in Kenya, Pre-Trial 
__________________ 
 316  Ruto 2012, para. 185; see also Kenya Authorization Decision 2010, para. 93; Corrigendum to 
Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation 
into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, ICC-02/11-14-Corr., paras. 45-46 (Oct. 3, 
2011). 
 317  Kenya Authorization Decision 2010, para. 90; see also G. Werle & B. Burghardt, “Do Crimes 
Against Humanity Require the Participation of a State or a ‘State-like’ Organization?,” J. of Int’l 
Crim. Just., vol. 10, p. 1151 (2012). 
 318  Kenya Authorization Decision 2010, Dissent,  paras. 45 and 51. The characteristics identified by 
Judge Kaul were: (a) a collectivity of persons; (b) which was established and acts for a common 
purpose; (c) over a prolonged period of time; (d) which is under responsible command or 
adopted a certain degree of hierarchical structure, including, as a minimum, some kind of policy 
level; (e) with the capacity to impose the policy on its members and to sanction them; and 
(f) which has the capacity and means available to attack any civilian population on a large scale.  
 319  Ntaganda 2012, para. 22. 
 320  Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 
ICC-01/04-01/10, para. 2 (Dec. 16, 2011). 
 321  Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony Issued on 8 July 2005 as Amended on 27 September 2005, 
ICC-02/04-01/05, para. 5 (Sept. 27, 2005). 
 322  Ibid., para. 7. 
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Chamber II confirmed charges of crimes against humanity against defendants owing 
to their association in a “network” of perpetrators “comprised of eminent ODM 
[Orange Democratic Movement] political representatives, representatives of the 
media, former members of the Kenyan police and army, Kalenjin elders and local 
leaders”.323 Likewise, charges were confirmed with respect to other defendants 
associated with “coordinated attacks that were perpetrated by the Mungiki and 
pro-Party of National Unity (‘PNU’) youth in different parts of Nakuru and 
Naivasha” that “were targeted at perceived [ODM] supporters using a variety of 
means of identification such as lists, physical attributes, roadblocks and language”.324 
 
 
 D. “With knowledge of the attack”  
 
 
151. The third general requirement is that the perpetrator must commit the act “with 
knowledge of the attack”. Jurisprudence from the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda concluded 
that the perpetrator must have knowledge that there is  an attack on the civilian 
population and, further, that his or her act is a part of that attack. 325 This two-part 
approach is reflected in the International Criminal Court ’s Elements of Crimes, 
which for each of the proscribed acts requires as that act ’s last element: “The 
perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a 
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.” Even so,  
 the last element should not be interpreted as requiring proof that the 
perpetrator had knowledge of all characteristics of the attack or the precise 
details of the plan or policy of the State or organization. In the case of an 
emerging widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, the 
intent clause of the last element indicates that this mental element is satisfied 
if the perpetrator intended to further such an attack.326 
It need not be proven that the perpetrator knew the specific details of the attack; 327 
rather, the perpetrator ’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstantial 
evidence.328 Thus, when finding in the Bemba case that the MLC troops acted with 
knowledge of the attack, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court 
stated that the troops’ knowledge could be “inferred from the methods of the attack 
they followed”, which reflected a clear pattern.329 In the Katanga case, the Court’s 
Pre-Trial Chamber I found that 
__________________ 
 323  Ruto 2012, para. 182. 
 324  Prosecutor v. Muthaura et al., Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges 
Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/09-02/11, para. 102 (Jan. 23, 
2012). 
 325  See, e.g., Kunarac 2001, para. 418; Kayishema 1999, para. 133. 
 326  ICC, Elements of Crimes, supra note 92, at 5. 
 327  Kunarac 2001, para. 434 (finding that the knowledge requirement “does not entail knowledge of 
the details of the attack”). 
 328  See Tadić 1997, para. 657 (“While knowledge is thus required, it is examined on an objective 
level and factually can be implied from the circumstances.”); see also Kayishema 1999, 
para. 134 (finding that “actual or constructive knowledge of the broader context of the attack” is 
sufficient); Blaškić 2000, para. 259 (finding that knowledge of the broader context of the attack 
may be surmised from a number of facts, including “the nature of the crimes committed and the 
degree to which they are common knowledge”). 
 329  Bemba 2009, para. 126. 
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 knowledge of the attack and the perpetrator ’s awareness that his conduct was 
part of such attack may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, such as: the 
accused’s position in the military hierarchy; his assuming an important role in 
the broader criminal campaign; his presence at the scene of the crimes; his 
references to the superiority of his group over the enemy group; and the 
general historical and political environment in which the acts occurred.330 
152. Further, the personal motive of the perpetrator for taking part in the attack is 
irrelevant; the perpetrator does not need to share the purpose or goal of the broader 
attack.331 According to the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia in Kunarac, evidence that the perpetrator committed the 
prohibited acts for personal reasons could at most “be indicative of a rebuttable 
assumption that he was not aware that his acts were part of that attack”.332 It is the 
perpetrator’s knowledge or intent that his or her act is part of the attack that is 
relevant to satisfying this requirement. Additionally, this element will be satisfied 
where it can be proven that the underlying offence was committed by directly taking 
advantage of the broader attack, or where the commission of the underlying offence 
had the effect of perpetuating the broader attack.333 For example, in the Kunarac 
case, the perpetrators were accused of various forms of sexual violence, acts of 
torture and enslavement against Muslim women and girls. The Trial Chamber of the 
Court found that the accused had the requisite knowledge because they not only 
knew of the attack against the Muslim civilian population, but also pe rpetuated the 
attack “by directly taking advantage of the situation created” and “fully embraced 
the ethnicity-based aggression.”334 
 
 
 E. Types of prohibited acts 
 
 
153. Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute, in subparagraphs (a) to (k), lists the 
underlying prohibited acts for crimes against humanity. These prohibited acts also 
appear as part of the definition of crimes against humanity contained in article 18 of 
the Commission’s 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind, although the language differs slightly. Article 7(2), in subparagraphs (b) 
to (i), provides further definitions of these prohibited acts. An individual who 
commits one of these acts can commit a crime against humanity; the individual need 
not have committed multiple acts, but the individual’s act must be “a part of” a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population. 335 The 
underlying offence does not need to be committed in the heat of the attack against 
the civilian population to satisfy this requirement; the underlying offence can be 
part of the attack if it can be sufficiently connected to the attack. 336 
154. Murder. Article 7(1)(a)of the Rome Statute identifies murder as a prohibited 
act. According to the International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes, the act of 
__________________ 
 330  Katanga 2008, para. 402. 
 331  See, e.g., Kunarac 2002, para. 103; Kupreškić 2000, para. 558. 
 332  Kunarac 2002, para. 103. 
 333  See, e.g., Kunarac 2001, para. 592. 
 334  Ibid. 
 335  See, e.g., Tadić 1997, para. 649; Kunarac 2002, para. 100. 
 336  See, e.g., Mrkšić 2007, para. 438; Tadić 1999, para. 248; Prosecutor v. Naletillić, Trial Chamber, 
Judgment, ICTY Case No. IT-98-34-T, para. 234 (Mar. 31, 2003). 
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murder means that “the perpetrator killed one or more persons”.337 The term 
“killed” can be used interchangeably with “caused death”.338 Murder was included 
as an act falling within the scope of crimes against humanity in article 6(c) of th e 
Nuremberg Charter; Control Council Law No. 10; the statutes of the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda; and the 1954 draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind and 1996 draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
of the International Law Commission.339 
155. Extermination. Article 7(1)(b) of the Rome Statute identifies extermination as 
a prohibited act. Article 7(2)(b) provides that extermination “includes the intentional 
infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and 
medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population”. To 
commit the act of extermination, according to the International Criminal Court’s 
Elements of Crimes, the perpetrator must have “killed one or more persons, 
including by inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of 
part of a population”.340 These conditions “could include the deprivation of access 
to food and medicine”.341 Killing, in the context of the act of extermination, can be 
either direct or indirect, and can take various forms.342 The conduct must also have 
“constituted, or [taken] place as part of, a mass killing of members of a civilian 
population”.343 Although extermination, like genocide, involves an element of mass 
destruction, it differs from the crime of genocide in that it covers situations in which 
a group of individuals who do not have any shared characteristics are killed as well 
as situations in which some members of a group are killed while others are not. 344 
Extermination was included as an act falling within the scope of crimes against 
humanity in article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter; Control Council Law No. 10; the 
statutes of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; and the draft codes of the International 
Law Commission.345 
156. Enslavement. Article 7(1)(c) of the Rome Statute identifies enslavement as a 
prohibited act. Article 7(2)(c) defines enslavement as “the exercise of any or all of 
the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the 
exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women 
and children”. The International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes provides that 
such an exercise of power includes “purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a 
person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty”.346 
Elements of Crimes also notes: “It is understood that such deprivation of liberty 
may, in some circumstances, include exacting forced labour or otherwise reducing a 
person to a servile status as defined in the Supplementary Convention on the 
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to 
__________________ 
 337  ICC, Elements of Crimes, supra note 92, at 5. 
 338  Ibid., n.7. 
 339  See 1996 ILC Report, at 48. 
 340  ICC, Elements of Crimes, supra note 92, at 6. 
 341  Ibid., n.9. 
 342  Ibid., n.8. 
 343  Ibid., at 6. 
 344  1996 ILC Report, at 48. 
 345  Ibid. 
 346  ICC, Elements of Crimes, supra note 92, at 6. 
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Slavery of 1956.”347 Enslavement was included as an act falling within the scope of 
crimes against humanity in article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter; Control Council 
Law No. 10; the statutes of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; and the draft codes of the 
International Law Commission.348 Article 3(a) of the 2000 Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime,349 defines “trafficking in persons” as the “recruitment, transportation, 
transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or 
other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power 
or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits 
to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the 
purpose of exploitation”. 
157. Deportation or forcible transfer of population . Article 7(1)(d) of the Rome 
Statute identifies forcible transfer of population as a prohibited act. Article 7(2)(d) 
defines deportation or forcible transfer of population as “forced displacement of the 
persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they 
are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law.” The 
International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes states that the term “forcibly” is 
not limited to physical force, and may include the threat of coercion or force, “such 
as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or 
abuse of power against such person or persons or another person, or by taking 
advantage of a coercive environment”.350 According to Elements of Crimes, the 
perpetrator must also be aware of the factual circumstances establishing that the 
persons are lawfully present in the area from which they were displaced. 351 
Elements of Crimes also notes that “deported or forcibly transferred” can be used 
interchangeably with “forcibly displaced”.352 “Grounds permitted under 
international law” can include legitimate reasons for transfer such as public health 
or welfare.353 Deportation was included as an act falling within the scope of crimes 
against humanity in article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter; Control Council Law  
No. 10; the statutes of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; and the draft codes of the Inter national 
Law Commission.354 
158. Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty . Article 7(1)(e) of 
the Rome Statute identifies as a prohibited act imprisonment or other severe 
deprivation of physical liberty. To commit this prohibited act under the Rome 
Statute, the perpetrator must have “imprisoned one or more persons or otherwise 
severely deprived one or more persons of physical liberty”.355 Additionally, the 
conduct must be “in violation of the fundamental rules of international law”.356 
Arbitrary imprisonment is a violation of individual human rights recognized in 
__________________ 
 347  Ibid., n.11. 
 348  1996 ILC Report, at 48. 
 349  Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319. 
 350  ICC, Elements of Crimes, supra note 92, n.12. 
 351  Ibid., at 7. 
 352  Ibid., n.13. 
 353  1996 ILC Report, at 49. 
 354  Ibid. 
 355  ICC, Elements of Crimes, supra note 92, at 7. 
 356  Ibid. 
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article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 9 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.357 Subparagraph (e) also 
includes large-scale or systematic cases of imprisonment, such as concentration 
camps.358 According to the International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes, the 
perpetrator must also be “aware of the factual circumstances that established the 
gravity of the conduct”.359 Imprisonment was included as an act falling within the 
scope of crimes against humanity in Control Council Law No. 10, the statutes of the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda; and the 1996 draft code of the International Law 
Commission.360 
159. Torture. Article 7(1)(f) of the Rome Statute identifies torture as a prohibited 
act. Article 7(2)(e) defines torture as “the intentional infliction of severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the 
control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising 
only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions.” The International Criminal 
Court’s Elements of Crimes provides that “no specific purpose need be proved for 
this crime”.361 This definition of torture mirrors the definition found in article 1(1) 
of the Convention against Torture, but removes the specific purposes 
requirement.362 Torture was included as an act falling within the scope of crimes 
against humanity in Control Council Law No. 10, the statutes of the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda and the 1996 draft code of the International Law Commission. 363 
160. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity .  
Article 7(1)(g) of the of the Rome Statute identifies as prohibited acts rape, sexual 
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any other 
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity. Each of these acts is addressed 
below. 
161. Rape. Rape was included as an act falling within the scope of crimes against 
humanity in Control Council Law No. 10, the statutes of the International Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and 
__________________ 
 357  1996 ILC Report, at 49. ICCPR, article 9 provides that: “Everyone has the right to liberty and 
security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be 
deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are 
established by law.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 (hereinafter ICCPR). 
 358  1996 ILC Report, at 49. 
 359  Ibid. 
 360  Ibid. 
 361  ICC, Elements of Crimes, supra note 92, n.14. 
 362  Convention against Torture, Article 1(1) provides that: “the term ‘torture’ means any act by 
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person 
for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing  
him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not 
include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. ” Ibid. 
 363  1996 ILC Report, at 48. 
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the 1996 draft code of the International Law Commission.364 Owing to the accounts 
of rape committed in a widespread or systematic manner in the former Yugoslavia, 
the General Assembly in 1995 unanimously reaffirmed that rape falls within the 
scope of crimes against humanity when the other elements of the offence are 
satisfied.365 
162. The International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes defines the act of rape 
as an act by which “the perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct 
resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of 
the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of t he victim 
with any object or any other part of the body.”366 This invasion must be “committed 
by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, 
duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such pe rson 
or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion 
was committed against a person incapable of giving genuine consent”.367 Elements 
of Crimes notes that a person may be incapable of giving genuine consent for 
reasons such as “natural, induced, or age-related incapacity”.368 Elements of Crimes 
also notes that the act of rape under crimes against humanity in the Rome Statute is 
intended to be gender-neutral.369 These elements were interpreted in some depth for 
the first time by Trial Chamber II in the Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui cases.370  
163. Sexual slavery. Sexual slavery is listed as a separate prohibited act in  
article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute, rather than as a form of enslavement under 
article 7(1)(c). The International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes defines 
sexual slavery as an act by which the “perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers 
attaching to the right of ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, 
selling, lending or bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them a 
similar deprivation of liberty”.371 Such a deprivation of liberty could include 
“exacting forced labour or otherwise reducing a person to a servile status as defined 
in the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and 
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956”.372 Additionally, the 
perpetrator must have “caused such person or persons to engage in one or more acts 
of a sexual nature”.373 Elements of Crimes also notes that due to the “complex 
nature of this crime, it is recognized that its commission could involve more than 
__________________ 
 364  N. Weiss, “Vergewaltigung und erzwungene Mutterschaft als Verbrechen gegen die 
Menschlichkeit, Kriegsverbrechen und Genozid,” MenschenRechtsMagazin, vol. 6, p. 132 
(2001); A. Adams, Der Tatbestand der Vergewaltigung im Völkerstrafrecht  (Duncker & 
Humblot, 2013). 
 365  G.A. Res. 50/192, U.N. GAOR, 50th sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/192 (Feb. 23, 2004).  
 366  ICC, Elements of Crimes, supra note 92, at 8. 
 367  Ibid. 
 368  Ibid., n.16. 
 369  Ibid., n.15. 
 370  Katanga 2014, paras. 963-72. The Trial Chamber found that during an attack on the village of 
Bogoro in February 2003, Ngiti combatants from militia camps committed rape as war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. The two defendants before the Court, however, were acquitted as 
an accessory to such rape (and to sexual slavery thereafter). Among other things, the Trial 
Chamber found unproven that these particular crimes formed part of the common purpose of the 
attack. 
 371  ICC, Elements of Crimes, supra note 92, at 8. 
 372  Ibid., n.18. 
 373  Ibid., at 8. 
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one perpetrator as a part of a common criminal purpose”.374 These elements were 
also interpreted in some depth for the first time by the Trial Chamber II in the 
Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui cases.375 
164. Enforced prostitution. It has been suggested that the crime of “enforced 
prostitution” was included in the Rome Statute “to capture those situations that lack 
slavery-like conditions”.376 The International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes 
defines enforced prostitution as an act by which 
 the perpetrator caused one or more persons to engage in one or more acts of a 
sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by 
fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of 
power, against such person or persons or another person, or by taking 
advantage of a coercive environment or such person’s or persons’ incapacity to 
give genuine consent.377 
Elements of Crimes also identifies an additional element: that “the perpetrator or 
another person obtained or expected to obtain pecuniary or other advantage in 
exchange for or in connection with the acts of a sexual nature”.378 Enforced 
prostitution was included as an act falling within the scope of crimes against 
humanity in the International Law Commission’s 1996 draft Code of Crimes against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind.379 
165. Forced pregnancy. Article 7(2)(f) of the Rome Statute defines forced 
pregnancy380 as “the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, 
with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out 
other grave violations of international law. This definition shall not in any way be 
interpreted as affecting national laws relating to pregnancy”.381 
166. Enforced sterilization. Following the Second World War, several defendants 
were found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity for medical 
experiments, including sterilization, conducted in concentration camps. 382 Forced 
sterilization can also amount to genocide when committed with the requisite intent 
to destroy a particular group in whole or in part, as a form of “imposing measures 
intended to prevent births within the group” under article 6(d) of the Rome 
Statute.383 The International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes defines enforced 
sterilization as an act by which the “perpetrator deprived one or more persons of 
biological reproductive capacity”.384 Additionally, Elements of Crimes establishes 
that the conduct must not have been “justified by the medical or hospital treatment 
__________________ 
 374  Ibid., n.17. 
 375  Katanga 2014, paras. 975-84. 
 376  C.K. Hall, et al., “Article 7, Crimes against Humanity,” in Commentary on the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, p. 213 (2d ed. 2008). 
 377  ICC, Elements of Crimes, supra note 92, at 9. 
 378  Ibid. 
 379  1996 ILC Report. 
 380  See generally N. Weiss, “Vergewaltigung und erzwungene Mutterschaft als Verbrechen gegen 
die Menschlichkeit, Kriegsverbrechen und Genozid,” MenschenRechtsMagazin, vol. 6, p. 132 
(2001). 
 381  The Elements of Crimes does not elaborate any further on this definition. 
 382  Hall et al., supra note 90, at 213-24, n.255. 
 383  Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 6(d). 
 384  ICC, Elements of Crimes, supra note 92, at 9. 
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of the person or persons concerned nor carried out with their genuine consent”.385 
Elements of Crimes includes a footnote to the first element, stating: “The 
deprivation is not intended to include birth-control measures which have a 
non-permanent effect in practice.”386 
167. Any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity . In the Akayesu case 
at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the defendant was prosecuted for 
sexual violence as crimes against humanity, on the basis that such violence fell 
within the scope of “other inhumane acts”.387 The Trial Chamber in Akayesu, in 
defining “sexual violence” in the context of crimes against humanity, said: 
 The Tribunal considers sexual violence, which includes rape, as any act of a 
sexual nature which is committed on a person under circumstances which are 
coercive. Sexual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the human 
body and may include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical 
contact.388 
The Tribunal found that the act of forcing a woman to undress and perform 
gymnastics in front of a crowd constituted sexual violence amounting to inhumane 
acts.389 The Tribunal also noted that in this context, evidence of physical force is 
not necessary to demonstrate coercive circumstances.390 The 1996 draft Code of 
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind also included “other forms of 
sexual abuse” as a prohibited act in its definition of crimes against humanity. 391 The 
International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes defines this prohibited act as one 
in which the “perpetrator committed an act of a sexual nature against one or more 
persons or caused such person or persons to engage in an act of a sexual nature by 
force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, 
duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person 
or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or 
such person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent”.392 This element 
appears consistent with the Trial Chamber ’s approach in Akayesu and incorporates 
the same broad definition of coercion. Additionally, the conduct must be of 
comparable gravity to the other offences enumerated in article 7, par agraph 1(g), of 
the Rome Statute.393 Elements of Crimes also provides that the perpetrator must 
have been “aware of the factual circumstances that established the gravity of the 
conduct”.394 
__________________ 
 385  Ibid., at 9. 
 386  Ibid., n.19. 
 387  Akayesu 1998, para. 688. 
 388  Ibid. 
 389  Ibid. 
 390  Ibid. (“Threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or 
desperation may constitute coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain circumstances, 
such as armed conflict or the military presence of Interahamwe among refugee Tutsi women 
at the bureau communal.”); see also Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Judgment, Case 
No. SCSL–2004–16–A (Feb. 22, 2008). 
 391  1996 ILC Report, at 50. 
 392  ICC, Elements of Crimes, supra note 92, at 10. 
 393  Ibid. 
 394  Ibid. For a recent statement on the ICC Prosecutor ’s approach to such crimes, see ICC, Office of 
the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes (June 2014). 
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168. Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity . Article 7(1)(h) of 
the Rome Statute identifies as a prohibited act “persecution against any identifiable 
group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender 
as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as 
impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in ” 
paragraph 1 as a whole or in connection with acts of genocide or war crimes.  
Article 7(2)(g) defines persecution as “the intentional and severe deprivation of 
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the 
group or collectivity”. The International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes 
clarifies that the crime of persecution includes targeting individuals because of their 
membership in the group or collectivity, as well as targeting the group or 
collectivity as a whole.395 Persecution may take many forms, with its central 
characteristic being the denial of fundamental human rights that every individual is 
entitled to without distinction.396 The importance of this notion can be seen in 
Article 1(3) of the Charter of the United Nations, which provides for “respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms of all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion”, as well as article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.397 Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute applies to acts of 
persecution that do not have the specific intent necessary to constitute the crime of 
genocide.398 Persecution on political, racial or religious grounds was included as an 
act falling within the scope of crimes against humanity in article 6(c) of the 
Nuremberg Charter; Control Council Law No. 10; the statutes of the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda; and the draft codes of the International Law Commission.399 
169. Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute prohibits persecution against any 
identifiable group or collectivity on several grounds, including gender. The Rome 
Statute was the first international legal instrument to explicitly list gender 
persecution as a crime.400 Article 7(3) defines gender as “the two sexes, male and 
female, within the context of society. The term ‘gender’ does not indicate any 
meaning different from the above”. In United Nations usage, “the word ‘sex’ is used 
to refer to physical and biological characteristics of women and men, while gender 
is used to refer to the explanations for observed differences between women and 
men based on socially assigned roles.”401 The phrase “in the context of society” in 
__________________ 
 395  ICC, Elements of Crimes, supra note 92, at 10 (“1. The perpetrator severely deprived, contrary 
to international law, one or more persons of fundamental rights. 2. The perpetrator targeted such 
person or persons by reason of the identity of a group or collectivity or targeted the group or 
collectivity as such.”) (emphasis added). 
 396  1996 ILC Report, at 49. 
 397  Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI; ICCPR, supra note 355, art. 2 
(“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”). 
 398  1996 ILC Report, at 49. 
 399  Ibid.; see also R. Ana Alija Fernández, La persecución como crimen contra la humanidad 
(2011). 
 400  V. Oosterveld, “The Making of a Gender-Sensitive International Criminal Court,” International 
Law Forum du Droit International, vol. 1, at 38, 40 (1999); see V. Oosterveld, “Gender-Based 
Crimes against Humanity, in L. Sadat (ed.), Forging a Convention for Crimes against Humanity, 
supra note 7, p. 78. 
 401  Implementation Of The Outcome Of The Fourth World Conference On Women, Report of the 
Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/51/322, para. 9 (1996). 
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paragraph 3 then can be interpreted to refer to these socially constructed roles and 
differences assigned to both sexes.402 Hence, the use of “gender” as opposed to 
“sex” in the Statute is more inclusive.403 
170. Enforced disappearance of persons. Article 7(1)(i) of the Rome Statute 
identifies enforced disappearance of persons as a prohibited act. Article 7(2)(i) 
defines enforced disappearance of persons as “the arrest, detention or abduction of 
persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a 
political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of 
freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the 
intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of 
time”. In 1992, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of 
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, stating that “enforced disappearance 
undermines the deepest values of any society committed to respect for the rule of 
law, human rights and fundamental freedoms” and that “the systematic practice of 
such acts is of the nature of a crime against humanity”.404 The definition of 
enforced disappearance of persons in article 7(2)(i) of the Rome Statute uses nearly 
the same language as appears in the 1992 United Nations declaration. 405 
171. Forced disappearance was included as an act falling within the scope of crimes 
against humanity in the 1996 draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind, whose commentary referred to the 1992 United Nations Declaration and 
the Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons for 
definitions of the prohibited act.406 The Commission stated in its commentary that 
forced disappearance was included as an act falling within the scope of crimes 
against humanity “because of its extreme cruelty and gravity”.407 As noted in 
paragraph 86 above, in 2006 the General Assembly adopted the International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. Article 5 
of the Convention provides: “The widespread or systematic practice of enforced 
disappearance constitutes a crime against humanity as defined in applicable 
international law and shall attract the consequences provided for under such 
applicable international law.”408 
__________________ 
 402  Hall et al., supra note 90, at 273. 
 403  Oosterveld, supra note 400, at 40. 
 404  Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance . G.A. Res. 47/133, 
47 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/133, at 207 (Dec. 18, 1992) (emphasis 
added). 
 405  The 1992 U.N. Declaration defines enforced disappearance as situations in which “persons are 
arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty by 
officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by organized groups or private 
individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence 
of the Government, followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons 
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty, which places such 
persons outside the protection of the law.” Ibid. 
 406  1996 ILC Report, at 50. 
 407  Ibid. 
 408  International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 
Dec. 20, 2006, 2716 U.N.T.S. 3; see also Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances, United Nation Human Rights Council, “General Comment on Enforced 
Disappearances as a Crime Against Humanity,” in Report of the Working Group on Enforced 
or Involuntary Disappearances, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/31 (Dec. 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Disappearances/GCas_crime_against_humanity.pdf.  
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172. The International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes does not separately 
address the elements for perpetrators involved in the deprivation of liberty and the 
elements pertaining to perpetrators involved in the refusal or denial; rather, the two 
types of conduct are addressed together. According to the first element, the 
perpetrator must have either “arrested, detained, or abducted one or more persons” 
or “refused to acknowledge the arrest, detention or  abduction, or to give information 
on the fate or whereabouts of such person or persons”.409 Footnotes clarify that the 
term “detained” includes “a perpetrator who maintained an existing detention” and 
that “under certain circumstances an arrest or detention may have been lawful”.410 
The second element requires that the arrest, detention or abduction be followed or 
accompanied by a refusal to acknowledge or to give information, or that the “refusal 
was preceded or accompanied by that deprivation of freedom”.411 The third element 
requires that the perpetrator be aware that either the “arrest, detention or abduction 
would be followed in the ordinary course of events by a refusal” or that the “refusal 
was preceded or accompanied by that deprivation of freedom”.412 The fourth 
element requires that the “arrest, detention or abduction was carried out by, or with 
the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization ”, 
while the fifth element requires that the refusal be with “authorization or support of, 
such State or political organization”.413 The sixth element requires that the 
“perpetrator intended to remove such person or persons from the protection of the 
law for a prolonged period of time”.414 A footnote indicates: “Given the complex 
nature of this crime, it is recognized that its commission will normally involve more 
than one perpetrator as a part of a common criminal purpose.”415 
173. Apartheid. Article 1 of the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression 
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid provides: “The States parties to the 
present Convention declare that apartheid is a crime against humanity.”416 The 1996 
draft code included what the Commission called “the crime of apartheid under a 
more general denomination”417 by referring to institutionalized discrimination on 
racial, ethnic or religious grounds as crimes against humanity.  
174. Article 7(1)(j) of the Rome Statute expressly identifies the crime of apartheid 
as a prohibited act. Article 7(2)(h) defines the crime of apartheid as “inhumane acts 
of a character similar to those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context 
of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial 
group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of 
maintaining that regime”. 
175. Other inhumane acts. Article 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute identifies as 
prohibited acts other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great 
__________________ 
 409  ICC, Elements of Crimes, supra note 92, at 11. 
 410  Ibid., nn. 25-26. 
 411  Ibid., at 11. 
 412  Ibid. 
 413  Ibid. 
 414  Ibid. 
 415  Ibid. 
 416  International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 
Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243. 
 417  Ibid. Specifically, the 1996 Draft Code made “institutionalized discrimination on racial, ethnic 
or religious grounds involving the violation of fundamental rights and freedoms and resulting in 
seriously disadvantaging a part of the population” a crime against humanity. Ibid. 
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suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. In the 
commentary to its 1996 draft code, the Commission explained the inclusion of 
“other inhumane acts” by recognizing that “it was impossible to establish an 
exhaustive list of the inhumane acts which might constitute crimes against 
humanity”.418 The 1996 draft code includes two examples of the types of acts that 
would qualify as “other inhumane acts” as crimes against humanity: mutilation and 
severe bodily harm.419 Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, Control Council Law 
No. 10 and the statutes of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda included “other inhumane acts” in 
their definitions of crimes against humanity.420 
 
 
 F. Draft article 2: Definition of crimes against humanity 
 
 
176. The definition of crimes against humanity as set forth in article 7 of the Rome 
Statute represents a widely-accepted definition of settled international law.421 As 
such, for the present draft articles, it should be used verbatim except for three  
non-substantive changes, which are necessary given the different context in which 
the definition is being used. First, the opening phrase of paragraph 1 should read 
“For the purpose of the present draft articles” rather than “For the purpose of this 
Statute”. Second, the same change is necessary in the opening phrase of paragraph 3.  
Third, article 7(1)(h) Rome Statute criminalizes acts of persecution when 
undertaken “in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court”. Again, to adapt to the different context, this 
phrase should instead read “in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph 
or in connection with acts of genocide or war crimes”.422 
177. Bearing these considerations in mind, the Special Rapporteur proposes the 
following draft article: 
 
   Draft article 2 
   Definition of crimes against humanity 
 
  1. For the purpose of the present draft articles, “crime against 
humanity” means any of the following acts when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack: 
  (a) Murder; 
  (b) Extermination; 
  (c) Enslavement; 
__________________ 
 418  1996 ILC Report, at 50. 
 419  Ibid. 
 420  Ibid. 
 421  See, e.g., Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic Peoples ’ 
Republic of Korea, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/63, para. 21 (2014) (“Matters relating to crimes 
against humanity were assessed on the basis of definitions set out by customary international 
law and in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.”). 
 422  In due course, the crime of aggression may be added to the jurisdiction of the ICC, in which 
case this language may be revisited by the Commission. At a minimum, this issue might be 
flagged in the Commission’s commentary for consideration by States when negotiating and 
adopting a convention on crimes against humanity. 
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  (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;  
  (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in 
violation of fundamental rules of international law;  
  (f) Torture; 
  (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable 
gravity; 
  (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in 
paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible 
under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this 
paragraph or in connection with acts of genocide or war crimes;  
  (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; 
  (j) The crime of apartheid; 
  (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing 
great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.  
  2. For the purpose of paragraph 1: 
  (a) “Attack directed against any civilian population” means a course of 
conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 
against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or 
organizational policy to commit such attack; 
  (b) “Extermination” includes the intentional infliction of conditions of 
life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to 
bring about the destruction of part of a population;  
  (c) “Enslavement” means the exercise of any or all of the powers 
attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of 
such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and 
children;  
  (d) “Deportation or forcible transfer of population” means forced 
displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts 
from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted 
under international law;  
  (e) “Torture” means the intentional infliction of severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under 
the control of the accused, except that torture shall not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions;  
  (f) “Forced pregnancy” means the unlawful confinement of a woman 
forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of 
any population or carrying out other grave violations of in ternational law. This 
definition shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws 
relating to pregnancy;  
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  (g) “Persecution” means the intentional and severe deprivation of 
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of 
the group or collectivity;  
  (h) “The crime of apartheid” means inhumane acts of a character 
similar to those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context of an 
institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial 
group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention 
of maintaining that regime;  
  (i) “Enforced disappearance of persons” means the arrest, detention or 
abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescenc e of, 
a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that 
deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of 
those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the 
law for a prolonged period of time.  
  3. For the purposes of the present draft articles, it is understood that 
the term “gender” refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context 
of society. The term “gender” does not indicate any meaning different from the 
above. 
 
 
 VII. Future programme of work 
 
 
178. A tentative “road map” for the completion of work on this topic is as follows.  
179. A second report, to be submitted in 2016, will likely address the obligation of 
a State party to take any necessary measures to ensure that crimes against humanity 
constitute an offence under national law; the obligation to take any necessary 
measures to establish the State party’s competence to exercise jurisdiction over the 
offence; the obligation of each State party to take an alleged offender in any 
territory under its jurisdiction into custody and carry out an investigation of the 
alleged offence; the obligation to submit the case to its competent authorities for the 
purpose of prosecution, unless the person is extradited to another State or 
surrendered to an international court or tribunal; and the entitlement of the alleged 
offender to fair treatment, including a fair trial.  
180. The subsequent programme of work on the topic will be for the members of 
the Commission elected for the quinquennium 2017-2021 to determine. A possible 
timetable would be for a third report to be submitted in 2017, which could address a 
State Party’s obligation to investigate an alleged offence in circumstances where the 
alleged offender is not present; rights and obligations applicable to the extradition 
of the alleged offender; and rights and obligations applicable to mutual legal 
assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of an alleged 
offence of crimes against humanity. 
181. A fourth report, to be submitted in 2018, could address all further matters, 
such as dispute settlement, as well as a preamble and concluding articles to the 
convention.  
182. If such a timetable is maintained, it is anticipated that a first reading of  the 
entire set of draft articles could be completed by 2018 and a second reading could 
be completed by 2020.  
 
A/CN.4/680 
 
87/88 15-02139 
 
Annex 
 
  Proposed draft articles 
 
 
  Draft article 1 
  Prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity 
 
 1. Each State Party confirms that crimes against humanity, whether 
committed in time of peace or in time of war, are crimes under international law 
which it undertakes to prevent and punish. 
 2. Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial 
or other measures to prevent crimes against humanity in any territory under its 
jurisdiction. 
 3. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a 
threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be 
invoked as a justification of crimes against humanity. 
 
  Draft article 2 
  Definition of crimes against humanity 
 
 1. For the purpose of the present draft articles, “crime against humanity” 
means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the 
attack: 
 a. Murder; 
 b. Extermination; 
 c. Enslavement; 
 d. Deportation or forcible transfer of population;  
 e. Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation 
of fundamental rules of international law; 
 f. Torture; 
 g. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;  
 h. Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, 
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other 
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in 
connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or in connection with acts of 
genocide or war crimes; 
 i. Enforced disappearance of persons; 
 j. The crime of apartheid; 
 k. Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical  health. 
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 2. For the purpose of paragraph 1: 
 a. “Attack directed against any civilian population” means a course of 
conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against 
any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational 
policy to commit such attack; 
 b. “Extermination” includes the intentional infliction of conditions of life, 
inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about 
the destruction of part of a population; 
 c. “Enslavement” means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching 
to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in 
the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children;  
 d. “Deportation or forcible transfer of population” means forced 
displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the 
area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under 
international law; 
 e. “Torture” means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the 
accused, except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, 
inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions; 
 f. “Forced pregnancy” means the unlawful confinement of a woman 
forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any 
population or carrying out other grave violations of international law. This 
definition shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws relating to 
pregnancy; 
 g. “Persecution” means the intentional and severe deprivation of 
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the 
group or collectivity; 
 h. “The crime of apartheid” means inhumane acts of a character similar to 
those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context of an institutionalized 
regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other 
racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime;  
 i. “Enforced disappearance of persons” means the arrest, detention or 
abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a 
State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that 
deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those 
persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a 
prolonged period of time. 
 3. For the purposes of the present draft articles, it is understood that the 
term “gender” refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of 
society. The term “gender” does not indicate any meaning different from the above.  
 
